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I Section  I 
THE  STOA  PROJECT 
The  STOA  Project (Scientific and  Technological  Options 
Assess•ent)  is the Technology  Assess•ent  unit of the 
European  Parlia•ent.  Set up  in 1997,  its function is to 
provide  background  infor•ation to the European  Parlia•ent on 
the scientific and  technological  aspects of political  issues 
and  to facilitate access to  t~chnical  expertise outside the 
European  Com•unity  institutions. 
STOA  is run  by  a Supervisory Panel  of "e•bers of the 
European  Parlia•ent assisted by  a ProJect  Team  of officials 
from  the  S~cretariat-General of the Parlia•ent.  It maintains 
a Network  of contacts with outside experts  and  publishes  a 
Newsletter.  Requests  for further  information  are welco•e  and 
should  be  sent to:  The  STOA  Project,  European  Parlia•ent, 
Room  II-5/58,  Luxe•boura  L-2929  CTelephone  Luxembourg 
43BB-2.511). Section II 
European Parli8Milt Raolutian Oil the FUsion Protr  1 
adopted in ltrubourcJ on 'rharllciQ,  11  Jlarch 1918 
This resolution represents ~  opinion of the European Parli.-.nt.  At 
the tiM of the compilation of the present cloaamt the Council luld not 
yet taken a  decision on  the Fusion ~-· 
The  first part of fiJhat  folloen~ ia the aeries of .aendalenta propoHCI bv 
the Parli..ant to the original text put forward ~  the eoa.iaaion.  '1'he 
second part is a  formal  Legialative leaolution.  the debate and 
resolution •re bum on  a  report by Kr Alllllll  Ketten,  IIEP  clcw.1n  up for 
the European Parliament's Coaaittee on Energy,  Research and Tec:bnology. 
the lletten report ia printed in the present doc\Dent after the 
Resolution of 11  Karch  1988. ' 
l 
10.  Controlled ther.onuclear fusion - JET 
Proposal  for  a  regulation COHC87)  320  final 
council  regulation adopting a  research and  training progra ... 
(1987-1991)  in the field of controlled ther.onuclear fusion 
TEXt  PROPOSED  BY  THE  COMMISSION 
~F fHE  EUROPEIN  COMMUNI1IES 
TEXT  Aft£NOEO  8Y  fHE 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Prea•ble unchanged 
Fjrst tvo recit•ls unchanged 
Whereas  thenaonuclear fusion fa  a 
potential new  source of energy using 
fuel  which  is virtually inexhaustible 
and  universally accessible; whereas 
magnetic  fusion  reactors will have 
inher.ent  safety f•a·tures  and  hold the 
proaise of a  low  i~act on  the 
enivron•ent;  ther.onuclear fusion 
fonas  therefore an  1~ortant objective 
within the fraaework  p~ogra~ae; 
Whereas  ther.onuclear fusion is a 
potential new  source of energy  using 
fuel which  is virtually inexhaustible 
and  universally  acces•~ibiiULiolic.._: -~~­
!'hereas nuclear fusfonij potent1allr 
a  safe and  enyiroQ!entally bcnfgn 
energy source·in a  number  pf respects; 
whereas  on'  of the prinefpal 
.obfectiyes pf the ·tra•evork PCPAC•IIe 
is therefore to achfeye  controlled 
theraonuclear fusion and  realize tbfs 
.Potential  in the process; 
fourth to seventh  recitals unchanged 
Wherea·s  the strategy on  which  the 
continuation of the  program.e  is based 
should  re•ain unchanged,  namely: 
.. 
Whereas  the strategy on  which  the 
continuation of the  program.e  is based 
should  re•ain largely unchanged, 
namely: 
3  indents unchanged 
PV  3  II 
Whereas  this strategy •ust be  modified 
to ensure that a  centraL  pbfectiue 
will be  to secure  the environmental 
and  safetr-related advantages of 
fusion  over other sources  of  energy; 
- 39  - PE  120.964  . " .. 
TEXT  PROPOSED  BY  T~E COMMISSION 
OF  T~E EUROPEPN  COMMUNlllES 
TEXT  Ar1ENOED  BY  THE 
EUROPE-N  PARLJAM~NT  -------·--.-.... __, 
.  Ninth  recital unchanged 
·: :.:  .  ... 
Tenth  to fourteenth  recitals  unchan~~d 
Article 1 unchanged 
'  ~.  ·. 
The  funds  esti•ated •• being necessary 
for the execution of the progra••• 
exclusive of JET  a.aunt to 533  R1o 
ECU,  including expenditure on  a  work 
force of 105  staff. The  funds 
esti•ated as  being  necessary  for JET 
during  the duration of the prograaae 
amount  to 378  Mio  tcu,  including 
expenditure on  1  work  force of 191 
te•porary e•ployees  within  the aeaning 
of Article 2(a) of the conditions of 
employaent  of other servints of the 
European  Comeunities. 
.  ··. 
·~  '' 
. ' ..  ' . 
PV·  J ll 
.. 
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•  ••  4  ... 
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·:.  t 
. 
' 
.  ; 
1.  The  funds  ost1•ated ., being 
necessary  ~or the execution of the. 
progra ..  e  exclusive of  JET  amount 
to 5!3  Nio  ECU,  including 
expenditure on  a work  force  of 105 
staff. 
2.  The  funds  estimated  as  being 
necessary  for  JET during  the 
duration of  the  prograaee aaount 
to 378  M1o  ECU  including 
expenditure  on  a  ••orkforce  of 191  .' .  .'. 
te•porary e•ployees  within the  .;· 
•eaning of  Art i c lo  2 (a)  of the  ;.l'i·  .. 
conditions of  employment  of other  , 
servants  of  the  European  :  -~ 
Comt~un  i t 1  e  s •  · 
1 
(' 
j'. 
3.  The  final  &l!!our.t  of  a~lropriations  ..  ~:. 
and  the nuiitb•r  of sta  snall be  ~~·· 
deter.ined on  ~he ~asis of  ~~ 
- 40  -
decisions  t~ken annually by  tne  ;.~ 
§.udgt:tar>:  :author{ tt in accordtmc.!  .:~ 
with  real needs.  ~ 
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·~ TEXT  PROPOSED  BY  THE  COMMISSION 
OF  THE  EUROPEIN  COMMUNiliES 
During  the course of its third year, 
the <o•aiss1on shall procetd to the 
evalu1tfon of  the progra••• having 
regard  to 1ts objectives set out  fn 
the Annex.  Following  thia evaluation, 
the Coaaission shall sub•it to the 
Council  in 1989  a  revision proposal 
designed  to  replace the present 
progra ..  e  with  a  five-year progra ..  e 
with  effect fro• 1  January  1990. 
TEXT  AMENDED  BY  THE 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
The  Coaa1asion  shall arraoa• for an 
independent  evaluet1on of the 
progre ..  e1  hevt;e re!erd to it• 
objectives set  t  1  the  AnneX.  •ad 
for an  appraisal to be condUCted  of 
the potential environMental,  safety: 
related and  economic  attrtctfveness of 
fusidn.  On  the basis of this 
evaluation end  appraisal, of which  the 
resort will be  forwtrded  to Parliaaent 
an  Council,  the Co••iss1on shall 
sub.it to Parliatent 'nd  Cguneil  • 
revision proposal designed to replace 
the present proqra••e with  a  five-year 
progra••• with  effect fro• 1 JanuarY 
.12.20· 
Articles 4 and  5 unchanged 
~ri~~!  ~titi§! 
~ONTROLLED THERMONUCL€AR  FUSION  CONTROLLED  THERMONUClEAR  fUSION 
1.  The  programme  to be  executed will  1.  The  programme  to be  executed will 
cover  :  cover  : 
Indents  (a)  to  (g)  unchanged 
The  work  ref~~~ed to in (a),  (b),  (c), 
(d),  (e)  and  (f)  will ·be  carried out 
by  means  of associations or li•ited 
duration  contra~ts which  are designed 
to yield the results necessary for  the 
imple•entat1on of the program•e  and 
which  take  into consideration the work 
carried out  by  the Joint Research 
Centre,  in particular in relation to 
NET  and  technology  referred to  in (f). 
Cga)  a  fusion  feas~bi  l ity stt.dt cCNe~"irg enrinnnental 
· · · i!pact",  safety and ecannic vici;ilitY. 
The  work  referred to in (a),  (b),  (c), 
(d),  (e),  (f)  !D~-~9!! will be  cerried 
out  by  means  of associations or li•ited  · 
duration contracts which  are designed 
to  yi~ld the  results necessary  for  the  . 
implementation of  the programme  and 
whi~h take  into consideration the.work 
carried out  by  the Joint Research: 
Centre,  in particular in relation to NET 
and  technology  referred to in (f), 
and  also to the matters  referred to in 
~9!i:---------------------------------
Last  subparagraph  unchanged 
Point  2  unchanged 
6 
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'. TEXT  PROPOSED  BY  THE  COMMISSION 
Of  THE  EUROPEIN  COMMUNillES 
3.  The  a.ount of 533  •  ECU  estiaated 
as  being  necessary  for  the 
execution of the prograaae 
exclusive of JET  is intended  to 
finance: 
TEXT  AMEN~ED OY  THE 
f"UR.\)PEAN  t'4ii  1-AMOO  ---- ........ _. __ ..  ,. ... 
f  ... 
3.  The  aiiOUnt  of '533  •  ECU  estiuced  .-· .. 
as being  necessary  for the execution 
of  the progra ..  e  exclusive of  JET,~~· 
is intended  to finance  :  l'!J,;' 
Indents  (a)  to (e)  unchanged 
PV  3  II 
I 
(ea) an  independent  eyoluation ot  the . 
---proqr•••e and  an  aeera1sal of the 
potential env1ron•enttl, 
safety-related tnd econo.ic 
attractiveness of fusion. 
(eb) After consult1na  the Consulttt1Yt 
--- Co••ittee for the Fusion  · 
Progra ..  e, shared cost contract• 
w1th  qroyps  fn  Meiber  States that 
do  not possess an  Association. to 
cover  cpecific  iteMs  of research 
at a  rate of about  251  for runnina 
expenditure  and  of tbout  451  for 
:capital expenditure specific to 
the  research. 
Last  subparagraph  unchanged 
Points 4 and  5 unchanged 
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4 • Dot.  A2-320/87 
LEGISLATIVE  RESOLUTION 
e•bodying  the opinion of the European  Parlia•ent on  the 
proposal  fro• the Coa•ission of  the European  Co•.unities to the  C~cil tor a 
Regulation  adopting  a  research and  training progra ..  e  (1987-1991)  in the field 
of controlled thermonuclear  fusion 
The  European  Parlia•ent, 
- having  regard to the  proposaL  fro• the  Coaaission  to the Counc1L(1), 
-having been  consulted by  the  Council  pursuant to Article 7 of the  EAEC 
treaty  (Doc.  C 2-146/87),  · 
- considering  the proposed  legal basis to be  appropriate, 
- having  regard to the report of the co ..  ittee on  Energy,  Research  and 
Technology  and  the  opinions of the Co••ittee on  Budgets,  Coaatttee on  Legal 
Affairs and  Citizens•  Rights  and  the (o  ..  ittee on  t~e Environaent,  Public 
Health  and  Consuaer  Protection (Doc.  A 2-320/87),  · 
- having  regard  to the  Coaaission•s  position on  the  aaendaents  adopted  by 
Parliament, 
1.  Approves  the Commission's  proposal  subject to Parliaaent•s a.endaents and 
in accordance  with  the vote thereon; 
2.  Calls  on  the Com•ission  to notify Parlia•ent should  it intend to depart 
froa  the  text approved  by  Parliament; 
3.  Reserves  the  right to open  the conciliation procedure  should  the<ouncil 
intend to depart  fro• the text approved  by  Parliament; 
4.  Asks  to be  consulted again  should  the Council  intend to aake  substantial 
modifications to the  Coaaission's proposal; 
S.  Instructs its President  to  forward  thi~ opinion  to the Council  and  the 
Co•aission. 
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r:-~  ~-:  Pa·~a-•a•• UM""I """""'•.-J.-'H ,,.,. t~ft  -::t  t,.,.  10\61~"1  ~· ·~  ':.JI'""' ~~~  'l  Pa••l-
t  '  ..._, ~~i  tetter of 18  September  1987,  the President of  the  Council  of the European 
:~~munities requested  the  European  Parliament  to  deliver an  opinion on  the 
proposal  from  the  Com•ission of the European  Co••unities for  1  Council 
regulation adopting  a  research and  training program•e  (1987  - 1991)  in the 
field of controlled thermonuclear  fusion. 
On  October  1987,  the President of  the  European  Parlia•ent  referred this 
~roposcl to the  Committee  on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  as the co••ittet 
~espor.sible and  to the  Co••ittee on  Budgets,  and  the Co••ittee on  the 
Environ•ent,  Public Health and  Consu.er  Protection for an opinion. 
The  Council  of  the European  Communities  announced  that it would  request  a 
a~oate by  urgent  procedure on  the proposal pursuant to Rule  75  of the Rules  of 
Protedure. 
-:-:-:-:- Co;:!mittet- cor.sidere~ the Commission  proposal  and  the draft  report  at its 
r  ..  ~{;th;;s of '2 and  23  September  1987,  25  and  26  Nove•ber  1987,  25  and 
26  January  1988.  During  the  latter meeting,  tne Com•ittee decided unani•ously 
to  rec~mmend to Parlia.ent that it approve  the  Commission  proposal, subject to 
the  following  a11end11ents. 
T:~e  l.c>mmi  ~  ~et- U1en  a.d~pted ttre  draft  legislative  resolution with  6  votes  in 
yavo:..i  cr:c'  5  2~4in~t, w·ith  no  abste,,tions. 
·;  :e  ioll,.;,..,dnf;  to=i-.:  pa:-t  ir.  thP  vot-e  tir  P;;.miatowski,  Chairman;  Mr  Ada•  and 
;.,,.  ~·:.-:l•)k.o·~.ror.~:·  ....  ''1:.:.·'-Chairmen,  Mr  Mett~n, rapporteur;  Mrs  Bloch  von  Blottnitz 
~deputizing for  ~r Harlin>,  ~r  O'Oon~ell  (deputizing  for Mr  Rinsche>, 
Mrs  P~us, Mr  kob-les  ?iquer,  Mr  Seli  gn:.,ar..,  Mr  ";mi th,  Mr  Staes and  Mr  Viehoff. 
7h~  ~ep~rt  wa~ tabLtd  un  29  Febru~ry  1~~~-
~;lc  tJecdlln(!  ")r  ~  .  .;;~Li:i~  allamd.:\...:t~  ~c t:.L;  :-cport  will  appear  on  the draft 
:~~~nc!a  fer·  f.:)·'  p~rt· -'>e~sion  at  "'hic;h  H:  is tc  be  considered. 
to 
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By  letter of 18  Septeaber 1987,  the  President of  the  Council  of the European 
Comaunities  requested  the  European  Parliaaent  to  deliver an  opinion on  the 
proposal  fro• the  Co••ission of the European  co ..  unities for a  Council 
regulation adopting  a  research  and  training prograaae  (1987  - 1991)  in the 
field of controlled theraonuclear fusion. 
On  October  1987,  the President of  the  European  Parliaaent  referred this 
propoaal  to the  Coaaittee on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  as the  c~1ttee 
responsible and  to the  Coaaittee on  Budgets,  and  the co ..  ittee on  the 
Environaent,  Public Health  and  Consuaer  Protection for an opinion. 
The  Council  of the European  Coaaunities  announced  that it would  request  a 
debate  by  urgent  procedure on  the proposal pursuant to Rule  75  of the Rules  of 
Pro~edure. 
The  Coaaittee considered  the co ..  ission propoaal  and  the draft  report at its 
meetings  of 22  and  23  Septeaber 1987,  25  and  26  Nove•ber  1987,  25  and 
26  January  1988.  During  the  latter aeeting, the  Coaaittee decided  unaniaously 
to reco ..  end  to Parlia  ..  nt that it approve  the  eo ..  ission proposal, subject to 
the  following  amend•ents. 
The  Committee  tben  ~opted the draft  legislative resolution with  6  votes  in 
favour  and  5 against, with  no  abstentions. 
The  following  took  part  in the vote  Mr  Poniatowski,  Chairaan;  Mr  Ada•  and 
Mr  Kolokotronis,  Vice-Chairmen,  Mr  Metten,  rapporteur;  Mrs  Bloch  von  Blottnitz 
(deputizing  for Mr  Harlin),  Mr  O'Donnell  (deputizing  for Mr  Rinsche), 
Mrs  Peus,  Mr  Robtes  Piquer,  Mr  Selign•an,  Mr  Saith,  Mr  Staes and  Mr  Viehoff. 
The  report  was  tabled on  29  February  1988. 
The  deadline  for tabling a•end•ents to this report will appear on  the draft 
agenda  for  the part-session at  which  it is to be  considered. 
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II Text  proposed  by  the  co ..  ission 
of  the  European  Com•unities 
Amend•ents  tabled by  the to  ..  ittee 
on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology 
The  Committee  on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  hereby  sub•its to the 
European  Parliament  the following  a•end•ents to the  Co••ission's proposal  and 
draft  legislative resolution together with  explanatory state.ent: 
Proposal  for  a  Council  regulation adopting  a  research  and  training progra*lf 
(1987-1991>  in the field of controlled ther•onuclear fusion 
Text  proposed  by  the Co•mission 
of  the  European  co ..  unities 
A•endments  tabled by  the Co••ittee 
on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology 
Citations unchanged 
First two  recitals unchanged 
Third  recital 
Whereas  ther•onuclear fusion is a 
potential  new  source  of energy  using 
fuel  which  is virtually inexhaustible 
and  universally accessible; whereas 
magnetic  fusion  reactors will have 
inherent  safety features  and  hold  the 
promise  of a  low  impact  on  the 
enivronment;  thermonuclear fusion 
forms  therefore an  important objective 
within  the  framework  progra•me; 
Amendment  No.  1 
Replace  the second  and  third clauses 
of this recital by  the following: 
wher~as nuclear fusion is potentially 
a  safe and  environaentally benign 
energy  source in a  nu•ber of respects; 
whereas  one  of the principal 
objectives of the  framework  progra ..  e 
is therefore to achieve controlled 
thermonuclear fusion and  realize this 
potential  in the process; 
Fourth  to seventh  recitals unchanged 
Eighth  recital 
Whereas  the strategy on  which  the 
continuation of the  programme  is based 
should  remain  unchanged,  namely:  ••• 
ENC88)0156/0157E  - 5  -
I 
Amendment  No.  2 
The  introductory phrase to read  as 
follows: 
Whereas  the strategy on  which  the 
continuation of the programme  is based 
should  remain  largely unchanged, 
namely:  •••• 
Amendment  No.  3 
After the eighth  recital,  insert  a  NEW 
recital: 
Whereas  this  strategy must  be  modified 
to ensure  that a  central objective 
will  be  to secure  the environmental 
and  safety-related advantages  of 
fusion  over  other sources  of energy; 
PE  116.137/fin. 
I~ Text  proposed  by  the Co••ission 
of- the  European  Com•unities 
Amend•ents  tabled by  the co ..  ittee' 
on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology' 
Ninth  recital unchanged 
Amendment  No.  4 
After the ninth  recita~, insert a  NEW 
recital: 
Whereas  the  next  review  of the 
progra ..  e •ust be  preceded by  an 
independent  evaluation of those 
COMPOnents  of the progra ..  e  already 
being  iaple  ..  nted and  an  appraisal of 
the potential environ ..  ntal, safety-
related and  econoaic  attractiveness of 
fusion; 
Tenth  to fourteenth  recitals unchanged 
Article 1 unchanged 
Article 2 
The  funds  estimated as being  necessary 
for the execution of  the progra••e 
exclusive of J£T  amount  to 533  Mio 
ECU,  including  expenditure on  a  work 
force of 105  staff.  The  funds 
estimated as  being  necessary  for JET 
during  the duration of  the progra•me 
amount  to 378  Mio  ECU,  including 
expenditure on  a  work  force of 191 
temporary  employees  within the •eaning 
of Article 2(a)  of the conditions of 
employment  of  other  servants of  the 
European  Communities. 
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Aaend•ent  No.  5 
1.  The  funds  esti•ated as being 
necessary  for the execution of  the 
progra ..  e  exclusive of  JET  a.aunt 
to 533  Mio  ctU,  including  -
expenditure on  a  work  force of 105 
staff. 
2.  The  funds  estimated as  being 
necessary  for  JET  during  the 
duration of  the  progra••e a•ount 
to 378  Mio  £CU  including 
expenditure on  a  workforce  of 191 
temporary  employees  within the 
meaning  of Article 2(a)  of the 
conditions of employment  of other 
servants of  the  European 
Communities. 
3.  The  final  amount  of  a~~rohriations 
and  the number  of sta  s  all be 
determined  on  the basis of 
decisions  taken annually by  the 
budgetary  authority in accordance 
with  real needs. 
- ll 
PE  116.137/fin. Text  proposed  by  the  Co••ission 
of the European  Co ..  unities 
Article 3 
During  the course of its third year, 
the Co••ission shall proceed  to the 
evaluation of the progra ..  e  having 
regard  to its objectives set out  in 
the Annex.  Following  this evaluation, 
the Co••ission shall sub•it to the 
Council  in 1989  a  revision proposal 
designed  to  replace  the present 
progra••e with  a  five-year progra ..  e 
with  effect fro• 1  January  1990. 
AaendMents  tabled by  the Co••ittee 
on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology 
Replace  Article 3  by  the  following: 
The  co ..  tssion shall arrange for an 
independent  evaluation of the 
progra ..  e, having  regard to its 
objectives set out  in the Annex,  and 
for an  appraisal to be  conducted of 
the potential environ.ental, safety-
related and  econa.ic attractiveness of 
fusion.  On  the basis of this 
evaluation and  appraisal, of which  the 
resort will be  forwarded  to Parlia•ent 
an  Council,  the  Co••ission shall 
subMit  to Parliament  and  Council  a 
revision proposal designed to replace 
the present progra••e with  a  five-year 
progra ..  e  with  effect fro• 1  January 
1990. 
Articles  4  and  5 unchanged 
ANNEX  .............. 
CONTROLLED  THERMONUCLEAR  FUSION 
Paragraph  1 
1.  The  programme  to be  executed will 
cover: 
<a>  plasma  physics  in the  sector 
concerned,  in particular studies 
of  a  basic character  relating to 
confinement  with  suitable devices 
and  to methods  for producing  and 
heating  plasma; 
(b)  research  into the  confinement,  in 
closed configurations, of 
hydrogen,  deuterium  and  tritium 
plasmas  of widely  varying density 
and  temperature; 
(c)  research  into  light-matter 
interactions  and  transport 
phenomena  and  the development  of 
high-power  lasers; 
(d)  the  development  and  application to 
confinement  devices  of 
sufficiently powerful  plasma 
he•ting  methods; 
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Add  a  new  paragraph 1Ch). 
Paragraphs  1Ca)  to  (g)  unchanged 
PE  116.137/fin. 
I~ Text  proposed  by  the  Co•aission 
of  the  European  Co•munities 
<e>  improvement  of diagnostic methods; 
(f)  predesign  and  possibly 
coMmence•ent  of the detailed 
engineering design  of  NET  <Next 
European  Torus>  and  technological 
developments  required  for  its 
design and  construction as well  as 
those  needed  in the  longer ter• 
for the fusion  reactor; 
Cg)  extension of the JET  device  to 
full perfor•ance; operation and 
exploitation of  JET. 
The  work  referred to in  Ca>,  Cb>,  (c), 
(d),  (e)  and  (f)  will be  carried out 
by  means  of associations or  limited 
duration  contracts which  are designed 
to yield the  results necessary for  the 
implementation  of  the  programme  and 
which  take  into ·consideration the work 
carried out  by  the Joint  Research 
Centre,  in particular in relation to 
NET  and  technology  referred to  in  (f). 
The  implementation of the  JET  project 
referred  to  in  (g)  has  been  entrusted 
to the  'Joint European  Torus  (JET), 
Joint  Undertaking',  established by 
Decision  78/471/EURATOM(1). 
~end•ents tabled by  the Co••ittee 
on  Energy,  Research  and  TechnologY 
(h)  a  fusion  feasibility study 
covering environmental  i•pact, 
safety and  econo•ic viability. 
The  introductory phrase of this 
paragraph  to read  as  follows: 
The  work  referred to in <a>,  (b),  (c), 
(d),  (e),  (f)  and  (h)  will be  carried 
out  •••  (rest unchanged,  but with  the 
addition of  the  following  phrase at 
the end  of the subparagraph:) 
•••  referred to in (f), and  also to 
the matters  referred to in  Ch). 
Unchanged 
l 
·~ 
Paragraph  2  unchanged 
'J. 
I~ $ 
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of  the  European  Co••unities 
Aaend ..  nts tabled by  the co ..  ittee 
on  Enerpr,  Research  and  Technology 
Paraqraph  3 
3.  The  a•ount  of 533  •  ECU  esti•ated 
as  being  necessary  for the 
execution of the progra ..  e 
exclusive of JET  is intended  to 
finance: 
(a)  priority projects at a  unifor. 
rate of approxiaately 451,  as 
specified  in paragraph  4; 
(b)  running  expenditure of the 
associations at a  unifona  rate of 
approximately  25%; 
(c)  certain  industrial contracts  in 
the fields of  'NET/fusion 
technology•  and  the develop•ent  of 
advanced  plas•a heating aethods at 
a  rate of 1QOX,  as  defined  in 
paragraph  4; 
<d>  administration costs and 
expenditure  intended to ensure the 
mobility of staff to enable  the• 
to work  in organizations 
cooperating  in the  i•ple•entation 
of the programme  and  in the NET 
Team; 
(e)  operational  costs of  the  NET  Team 
at a  rate of approximately  75%; 
EN(88)0156/0157E  - 9  -
Add  new  subparagraphs 3(f) and  3(g). 
Paragraphs 3(a) to (e)  unchanged. 
(f)  an  independent  evaluation of the 
programme  and  an  appraisal of the 
potential environmental, 
safety-related and  economic 
attractiveness of  fusion. 
(g)  After consulting the Consultative 
Coa•ittee for the Fusion 
Progra ..  e, shared cost contracts 
with  groups  in Me•ber  States that 
do  not  possess an  Association,  to 
COVer  specific  iteMS  of  research 
at a  rate of about  25%  for  running 
expenditure  and  of about  45%  for 
capital expenditure specific to 
the  research. 
I~ 
PE  116.137/fin. Text  proposed  by  the Commission 
of  the  European  Communities 
Any  positive balance  fro• the 
contributions  of associated third 
countries  (Sweden  and  Switzerland) 
under  the programme  exclusive of JET, 
shall  be  devoted  to the financial 
participation by  the  Com•unity  in the 
expenditure  referred  to  in paragraph 3. 
AMendments  tabled by  the CoMMittee 
on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology 
Unchanged 
Rest  unchanged 
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l DRAFT  LEGISLATIVE  RESOLUTION 
embodying  the opinion of  the European  Parlia-.nt in first  reading on  the· 
proposal  fro•  the Com•ission  of  the European  Co•.unities to the Council  for  a 
Regulation  adopting  a  research and  training progra ..  e  (1987-1991)  in the field 
of  controlled thermonuclear  fusion 
The  European  Parlia•ent, 
- having  regard  to the proposal  fro•  the Co••ission to the Councfl(1), 
-having been  consulted by  the  Council  pursuant  to Article 7 of the  EAEC 
Treaty  <Doc.  C 2-146/87), 
- considering  the proposed  legal basis  to be  appropriate, 
- having  regard to the report of the  co ..  ittee on  Energy,  Research  and 
Technology  and  the opinions  of the Co••ittee on  Budgets,  Co••fttee on  Legal 
Affairs and  Citizens'  Rights  and  the  Co••ittee on  the  Environ•ent,  Public 
Health  and  Consu•er  Protection  (Doc.  A 2-320/87>, 
- having  regard  to the  Com•ission's  position on  the a•endaents adopted  by 
Parliament, 
1.  Approves  the Commission's  proposal  subject  to Parlia•ent's aaend•ents  and 
in accordance  with  the  vote  thereon; 
2.  Calls on  the Commission  to notify Parliament  should it intend to depart 
fro• the text approved  by  Parliament; 
3.  Reserves  the  right  to open  the conciliation procedure  should  the Council 
intend to depart  from  the text approved  by  Parlia•ent; 
4.  Asks  to be  consulted again  should  the Council  intend  to •ake  substantial 
modifications  to the  Commission's  proposal; 
5.  Instructs  its President  to forward  this opinion  to the  Council  and  the 
Commission. 
(1)  OJ  C 247,  15.9 87,  p.2 
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EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
Controlled nuclear fusion 
1.  Matter  - in either solid,  liquid or gaseous  state- consists of very  s•all 
particles called atoms.  Protons  and  neutrons  for• the nucleus of these  at~s, 
with  electrons  in orbit around  the•.  Nuclear  fusion is a  process  whereby 
light hydrogen  nuclei  are fused to for• a  heavier heliu• nucleus.  Energy  is 
released during  this process:--
2.  Nuclear  fusion  occurs  between  the  nuclei  of  the  hydrogen  isotopes 
deuterium  and  tritium.  Deuteriu• is obtained  from  water,  in particular sea 
water,  from  which  it is  recovered  using  filter and  centrifuge techniques. 
Tritium can  be  obtained  fro• the  reaction between  neutrons  and  lithiu•. 
Lithium  is  found  in a  variety of •inerals and  •ineral waters.  These  fuels,  or 
base  materials,  for the nuclear fusion process are  readily available and 
virtually inexhaustible. 
3.  Nuclear  fusion  for the purpose  of generating  energy  is known  as  controlled 
nuclear  fusion.  There  is also a  for• of non-controlled nuclear fusion:  the 
hydrogen  bomb,  or H-bomb.  This  type  of  fusion  is possible because  of a 
preceding nuclear-fission reaction and  is practicable if the sole purpose of 
the  fusion  reaction is an  explosion. 
4.  The  process  of  controlled nuclear fusion  takes  place  in a  special fusion 
reactor.  The  fusion  of deuteriu• and  tritium produces  heliu• gas  and  a 
neutron  and  releases  energy.  The  helium  gas,  which  is neither toxic nor 
radioactive,  is removed.  The  release of neutrons  is used  to produce  a 
reaction with  the  lithium present  in the  reactor blanket,  and  this produces 
tritium.  Tritium is used  in the fusion  process.  The  neutrons  also carry the 
energy  which  is  released;  they  transfer it to the blanket  around  the  reactor. 
Steam  turbines use  this heat  to generate electricity. 
5.  The  main  fusion  reactor studied in the £uropean  Community  is the Tokamak 
desig~ which  is Russian  in origin.  Tokamak  stands  for  toroidal magnetic 
chamber.  The  Tokamak  r~actor has  produced  the best  results so  far and  it is 
the  most  promising.  However,  for  the  sake  of clarity, it should  be  pointed 
out  that  e~periments are  being  carried out  in the  Community  on  other designs: 
the  Reversed  Field Pinch  reactor and  the  Stellarator.  The  advantages  of  the 
Reversed  Field Pinch  reactor are  lower  energy  and  material  requirements  and 
easier  replacement  and  maint~nance because  it is a  smaller  reactor of simpler 
design  with  better facilities  for  spontaneous  ignition of  the plasma.  The 
Stellarator is also smaller,  with  the  same  advantages,  and  is more 
energy-economical;  it also affords other,  specific advantages,  the  most 
significant being  that it operates in a  natural  steady-state environment 
rather than  on  the  basis of  energy  pulses,  in  respect  of  which  mechanical  and 
materials-related  requirements  are considerable. 
19 
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6.  In  the  Tokamak  fusion  reactor the aim  is to create the conditions for a 
nuclear-fusion process.  These  conditions  are: 
(a)  An  extremely  high  te!perature  (circa 100  000  QOOOC)  to!!!! the fuels to 
such  a  level  that  the electrons  and  the nuclei  are separated and  collide with 
each  other at high  speed.  Without  this heat, and  hence  thi$ speed  <several 
thousand  kilometres  per second),  the  nuclei  would  repel  each  other and  fusion 
would  not  take place.  However,  nuclear fusion occurs only once  in every. 
10  000  collisions.  The  110ving  •ass of  nuclei  and  elec.trons  is known  as  a 
plasma. 
(b)  The  heating  process •ust be  maintained  for  a  relatively  long  period and  be 
capable of being  applied regularly. 
(c)  The  plas•a •ust be  sufficiently dense  to enable the fusion process to take 
place and  must  be  kept  away  fro• the~tor  wall  by  magnetic  confine.ent to 
prevent  te•pe~ature loss. 
7.  Experiments  are being  carried out  on  various  for•s of heating: 
(a)  Ohmic  Heating,  -whereby the plasma  is heated by  electricity.  The 
temperature  reached  is not  high  enough,  however. 
(b)  Neutral  Beam  Injection, whereby  neutral  hydrogen  atoms  are injected to 
heat  the plasma.  However,  this is a  low-yield method. 
(c)  'High-Power  Radio  Frequency  Heating•, whereby  electromagnetic energy is 
injected into and  absorbed  by  the  ~lasma.  This  is an  encreasingly popular 
method. 
8.  The  fusion  process  is initiated by  heating.  The  process  must  be  sustained 
for  a  certain period by  its own  heat, and  if that fails, must  be  restarted by 
external heating.  A specific  rhythm  <pulses)  must  be  used  for this.  The 
balance of energy  input and  energy output must  be  positive.  The  break-even 
point is the  point  when  this balance  is in equilibrium.  The  moment  when  the 
process  sustains itself is known  as  ignition. 
9.  The  plasma  has  to be  prevented  from  colliding with  the wall,  since this 
would  involve an  excess  loss of heat  and  damage  to the wall.  To  prevent this, 
a  magnetic  field  is  created  by  using  toroidal  and  poloidal  magnetic  rings  and 
limiters are  inserted  in the  reactor.  These  come  into contact with  the plasma 
before  the  plasma  can  reach  the  wall.  The  two  forms  of  magnetism  - vertical 
and  horizontal  - move  the plasma  as  close as  possible to the  centre of the 
reactor.  The  shape  of  the  reactor  is designed  to accommodate  this process: 
it is a  torus -an annular,  hollow  tube. 
10.  The  fusion  process  is not  possible at  present  because: 
(a)  it is not  yet possible to heat  to beyond  100  000  000°C  without  negative 
effects on  energy  confinement  time; 
(b)it  has  not  yet  been  possible  to  reach  break-even point  and  achieve  ignition. 
11.  European  nuclear-fusion  research  is carried out  in  Community  laboratories 
such  as  Culham  and  Ispra  and  in national  research  institutes with  which 
research  contracts  have  been  signed  (the Association partners>.  The  main 
Community  programme  is JET  stands  for  Joint  European  Torus. 
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nuclear  fusion,  i.e. to de.anstrate  that nuclear fusion is possible and  that 
experimenting will  have  to continue until it is clear  how  the process  can  be 
achieved. 
JET  research  is concerned  principally with  the  following: 
<a>  plasma  density, plasma  behaviour, plas•a heating and  plasaa-wall. 
interaction; 
(b)  the  method  of magnetic  confine•ent; 
(c)  the use  of tritium; 
(d)  the use  of different materials for the wall; 
(e)  the use of  robots for  repair, •aintenance and  replace ..  nt work; 
(f)  the  environment  and  safety. 
JET  started in 1978  after a  few  years  of  preparatory work.  In  1971  a  Euratoa 
working  party  came  out  in favour of designing a  large Toka•ak.  In 1973  a 
design  team  for  this  reactor was  appointed.  In 1975  a  design  was  presented 
and  approved.  The  JET  construction phase  started in 1978.  The  operational 
phase  started in 1983  and  experiments  began  with  the torus.  The  original 
intention was  to  compl~te this phase,  and  hence  the entire JET  program•e,  in 
1990.  However,  because  additional  heating of  the plas•a •eant that  higher 
temperatures were  achieved but  that the  confinement  time  was  reduced, 
additional  equipment  must  be  installed and  the operational  phase  of JET 
extended  to 31  December  1992  in order to achieve  the original objectiv••· 
13.  The  next  phase  in  achieving  controlled nuclear  fusion  is the Next  European 
Torus  (NET>,  which  is  intended to confirm  the scientific feasibility of 
nuctear fusion  and  to demonstrate  technological  and  constructional 
feasibility.  A preparatory team  has  been  operating since 1983  on  design 
phase,  which  will  last until 1990.  following  a  further  technical-design 
phase,  construction of  NET  could start in 1993,  lasting until approximately 
2000. 
The  objectives of  NET  are:  to achieve  the  controlled ignition and  long-ter• 
combustion  of the  deuterium-tritium mixture,  to demonstrate  the reliability 
and  stability of  the  system  and  to demonstrate  safe and  environmentally 
compatible  operations.  In  addition,  NET  must  demonstrate  the viability of 
design  concepts,  test materials  and  test tritium and  energy  withdrawal  systems 
for  the demonstration  reactor. 
14.  After  the  year  2000,  the  DEMO  project  is to start - the demonstration 
reactor which  will  have  to be~lt  on  the basis of  NET  research findings.  The 
DEMO  reactor will  be  used  to investigate the  industrial  and  commercial 
feasibility of nuclear  fusion.  According  to current plans,  results are 
expected  between  2030  and  2040.  The  most  optimistic appraisal  is that nuclear 
fusion  could  play  a  role in Europe's  energy  supplies after 2030. 
15.  In  addition  to JET  and  the groundwork  for  NET,considerabl~ research  has 
been  conducted  into fusion  technology  in  Community  research  centres and 
associated  national  laboratories.  Together  these  make  up  the total Community 
nuclear-fusion  research effort.  Research  costs are borne  by  the  Community  and 
the  Member  States.  From  1976  to 1986,  fusion  research outlay exceeded  2.3 
billion ECU,  including  some  1 billion  ECU  from  the  Community.  Between  1987 
and  1991,  costs  will  total  some  2.2 billion ECU,  with  the  Community  again 
contributing about  1  billion ECU. 
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I The  following  table sets out total cost between  1976  and  1991: 
Table 1:  Cost  of  the Co•munity's  fusion progra••e 1976- 1991  (in ECU) 
funding  General  JET  fotal 
Source 
European  Com•unity 
Me•ber  States 
Total 
Prograa•e 
1181 
2146.7 
3327.7 
868.4 
353.3 
1221.7 
2049.4* 
2500 
4549.4* 
Proposed  spending  on  fusion for the next five years is on  a  scale ca.parable 
with  outlay in  the  first 11  years,  revealing a  rising-cost  trend  likely to 
continue. 
The  Co••ission's  proposal  for  a  fusion  progra ... for the period 1987  - 1991 
would  require the following  co••itaent appropriations  (including carry-overs 
fro• 1986>: 
Table  2:  Cost  of the Coa.unity's  fusion progra••e 1987  - 1991  (in •  ECU) 
funding  source 
European  Community 
Member  States 
Total 
·An  initial appraisal 
General  Progra ..  e 
G16 
1117.7 
1733.7 
JET 
397.2 
112.4 
509.6 
Total 
1013.2• 
1230.1 
2243.3• 
16.  Controlled nuclear fusion  has  not  yet been  achieved;  nor has  there been 
any  scientific proof  that it is at all possible  (JET  and  si•ilar experi ..  nts 
in Japan,  the USSR  and  the US  are  intended to provide  that proof). 
Consequently,  considerable caution is needed  in evaluating nuclear fusion as  a 
possible  future  energy  source. 
*Exclusive of  research  conducted  by  the  JRC  (75•  ECU  for period 1987  - 1991) 
17.  The  claims  made  for nuclear fusion are quite considerable: 
<a>  It is an  inexhaustible  source  of energy. 
(b)  It is clean. 
(c)  It is safe. 
(d)  lt is cheap. 
These  claims  can  be  justified: 
(a)  The  fuels  used  in nuclear fusion  are  indeed virtually  inexhaustible.  Very 
little sea  water  is  required to provide  a  considerable volume  of deuterium, 
and  there  is a  superabundance  of  sea  water.  Lithium  will  be  readily available 
for  several  thousand  years.  The  fuel  production costs are  low  in comparison 
with  the other cost  components  in the nuclear-fusion process. 
(b)  The  claim  that  nuclear fusion  is a  clean source of energy,  with  low 
radiation  and  virtually no  radioactive waste,  is not  entirely true. 
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'-:.· Highly  radioactive tritiu• is a  very  volatile substance which  easily 
penetrates walls,  valves  and  coolant ducts etc.  There  is a  correspondingly 
high  risk of  the  substance escaping.  Checking  for possible sources of  leaks 
is a  major  technical proble• in nuclear  fusion  research.  Once  it has escaped 
it disperses  very  rapidly  in air and  water.  Absorption  into the  hu•an  body  is 
also very  rapid.  The  esti•atesof the amount  of tritiu• present in a  fusion 
reactor differ. 
There  is also  some  controversy  as  to the  clai• that there  is little nuclear 
waste.  The  fuels  themselves do  indeed produce  no  nuclear waste. 
The  radioactive  waste  - probably  for the  most  part  low- or aediua-level -
originates in the wall  and blanket.  If these  have  to be  replaced pre•aturely 
or if the  power  station is deco.•issioned after 30 years or so,  there is a 
waste  proble• widely believed to be at  least comparable  to the waste problea 
in  connection  with  fission power  stations.  Replacing  the  mantel  and  the wall 
depends  on  the materials used.  Esti•ates indicate a  replacement  rate of once 
every  two  to ten years  for the  wall  and  no  replacements at all for the 
blanket.  Research  into different wall  materials  <vanadium  and  various  types 
of  stainless steel)  has  not  yet  produced  satisfactory  results to enable a 
final  choice  to be  made.  The  properties, price, scarcity and  other factors 
are  not  yet  sufficiently  researched.  Hence  it would  certainly be  wrong  to 
minimise  the waste  problem  in connection with nuclear fusion. 
(c)  There  is also  considerable  controversy about  the  safety of  the 
nuclear-fu~ion process.  Safety is defined as  inherent  safety.  Plasma  expands 
as it is heated.  Hence  it is not  possible to  increase  the  density to a  level 
at which  the plasma  can  explode.  An  additional advantage  is that the pressure 
in  the  reactor is virtually equivalent  to normal  pressure. 
However,  there are  the  following  risks: 
If there  are faults  in the  control  system  either  th~ plasma  can  become  too 
dense or the  temperature  too  high;under  a  worst-case scenario,  the wall 
may  melt  or crack. 
The  plasma,  if suddertly  cooled,  may  form  a  deposit  on  the  wall  ,  in which 
holes  may  form  as  a  result. 
If  liquid  lithium  is used  in  the  bl~nk~t and  the  lithium  comes  in to 
contact  with  water or air, there  may  be  explosions  with severe  lithium 
fires. 
Radioactive  ~ritium may  be  relcas~d during  maintenance,  replacement  work 
or  repairs;  tritium  leaks  may  occur at other times  too. 
Sudden  discharge ot the  high  concentratioa1  of electricity present  in the 
magnetic  coils may  cause  a  short circuit-
If  these  risks  materialize,  the  fusion  proces$  as  such  will  stop but  the 
damage  can  be  considerable and  the  consequences  serious.  Effective 
troubleshooting facilities and  technical  innovations  (e.g.  in  tritium 
treatment  and  keeping  lithium  scp~rate from  air and  waterand  ensuring  that 
metallic  lithium  i~ not  used)  may  serve  to  minimize  the  risks.  However,  it 
would  be  an  exaggeration,  in pointing to the  inherent  ~afety of  the 
nuclear-fusion process,  to claim  thdt  it is  a  virtually  risk-fre~  sourc~ of 
energy.  Much  technical  research  is needed  to minimise  the  risks of  the  fusion 
process  ~nd to  maximise  reactor  safety. 
13 
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<a>  Two  alternative approaches  - laser fusion  and  fusion-fission hybrid 
reactor - can  be  used  for •ilitary purposes. 
The  laser fusion process  is initiated by  the  concentrated heat  of  laser 
beams.  Successful experi•ents have  been  carried out  in Japan  in 
particular.  The  Co••unity  is endeavouring  •erely to keep  abreast of this 
development.  If  laser fusion  becomes  routinely workable,  hydrogen  bo.bs · 
could  in  theory  be  exploded  by  using  lasers.  In  what  are  known  as.  hybrid 
power  stations the fusion  process  is used  not  so •uch as an  independent 
energy  source  but  as  part of  the enrichment  technology  for fission power 
stations.  Uranium  is placed  in the blanket and  the  neutrons  released in 
the  fusion  process  produce  plutoniu•.  This  is how  fuel  is produced  for 
nuclear power  stations, but also the  raw  •aterial for ato.ic weapons,  is 
produc~d.  At  present only  the Soviet Union  is still considering uttliiing 
this technology;  there,  it· is regarded as an  alternative if the econo•ic 
practicability of nuclear fusion  as  such  cannot  be  de.anstrated.  Because 
it would  be  a  straightforward process for  hybrid power  stations to produce 
plutonium,  the  proliferation  risk  involved  in developing  such  power 
stations is obvious. 
(b)  There  are  doubts  about  the  technical  and  econo•ic  feasibility of  fusion 
based on  the deuterium-tritium reaction.  This  reaction would  always 
involve  a  large quantitr of  fast  neutrons  and  hence  a  radioactive risk. 
Overcoming  this  risk  requires a  technical effort which  is proble•atic and 
in any  ease extremely  expensive.  A more  acceptable for. of  fusion  would 
be  fusion  based on  a  reaction  in which  neutrons of a  far  lower  velocity 
are  released,  e.g.  a  deuterium-deuterium  reaction. 
Advocates  of this approach  acknowledge  that it will  take  longer to derive  such 
result  from  fusion  research  because  it is much  harder  to achieve  this type of 
reaction and,  in theory, it releases  less energy.  However,  they believe that 
it was  premature  to opt  for  the deuterium-tritium  reaction.  Proponents  of the 
deuterium-tritium reaction point out that it is much  more  important first to 
demonstrate  the  scientific and  technical  f~asibility of  the  fusion process  as 
su~h, and  hence  to opt  for  the most  promising  type of  reaction, before 
considering  more  acceptable alternatives,  technically and  economically,  which 
can  be  undertaken  subsequently. 
19.  The  tast point  to be  considered  is  the  economic  feasibility of  nuclear 
fusion.  It is claimed to be  a  cheap  energy  source, particularly because of 
the  low-cost  fuels  used.  However,  this  claim  must  be  qualified.  It is 
obvsious  that the  main  costs  involved will  be  capital expenditure;  an  estimate 
of  the costs of  a  power  station which  is to operate on  the basis of  a  pro~ess 
the functioning of which  has  not  yet been  demonstrated  in practice is indeed 
bound  to be  highly tentative.  It is  just as difficult  to  claim  that  fusion 
energy is cheap  as  it is to claim the opposite. 
It is striking, however,  that most  recent  articles about  the price of  fusion 
energy  have  adopted  a  defensive  tone.  According  to the  Commission's  study, 
which  also  looked  at  the  economic  propsects of  fusion,  'the overall generating 
cost of electricity from  a  fusion power  station is within  the wide  range  of 
costs  expected  from  existing or other alternative energy  sources.  Fusion  can 
therefore  n~t be  dismissed  urel  on  economic  grounds.'  (rapporteur's 
emphas1s  •  Alt  ough  t  e  techno  ogical  and  industrial  spin-off  fro• 
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I nuclear-fusion  research benefits European  industry, this is no  justification 
for  an  extremely costly programme  such  as  the nuclear-fusion progra ..  e.  What 
might  go  a  long  way  towards  justifying this would  be  if nuclear-fusion energy 
- if it were  feasible -were to •ake Europe  less dependent  on  imports.  We 
must  of  course  bear  in mind  the  time  scale.  Should  nuclear  fusion prove 
technically feasible,  and  initial contribution in energy  consumption  cannot be 
e~pected until  2030  at  the earliest, i.e. nuclear fusion  is a potential energy 
source for  the  long  term  and,  in the  intervening years, will  have  no  role to 
play  in energy  supply. 
The  future of nuclear-fusion  research 
20.  The  excellent quality of European  nuclear-fusion research  has  been 
established beyond  doubt.  It is a  for• of cooperation which  can be  taken as 
an  excellent  example  for  research at European  or even  world  level.  Although 
the  research  has  been  slowed  up  so•ewhat  by  physical proble•s  Cconfine•ent 
degradation - the  reason  for the  request  to extend JET),  there is nothing  in 
the  way  the  research is actually being carried out to suggest doubts about 
further progress.  Since  nuclear-fusion  research  is financed to a  large extent 
from  the (ommunity  research budget,  external  appraisal criteria •ust also be 
applied. 
21.  The  European  Parliament  faces  an  immense  proble• whenever  it is obliged 
to  judge whether  the outlay on  fusion  research is money  well  spent; moreover, 
the  Commission  and  Council  face  more  or  l~ss the  same  problem.  By  consulting 
specialist literature and  experts, politicans can  indeed  reach  sound 
conclusions  on  the quality of nuclear-fusion  research.  However,  neither the 
question of whether  research will yield results nor  the question of 
acceptability of results  can  be  answered  with  absolute certainty.  In view  of 
the  considerable and  rising cost of fusion  research,  these questions are 
neverthel~ss crucial. 
22.  The  first basic question  which  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission 
need  to  answ~r is:  how  long  are  they prepared to provide  funding  for this 
research  when  the  results are  uncertain?  It may  be  2020 before it is 
established that nuclear fusion is economically viable  <assuming  it is 
a:tually feasible>.  Are  all the parties  concerned  prepared,  in principle,  to 
continue  injecting funds  into the project until  then?  This  will depend  partly 
on  the  importance  attached to the  research per se,  the energy  supply pattern 
expected  in the  next  century  and  the alternatives. 
23.  The  second  basic  question  which  the  politicians have  to answer  is: under 
what  conditions  do  they  consider nuclear fusion  acceptable?  What  is now  the 
acceptable  level  of  pollution, of  likely  risk  and  of  costs  compared  with 
alternative sources? 
24.  The  rapporteur believes  that·these questions  cannot  be  answered  at  this 
stage  in the  research  programme.  The  technical feasibility of fusion will 
have  to be  demonstrated  by  the  experimental  reactors  now  in operation.  If it 
can  be  demonstrated,  the  decision on  the  next  phase  - the design and 
construction of  NET  (Next  European  Torus)  - can  be  taken.  When  the  initial 
decision is due,  in about  1990,  Parliament,  the  Commission  and  the  Council 
will  need  to  have  at  their disposal  all  the  relevant  information:  not  only  a 
thorough  evaluation of  what  has  been  achieved,  but  also  realistic prognoses 
for  economic  viability,  reactor  risk  and  environmental  impact.  This  means 
that work  should start forthwith  on  a  thorough  and  independent  evaluation 
relevant  to  the  policy-making  process  so  that  the political  decision-tak~rs 
have  the  information  they  require  in good  time.  The  report  by  the Office of 
Technology  Assessment  for  the  US  Congress  ('Starpower:  the  US  and  the 
International  Quest  for  Fusion  Energy')  is an  example  of what  Parliament,  the 
Commission  and  the  Council  require. 
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·~ The  recently published Heldren  report  <'Exploring  the  co~etitive potential of 
magnetic  fusion  energy:  the  i~teraction of  econo•ics  with  safety and 
environ•ental characteristics') also contains •ore reliable infor•ation than 
the  Co•mission's  'Environaental  I•pact  and  ~cono•ic Prospects of fusion•, 
which  reads  too •uch  like propaganda. 
An  evaluation of  this type  should  be  the  sine qua  non  for Parliaaent to 
discuss any  proposal  concerning  NET  <or  any  internetional equivalent). 
25.  The  us,  Japan,  the  USSR  and  the European  Coaaunity  are  cooperating on 
defining the next  step to be  taken.  For  the  co ..  unity,  this is proceeding  in 
tandea  with  the  NET  definition phase. 
When  a  specific NET  design has  to be  defined,  there will need  to be 
international agree•ent  on  whether  the  four partners  in  ITER  <International 
Ther•onuclear  Experimental  Reactor)  should  also cooperate  in designing and 
building a  second  reactor.  Since Parlia•ent,  the Co••ission and  the Council 
will  have  to debate  this in due  course,  the i•plications of such  cooperation 
will need  to be  considered  in  the evaluations and  forecasts.  Attention will 
have  to focus  on  the political i•plications:  high-investment,  and  valuable 
cooperation between  the  USS~ ~nd the us  in what  is a  sensitive high-tech  area 
•ay have  far-reaching  consequences  for  international political  relations~ 
26.  Conclusions 
(a)  The  legal  basis of the. Com•ission's  proposal  for a  Council  regulation on 
the nuclear-fusion programme  should  be  amended  so  that the proposal is subject 
to the  procedure  laid down  in Article 130  Q(2)  of the  Single European  Act. 
See  the  relevant note. 
(b)  The  strategy underlying  the  present  progra••e  can  remain  largely 
unchanged,  though  one  important modification is required:  the progra ..  e •ust 
be  explicitly biased  towards  securing  the potential environmental  and 
safety-related advantages  of fusion over fission.  These  advantages  can  only 
be  secured  if designs  are  tailored to this purpose  and  if the usability of 
low-activation materials for fusion  can  be  demonstrated. 
Postponing  ~onsideration of major  environmental  and  safety-related problems 
until the technical problems  have  been  ironed out  is the  wrong  approach,  and 
it would  jeopardise  the  long-term  feasibility of  the  fusion  programme  itself. 
In  plain English:  the  programme  will  come  unstuck,  sooner  or later, without 
convincing  guarantees  on  safety and  environmental  impact;  the  sources  of 
funding  will dry  up  because  society will no  longer  support  it. 
(c)  There  must  be  an  independent  assessment  of  the programme,  involving 
fo~~asts of the potential environmental,  safety-related and  economic 
attractiveness of  fusion. 
Parliament  needs  to have  an  input  in  this evaluation process,  and  the 
evaluation itself will  have  to be  made  available to Parliament  before it 
considers  the  programme  review. 
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be  involved at  an  early  stage  in the decision-•aking process  in respect  of  the 
next  phase  of  ITER. 
(e)  JET,  though  still based  on  the Eurata. Treaty and  not  Article 130  (o)  of 
the Single  European  Act,  is covered  by  the  fra•ework  progra ..  e  and  the 
decision-•aking  procedures  provided  for  in that progra••e.  Extending  JET  will 
have  financial  i•plications; but this is a  necessary step, otherwilf it will 
be  quite  impossible  to take a  decision on  the construction of NET.  Parlia  ..  nt 
therefore approves  the proposal  to extend  JET. 
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ANNEX  -
THE  LEGAL  BASIS  FOR  THE  NUCLEAR-FUSION  PROGRAMME  <COM<87)  302  final) 
In  his Draft  Report,  the  Rapporteur  proposed  draft a•endaents  which  would  have 
changed  the  Legal  Base.  These  draft a•end•ents were  not  adopt•d by  the 
Com•ittee.  However,  the argu•ents  in favour  of  the• are  set out  below. 
1.  The  legal basis is the fra•ework progra•e.  On  28  Septellber 1987,  the 
Council  adopted  the  fraaework  research progra••e 1987-1991,  the  legal basis 
for which  was  Article 130  Q(1)  of the  EEC  Treaty and  Article 7 of the  EURATOM 
Treaty.  The  Council's unaniaous  decision to adopt  the  fra ..  work  progra ..  e 
therefore i•plies that decisions have  been  taken on  EURATOM  research  and 
training progra••es and  on  relevant  EEC  activities.  The  annexes,  which  are  an 
integral part of the  fra•ework  progra ...  ,  are •oreover entirely una•biguous  in 
this  respect. 
2.  The  fra•evork  progra ... is binding on  Eurata. services too and  co•prises 
research activities to be  carried out by  both  EEC  and  EURATOM.  Although  th~re 
is no  reference  to  'fra•ework progra••e'  in the  EURATOM  Treaty itself, 
framework  will obviously be  legally binding as  regards  EURATOM's  research and 
training progra•mes  too,  since part of  its legal basis is to be  found  in the 
EURATOM  Treaty. 
3.  fra•ework  lays  down  the decision-taking procedure  in respect of specific 
progra•.es.  The  EURATOM  Treaty does  not  lay  down  what  further action is to be 
taken,  once  the Council  has  unanimously  adopted  ~URATOM research  and  training 
programmes,  unlike  fra•ework,  which  does,  however,  specify how  to proceed 
further,  referring  to activities  <Article  1>  to be  impleaented  by  .eans of 
specific programmes  (Article 2).  The  break~own of the a•ount  dee.ed necessary 
between  the activities concerned,  the broad  thrust of  the activities and  their 
scientific and  technical objectives are set out  in highly detailed annexes 
which,  as  referred to above,  are  an  integral part of  the  Framework  progra•me. 
4.  The  nuclear-fusion progra ..  e  is a  specific progra ..  e.  Annexes  I  and  II 
of  Framework  establish beyond  doubt  that the  nuclear-fusion programme  is also 
regarded  as  a  specific programme  under  the  terms  of  Framework.  No  refer~nce 
is made  to specific  programmes  in  the  EURATOM  Treaty;  however,  this treaty 
forms  part of the basis of the  framework  programme,  adopted  by  the  Council,  in 
which  considerable  importance  is attached to the  term.  It is therefore 
difficult to  ~ontend that  specific programmes  are  irrelevant to the  EURATOM 
Treaty:  because  of  Framework,  which  is partly based  on  the  EURATOM  Treaty, 
such  programmes !!!  relevant. 
5.  There  is only one  decision-taking procedure  for  specific programmes.  Is 
there uncertainty in this  regard?  Could,  for example,  decision-taking 
procedures  vary  with  the  type  of  specific programme  concerned?  Such  a 
distinction, if possible, ought  to be  indicated in the  Framework  programme 
itself;  however,  neither the  recitals nor  the  annexes,  which  are  highly 
detailed, contain any  indication to that effect.  Indeed,  the  implication is 
that  the  distinction between,  for  example,  nuclear  and  non-nuclear  specific 
programmes  has  been  abandoned.  According  to Article 1(3), the  total amount 
deemed  necessary  for  Community  participation  (Community  in the  singular), 
i.e. the  sum  earmarked  for  the specific programmes  to be  adopted  during  this 
period,  has  been  fixed  at  5396  m ECU.  It can  hardly  be  claimed  that 
'Community'  refers only  to one  of the  two  Communities  concerned,  since  the 
annexed  breakdown  of  the  total amount  covers  all  specific  programmes, 
irrespective of  whether  they  principally relate to nuclear or  non-nuclear 
fields.  For  this  reason,  the distinction between  the  EEC  and  EURATOM  has  been 
abandoned  in  the  Framework  programme  itself. 
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progra••e.  Because  part of the basis for  Fra•ework  is to be  found  in Article 
130  Q(1)  of  the  EEC  Treaty, decision-taking  in  respect of  specific progra••es 
must  be  based  on  the  cooperation procedure  involving  the European  Parlia•ent. 
The  Council  would  have  had  every  opportunity to  lay  down,  in the fra•ework 
programme  itself, a  different decision-taking procedure  for certain co~nts 
of  the  programme  if it had  wished  to do  so.  Not  only  did it not  do  so; it 
even  refrained  from  making  any  distinction between  specific progra ...  l  by,  for 
example,  designating  separate activities or referring to the different 
Communities. 
7.  The  legal basis  for  the nuclear-fusion progra••e shoutd  be  aaended.  The 
basis  proposed  by  the  Commission  - the  EURATOM  Treaty alone,  in particular 
Article 7  thereQf  - is erroneous.  This  must  be  regarded  as  a  reprehensible 
and  short-sighted atte•pt to short-circuit the  European  ·Parlia  ..  nt's influence 
over  a  program••  accounting  for  151  of  Fra•ework  and  costing 1  bn  £CU  over 
five years:  reprehensible in that it seeks to nullify one  of Parlia.ent's 
powers  established by  the Single  European  Act  even  before  the  ink  on  that 
document  has  dried;  and  short-sighted in that the support of Parliament, as 
one  arm  of  the budgetary  authority,  is obviously  required  if the  progra••• is 
to be  implemented,  nor,  since this is a  high-cost  programme  to be  financed 
from  a  permanently  strained overall budget,  is there  any  strategic rationale 
in 5eeking  to debar  Parliament  from  influencing the  programme. 
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(Rule  120  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure) 
of the eo.aittee on  Budgets 
Drafts•an:  Mr  PAPOUTSIS 
At  its •eeting of 23  Septe.ber 1987,  the  co ..  ittee on  Budgets  appointed 
Mr  PAPOUTSIS  drafts•an for all the  proposals  concerning  the fra•evork 
progra ..  e  for  research and  technological developaent  in the Co.aunity. 
The  coa•ittee considered  the draft opinion at its •eeting of 27  Januar.r  1988 
and  adopted  the  conclusions unani•ously. 
The  following  were  present:  Mr  COT,  chair•an;  Mr  PAPOUTSIS,  rapporteur; 
Mr  ADAM  (deputizing for  Mr  STEVENSON),  Mrs  BARBARELLA,  Mr  CAAMANO  BERNAL, 
Mr  CALVO  ORTEGA,  Mr  CHRISTODOULOU,  Mr  COLOM  l  NAVAL,  Mr  DANKERT,  Mr  HACKEL, 
Mr  d'ORMESSON  and  Mr  PRICE. 
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I 1·.·  In  document  COMC87>  302  final,  the  Co••ission put  forward  two  proposals 
and  a  report  on: 
<a>  a  review  of  the  current  controlled ther•onuclear fusion  progra••e 
(1985-1989)  and  the adoption of a  new  five-year progra ..  e  for 
1987-1991  and, 
(b)  extending  the  JET  (JOINT  EUROPEAN  TORUS)  Joint Undertaking until tht 
end  of 1992, 
Cc>  the  environmental  i•pact and  econo•ic  prospects of  fusion. 
2.  As  regards  the  legal  fra•ework,  the  regulation relating to the specific 
nuclear fusion  progra••• will have  to be  approved  in accordance  with 
Article 7 of  the  EA£C  Treaty, which  stipulates that  'Co••unity research 
and  training program•es  shall be  deter•ined by  the Council,  acting 
unanimously  on  a  proposal  fro• the  Com•ission,  which  shall consult  the 
Scientific and  Technical  Com•ittee•.  To  extend  JET,  the decision will 
have  to be  taken in accordance  with  Article 50 of the  EAEC  Treaty, which 
requires  the  unanimous  approval  of  the Council. 
Although  it is not obligatory,  the  Commission  calted on  the  Council  to 
seek  Parliament's opinion. 
3.  The  European  thermonuclear  fusion  programme  which  enabled the JET  Joint 
Undertaking  (1978)  and  the NET  tea•  (1983)  to be  set up  has  proved 
exceptionally  successful.  Not  only  have  the  technological  and  scientific 
results achieved  placed Europe  in the  forefront  as  regards •agnetic 
fusion,  since  the  JET  programme  was  an  important  step  in demonstrating 
that fusion can  be  achieved  from  a  scientific point of view,  but, in 
addition,  the  fusion  programme  made  a  substantial  contribution to the 
building-up of a  genuine  scientific and  technological  community  of small 
and  large-scale  laboratories. 
4.  From  a  strategic  point  of view,  the objects of  continuing  the  fusion 
programme  are: 
- the  completion  of  the first phase,  which  consists of  the JET  programme 
with  its various  spin-offs and  includes fully exploiting the existing 
mechanical  equipment  and  equipment  being  constructed by  the various 
companies, 
- the preliminary  plan  for  the  second  stage of  the  programme,  the 
setting-up of a  demonstration  reactor  (DEMO>,  to be  based on  the 
tokamak,  in other words  the  Next  European  Torus  <NET), 
-widening the field of alternative possibilities which  could  lead to the 
construction of  a  fusion  reactor. 
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I 5.·  Against  this backgr~, if the objectives of the JET  progra_. are to be 
achieved,  and  particularly if its final  stage,  the tritiu• stage,  is to be 
put  into effect, additional equip.ent will be  required;  this cannot be 
constructed,  coa•issioned and  operated within the  lifeti•e of  the Joint 
Undertaking  as  laid down  in the  JET  Regulation.  The  Co.•ission th.refore 
proposes  that  the  Council  extend  the Joint Undertaking  for two  years  and 
seven .onths fro• 31  May  1990  to 31  Dece~r 1992. 
6.  As  far as  the  financial  i•plications are  concerned,  the  following  table 
shows  the total level of co ..  unity participation and  the  relationship 
between  the General  Progra••e,  JET  and  JRC  (Joint  Research  Centre>,  the 
new  appropriations to be  ear•arked for  fusion within the 1987-1991 
fra•ework  progra••• and  the appropriations which  have  been  transferred 
fro• current  progra ..  es. 
Mio  ECU 
General  programme 
Participation in the 
JET  Joint Undertaking 
Fusion  program•e 
total 
JRC  <not  included 
in this proposal) 
Total  for fusion 
activities 
New  appropriations 
corresponding  to the 
1987-1991  framework 
program•• 
362 
169 
531 
60 
591 
Transferred 
appropriations 
fro• 1985-1989 
171 
209 
380 
15 
395 
Total financing 
for the 
1987-1991 
period 
533 
378  (1) 
911 
75 
986 
(1)  Including  additional  expenditure occasioned by  extending  JET. 
The  above  table demonstrates  that  the  Commission's  two  proposals do  not 
relate exclusively to the General  Program•e  and  JET.  The  work  being  done 
by  the  JRC  in the field of fusion,  although,  from  a  technological and 
scientific point of view,  they  fall  under  the overall  fusion  programme,  is 
governed  by  a  different decision  relating to special  research  programmes 
1988-1991  which  the  JRC  is required  to carry out  on  behalf of  the European 
Atomic  Energy  Community. 
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additional  expenditure will ..  ount  to 188  •  ECU  and  is included  in the table 
above. 
7.  Where  objectives are  concerned,  the  fusion  progra••• is at the state of 
de•onstrating scientific feasibility and,  building on  the progress 
achieved  so  far,  one  of  the aain objectives is to set up  the physital 
substructure needed  for JET,  especially creating and  studying a  plasaa of 
a  size and  in  conditions  close to those which  will  be  required  in • 
thermonuclear  reactor. 
Since  in the  course of 1990-1991  the  NET  project will be  .oving into the 
detailed project stage and  coaponent  prototypes will consequently have  to 
be  ordered  froa  industry,  the  rapporteur considers that the Coa.unity 
should provide a aini.ua guaranteed  level of funding  towards  the 
expenditure associated with partnership contracts with  universities and 
research  centres. 
8.  In  conclusion,  the  rapporteur proposes  that the Co••ittee on  Budgets 
reiterate the views  which  it expressed on  the budget,  to the effect that: 
(a)  the appropriations  required  for  imple ..  nting the proposed  progra••• 
shall be  deter•ined annually, according to actual  require ..  nts, during 
the annual  budget  procedure,  although  it will not  be  poesible to 
establish an  absolute figure for the overall financing of the 
framework  progra••e, with  the result that the budgetary authority is 
not tied down  by  any  li•it, 
(b)  the manpower  levels  required  for carrying out  the  program•e  will have 
to be  considered in the context of approving  the  general budget  for 
the financial  year  in which  it falls and  not  by  •eans of a  proposal 
for a  regulation to that effect. 
9.  CONCLUSIONS 
In  view  of the above,  the Committee  on  Budgets  proposes  the  following 
amendments  to  the Com•ission's  proposal  for a  regulation: 
AMENDMENT  No.  1 
Article 2 
to  read: 
'1.  The  funds  estiMated  as  being  necessary  for the execution of the 
programme  exclusive of JET  amount  to 533  Mio  ECU,  including 
expenditure  on  staff. 
2.  The  funds  estimated as  being  necessary  for JET  during  the duration of 
the programme  amount  to 378 Nio  ECU  including expenditure on  temporary 
employees  within the meaning  of Article 2(a)  of  the  conditions of 
employment  of other servants of the European  Communities. 
'The  final  amount  of appropriations  and  the  number  of  staff shall be 
determined  on  the basis of decisions  taken  annually  by  the budgetary 
authority  in accordance  with  real  needs.• 
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---·--- ........ .__  ...........  ~  ... 'lJ-......  ~  ....... ft-1•.• 4.  A proportion of the order of 4X  of  total  financing  shall be  set aside 
for basic  research in the field of plas•a, in which  universities and 
research  institutions fro• all the Co••unity  countries •ay 
participate.• 
AMENDMENT  No.  2 
Article 3 
to  read: 
'During  the  course of its third year,  the Co.•isston shall proceed  to the 
evaluation of the progra ..  e  having  regard to its objectives set out  in the 
Annex.  Following  this evaluation,  the Co••ission shall  su~it to the 
Council,  and  to the European  Parlia•ent for the purpose of consultation, a 
revision proposal  designed  to replace  the present  progra••e with  a 
five-year progra ..  e  with  effect fro• 1  January  1990.' 
3~ 
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COMMITTEE  ON  LEGAL  AFFAIRS  AND  CITIZENS'  RIGHTS 
OPINION 
pursuant  to Rule  36(3)  of the  Rules  of Procedure 
on  the  legal  basis for  the  Co••ission proposals 
for a  Council  regulation adopting a  research and  training progra ..  e 
(1987-1991)  in the  field of  controlled ther.onuclear fusion 
(Doc.  c 2-146/87,  COM(87)  302  final) 
for a  Council  decision  revising  the •ultiannual  research  and  training 
progra••e for  the  European  Ata.ic Energy  Community  in the field of 
radiation protection (1985-1989)  (Doc.  C 2-131/87,  COMC87)  332  final). 
Draftsman:  Mr  W.  ROTHLEY 
3  December  1987 
EM(88)Q156/0157E  - 28  - PE  116.137/fin. By  letter of 30  October  1987  the President of the  European  Parlia•ent, 
Lord  PLUMB,  referred  the  request  for  exa•ination of  the  legal basis for  two 
Commission  proposals  by  Mr  Gordon  ADAM,  acting chair•an of the  co ..  ittee on 
Energy,  Research  and  Technology,  pursuant  to Rule  36(3)  in conjunction with 
Rule  120  of  the  Rules  of Procedure  to the  co ..  ittee on  Legal  Affairs and 
Citizens•  Rights. 
At  its meeting  of 30  Septe•ber/1  October  1987  the Co••ittee on  LegaL  Affe1rt 
and  Citizens•  Rights  appointed  Mr  ROTHLEY  drafts•an of opinions on  all 
requests  for  the exa•ination of  legal bases  until 31  January 1988. 
The  Committee  considered the draft opinion at its •eeting of 2  Dece•ber  1987 
and  adopted  the  conclusions  unani•ously. 
The  following  took  part in the vote:  Lady  ELL£S,  chair•an;  Mrs  VAYSSADE, 
vice-chair•an;  Mr  ROTHLEY,  drafts•an;  Mr  ALBER,  Mr  BARZANTI,  Mr  DE  WINTER, 
Mrs  FONTAINE,  Mr  GARCIA  AMIGO,  Mr  GAZIS  and  Mr  LAFUENTE  LOPEZ. 
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I , 
A. 
1.  The  Com•ission  bases  these  two  proposals  on  Article 7 of the  EURATOM 
Treaty.  This  article requires  the.Council  to act by  unani•ity on  a  proposal 
fro•  the  Co••ission.  The  European  Parlia•ent does  not  have  to be  consulted. 
The  co••ittee responsible considers  that in both  cases the procedUre  under 
Article 130  K and  130  Q(2)  of the  EEC  Treaty •ight apply,  i.e. cooperation 
with  the European  Parlia•ent.  The  Council  could  then act by  qualified 
majority  (see Article 149(2)  of the  EEC  Treaty). 
B.  The  correct  legal basis 
2.  The  decision-.aking procedure  depends  on  the  legal basis.  The  co.•ittee 
responsible considers the  fra•evork  progra••e1  to be  the correct  legal 
basis.  According  to Article 130  I  of  the  EEC  Treaty, the  Coa•unity shall 
adopt  a  •ultiannual fra  ..  vork  programae  setting out all its activities and 
laying  down  objectives and priorities.  Article 130  K states that  the 
framework  progra•ae shall be  i•plemented through  specific progra ..  es developed 
within each  activity.  Article 130  Q  requires  the Council  to adopt  the 
provisions  required for this purpose  by  a  qualified majority in cooperation 
with  the European  Parli ..  ent. 
3.  The  statement  that the  fra•ework  program•e  is the  correct  legal basis  can 
mean  one  of two  things:  the eapowering  provision could  be  the basis for the 
framework  programme  (a) or the framework  progra••e itself (b). 
4.  (a)  The  framework  progra ..  e  is based  on  both  Article 130  Q(1)  of the  EEC 
Treaty and  on  Article 7 of the  EURATOM  Treaty.  The  only  respect  in which  this 
does  not  coincide with  the  Commission  proposal  is that  the Articles 43  and  75 
of  the  E£C  Treaty  which  it also cited, no  longer appear2.  The  reasons  for 
their disappearance are not  relevant  to our  enquiry.  In  its opinion3  the 
European  Parliament  made  no  com•ents  on  the  legal basis  proposed. 
5.  The  procedure  under  Article 130  Q(2)  of the  EEC  Treaty might  be  applied to 
these proposals  if Article 130  F et  seq.  of the  EEC  Treaty were  the 
independent  legal basis for all research activities.  Article 130  F and  I  of 
the  ·EEC  Treaty  mention  'the Community•.  This  means  the  European  Economic 
Community  by  distinction from  the  ECSC  and  the EAEC.  This  is perfectly clear 
in  respect  of  the  E(SC  Treaty,  as  research activities under  that Treaty  are 
1  Council  Decision  of  28  September  1987  concerning  the  framework  programme 
for  Community  activities in the field of  research  and  technological develop-
ment  (1987-1991),  OJ  No.  L 302,  24.10.1987,  p.  1 et seq. 
2  OJ  No.  C 275,  31.10.1986,  p.  4;  see  in particular footnote  1 
3  Resolution  of  8  December  1986,  OJ  No.  C 7,  12.1.1987,  p.  19  et seq. 
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not  included  in  the  framework  progra••e because  of a  lack  of  institutional 
comparability  (see  the  prea~le to the  Council  decision).  The  sa•• is also 
true as  regards  the  EAEC,  with  which  the  EEC  shares a  budget.  The  ter• · 
'European  Community'  is politically attractive, and  internationally has  even 
received a  degree  of  recognition,  but  the  situation re•ains that there are 
three  Communities  with  three separate  legal personalities, established by 
Article 6 of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  Article 210  of the  EEC  Treaty  and  Article 184  of 
the  EURATOM  Treaty.  Article 32  of the •erger Treaty  has  not  changed  thia 
situation;  it may  forecast  the establish•ent of a  single European  co ..  unity, 
but  this has  not  yet occurred. 
6.  The  Com•unity  mentioned  in Article 130  f  and  I  of  the  EEC  Treaty  is 
therefore the  Economic  Com•unity  alone, which  does  not  include  the EAEC. 
Article 130  F et  seq.  of  the  EEC  Treaty  therefore governs  only  research 
covered  by  the  EEC  Treaty.  Radiation  protection progra ...  s  pursuant to 
Article 4<2>  of  the  EURATOM  Treaty  in  conjunction with  Annex  I, Chapter  VI, 
and  fusion  program.es  pursuant  to Article 4(2)  of the EEC  Treaty in 
conjunction with  Annex  I, Chapter  II<1><e>  fall  within the sphere of the 
EURATOM  Treaty. 
7.  The  Single European  Act  came  into  force  on  1 July 1987.  On  the general 
principle of  the  subsequent  measure  and  taking  into account  the  'spirit of the 
Single European  Act'  it might  be  thought  to have  superseded  the  procedures 
under  Article 7 of the  EURATOM  Treaty.  Even  matters falling within the sphere 
of  the  EURATOM  Treaty  would  then be  governed  by  the  new  procedures  under  the 
Single  European  Act.  Article 232(2)  of the  EEC  Treaty is the first stumbling 
block  to this theory,  stating that  the  EEC  Treaty, of which  Article 130f  et 
seq.  is a part, shall not  derogate  from  the provisions of  the  EURATOM  Treaty. 
It  is true that Article 232(1)  of  the  EEC  Treaty  sets out  the  relationship 
with  the  ECSC  Treaty  in different terms;  but  the difference is siaply the 
result  of  the different background:  the  EEC  Treaty  and  the cURATOM  Treaty 
came  into force at the  same  time,  when  the  ECSC  Treaty  had  been  in existence 
for years. 
8.  The  conclusion  to be  drawn  is clearly set out  in Article 32  of  the  Single 
European  Act.  These  provisions simply  express  the outcome  of the 
intergovernmental  conference,  to the  effect that the  Single  European  Act  would 
amend  the £URATOM  Treaty  and  the  ECSC  Treaty only  in  respect of the Court  of 
Justice and  the  ~stablishment of  one  institution  (the European  Council)  and 
the  appointment  of one  other  (the  European  Parliament>.  Article 7 of the 
EURATOM  Treaty  is therefore unaffected and  in relation to the  EEC  Treaty  is 
the  specific provision governing  research  programmes  in the  fields of  fusion 
and  radiation protection. 
9.  (b)  The  framework  programme  itself could  provide  the  legal basis. 
Article  2<1>  of  the  framework  programme  states that  that programme  shall be 
implemented  through  specific programmes.  Radiation protection and  controlled 
thermonuclear  fusion  are in fact  included  in Annex  II of  the  fra•ework 
programme.  The  present  proposals  therefore  represent  specific programmes  for 
the purposes  of  the  framework  programme.  They  are also included in the 
planned  budget  estimates. 
10.  If  the  framework  programme  and  the  related specific programmes  were  to be 
finally governed  by  Article 130  F et seq.  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  this would  amount 
to a  derogation  from  Article 7 of  the  EURATOM  Treaty. 
Article  7 of  the  EURATOM  Treaty  in fact  speaks  of  'research and  training 
programmes•  and  makes  no  mention  of  the  terms  'framework  programme'  or 
'specific programmes'.  Article 130  I,  K,  L,  M and  P of  the  EEC  Treaty 
ENC88)0156/0157E  - 31  - PE  116.137/fin. expressly use  the ter• 'the fra ..  work  progra ..  e' and  Article 130  K and  p of 
the  EEC  Treaty  •ention •specific progra ..  es'.  However,  fro• this  we  cannot 
draw  the  conclusion  that Article 130  F et seq. of the  EEC  Treaty alone  govern 
these  progra••es  and  that  the  procedures  under  Article 130  Q of the  EEC  Treaty 
should  then  apply: 
11.  For  one  thing  the  fra•ework  progra••e which  has  now  been  adopted  is 
expressly based  on  Article 7 of the  EURATOM  Treaty as well  and  not si•ply on 
Article 130  Q(1)  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  to which  the European  Parlia  ..  nt  has 
clearly agreed. 
For  another,  historical considerations also •ake  it clear that  the ter•s 
framework  progra••• and  specific progra••es cannot  si•ply be  regarded as  legal 
ter•s.  The  present  fra•ework  progra••e  had  a  predecessor which  also included 
the words  fra•ework  progra••• in its title, was  iapleaented through  specific 
progra ...  s, and  was  based  on  both  the  EEC  and  the  EURATOM  Treaties.  The  tera 
then  had  an  exclusively political significance:  its pu~se was  to provide  a 
conspectus  of all  research  activity in the fields  covered  by  the  EEC  and  the 
EAEC,  to provide  inforaation on  the anticipated financial burden  and  to 
achieve  a  proper  balance  between  nuclear  an6 non-nuclear  research.  With  the 
Single  European  Act,  what  had  been  exclusively political teras were 
established as  legal  teras within  the  sphere  of the £EC.  However,  this does 
not  change  anything  within  the sphere of the  EAEC,  in which  the political 
significance re•ains,  and  both  tenas are to be  subsuaed  within  the  wording  of 
Article 7 of the  EURATOM  Treaty.  The  fra•ework  progra ..  e  thus  contains two 
separate components:  the  EEC  part,  in  which  it is a  legal ter•, and  the  EAEC 
part, in which  the political •eaning still applies. 
12.  'Framework  program•e'  and  'specific progra••es'  are therefore ter•s which 
may  be  used  in the  EEC  Treaty  and  in the  EURATOM  Treaty, but  with  different 
meanings. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
13.  The  <o••ittee on  Legal  Affairs and  Citizens'  Rights  recommends  the 
Com•ittee  on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  to accept  the  legal bases 
proposed  by  the  Com•ission  in the  research  programmes  under  consideration. 
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<Rule  120  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure> 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Environment,  Public  Health  and  Consumer  Protection 
Drafts•an:  Mrs  BLOCH  von  BLOTTNlfZ 
At  its meeting  of  4 December  1987,  the  Committee  on  the  Environment, 
Public  Health  and  Consumer  Protection appointed  Mrs  Undine  BLOCH  von  BLOTTNITZ 
draftsman  of  its opinion. 
The  Committee  considered  the draft  opinion at  its meeting  of  Thursday 
25  February  1988,  and  adopted  it unanimously. 
The  following  took  part  in the vote:  Mrs  WEBER  (Chairman),  Mrs  SCHLEICHER 
(Vice-Presi~nt, Mr  PEREIRA  (Vice-President),  Mrs  BLOCH  von  BLOTTNITZ 
(Draftsman),  Mrs  BANOTTI,  Mr  BONINO,  Mr  DEVEZE  (deputizing  for  Mr  l~ PEN), 
Mr  FI~UEIREDO LOPES,  Mr  FITZSIMONS  (deputizing for  Mr  VERNIER), 
Mrs  LENZ-CORNETTE;  Mrs  LLORCA  VILAPLANA,  Mrs  MARTIN,  Mrs  SQUARCIALUPI, 
Ms  TONGUE  and  Mr  WEDEKIND  (deputizing for  Mr  AlBER). 
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Nuclear  fusion  is  the process  whereby  extremely  light nuclei,  usually 
those  of  the  isotopes  of  hydrogen  known  as  tritium  (3H>  and  d~uterium (2H),  fuse 
together  to produce  a  heavier  nucleus  such  as  helium  <~He>, with  a  considerable 
release of  energy.  The  energy  release occurs because  the  heavier  nucleus sits 
at  a  lower  energy  level  than  the  lighter ones,  and  energy  has  to be  given out  to 
get  down  to this  level.  Unfortunately,  electrostatic  repulsion between  the protons 
in  the  nuclei  has  to be  overcome  before  fusion  <involving  the enormously  powerful, 
but  very  short  range  ''strong nuclear  force'')  can  occur.  The  way  to do  this  (that 
is,  force  more  violent  collisions  to occur>  is to heat  and  compress  the aixture. 
The  hydrogen  bomb  does  this  by  using  an  'ordinary'  fission bomb  as  the  tr.igger. 
for  controlled thermonuclear  fusion,  however,  a  way  must  be  found  to heat  and  hold 
a  plasma 6n which  all  the orbiting electrons have  been  ripped  away  from  the nuclei) 
at  a  temperature  approaching 100  million degrees  centigrade.  Since  no  •aterial 
substance  can  do  this,  the  favoured  device at  present  is a ~~,  a  doughnut 
shaped toroidal  vacuum  chamber  in which  the  heated plasma  is contained without 
touching  the walls  by  a  powerful  magnetic  field produced  by  huge  electroaagnets. 
The  world's  leading  tokamak  experiment  is  the  European  Fusion  Research  Programmes 
JET,  situated at  Culham  in  the  UK.  (A  more  familiar  fusion device  is  the  sun, 
which  actually  runs  at  a  lower  temperature  because  of  its higher density>. 
The  Commission  Proposals 
According  to  COM~87)302, "the Community  Fusion Programme  is a  long-term 
cooperative project  embracing all the work  carried out  in the  Member  States  in 
the  field of  controlled  thermonuclear  fusion.  lt  is designed  to  lead  in due 
course  to  the  joint  construction of  prototype  reactors with  a  view  to  their 
industrial  production and  marketing  ..  (p.4).  The  Commission  has  chosen  Article 7 
of  the  Euratom  Treaty  as  the  legal  base  for  the proposal.  This  is co.mented  on 
separately  in  the  Conclusions  and  Reca.mendations  of  this opinion. 
The  present  strategy  is to extend  the  JET  experiment  to 1992,  to decide  on 
the  construction of  NET  (the Next  European  Torus>  by  1994,  with  completion around 
the  year  2000,  and  to proceed early next  century  to  the  construction of  DEMO. 
At  the  same  time,  research  will  also be  carried out  on  specialist devices  in 
national  laboratories  associated with  the  programme. 
JET  is designed  to  partly est .~lish  the  scientific  feasibility of  fusion; 
NET  phase  1 will  complete  this sta.e;  NET  phase  2  will  demonstrate  technological 
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feasibility;  and  DEMO  will  demonstrate  that  a  working  fusion  reactor  can  be 
built.  After  this  stage,  commercial  exploitation  is  ~xpected to  follow, 
probably  not  before 2030. 
The  overall  fusion  programme  has  so  far  cost  in  the order of  2.600  Mio  ECU. 
The  proposed  expenditure  in  the  new  1987-91  proposal  is 986  Mio  ECU.  As  for  the 
likely overall  costs of  the progra••e up  to the st•ge where  comMercial  feasibil~ty 
can  be  demonstrated,  a  figure of  20  billion ECU  would  seem  to be  a  rough  approxi-
mation.  <Source:  US  Congress  OTA  report  on  fusion:  .. Starpower  ..  October  1987>. 
The  present  proposal  from  the  Commission  concerns only  the next  five year  "rolling 
programme",  plus  the necessary  change  to  the JET  statutes to permit  the experiment 
to  run  until  1992  instead of  closing down  in 1990. 
There  are  similar fusion  research  programm~s in Japan,  the USA,  and  the 
USSR.  There  is also a  project  known  as  ITER  (International  Thermonuclear 
Experimental  Reactor>  which  proposes  to  combin~ all 4  of  the world's  leading pro-
grammes  to design,  and  possibly build,  a  sort of  World-NET  machine.  This  project 
is organised under  the auspices of  the  lAEA  in Vienna,  but  the site for  the 
meetings  of  the  Conceptual  Design  Team  has  b~en fixed at Garching,  near Munich, 
the  headquarters  of  the  NET  team. 
Comments 
The  basic  case  for  the development  of  fusion  power  is that  it offers  the 
only  environmentally  and  politically acceptable alternative  to  fast  breeder 
reactors  for  the  future  long  term  centralised production of electricity, assuming 
finite  reserves  of  coal  and  oil, and  a  limited contribution  from  renewabte  energy 
sources  and  conservation.  The  basic  assumption  is  thus  that  energy  production 
and  consumption  patterns will  continue more  or  l~ss as  they  are at present, 
and  that  therefore  an  energy  source which  uses  deuterium  as  its base  fuel  <with 
enormous  quantities present  in  sea  water>  and  which  breeds  its second  fuel, 
tritium,  from  a  blanket  containing  lithium  <large  resources  in  the earth's crust> 
is a  very  ~ttractive proposition.  Low  fuel  costsalone,  however,  may  not  be  ~nough 
to make  fusion  commercially  attractive,  since  the  capital  costs of  construction 
will  be  very  large  indeed.  Moreover,  the environmentally  clean  image  of  fusion 
is not  entirely accurate,  a  point  considered  further  below. 
Fusion  as  an  energy  research  programme 
It  is  impossible  to do  fusion  r•  search on  the  cheap:  experimental  and  proto-
type  reactors  have  to  be  built  on  vi· tually  the  same  scale  as  a  final  commercial 
reactor.  This  means  that  the  costs  ~f  fusion  research  are  high  in  relation  to all 
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Itt other  energy  technology  research  programmes  including  the  fast  breeder  reactor. 
It  is  therefore essential  that  fusion be  evaluated across  the  board  in comparison 
with  competing  long-term energy  resources.  The  basic  question here  is what 
is  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  fusion  research programme?  What  are we  foregoing 
in  terms  of  research  into  renewable  energy  resources  (inctuding perhaps expensive 
high  technology  space-based photo-voltaic systems>  and  conservation techniques 
if  we  commit  so  much  money  and  so much  scientific and  technological expertise 
to  this one  energy  source?  Furthermore  the case  for  the developaent  of  fusion 
rests on  certain future energy  scenarios;  but  your  draftsman  is not  convinced 
that  adequate attention has  been  paid  to other equally credible energy  scenarios 
which  involve  roughly  steady state energy production and  consumption.  During 
consideration of  the working  document  produced by  its rapporteur,  Membe~of the 
Committee  on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  referred to the growing  energy 
demand  in the developing world  as  reinforcing the  case  for  fusion.  Your  draftsman 
is of  the opinion  that  fusion,  because of  its extraordinary technological 
sophistication and  capital costs,  is only a  possible option for  the most  advanced 
industrialised countries  in the world. 
Uncertainties  facing  the  fusion  research programme 
It  is  clear  that major  uncertainties are still present  here,  and  include  the 
likely behaviour  of  an  ignited plasma;  the problems  of  running  supercooled super-
conducting magnets  close  to an  extraordinarily hot  plasma;  problems  deriving  from 
the  impact  of  14  MeV  neutrons with  the first wall  and  blanket materials  (these 
"carry"  the  heat  from  the  reactor,  but  also cause  radiological da•age>;  problems 
associated with  the  choice of  coolant;  problems  relating to the design and  con-
struction of  an  extensive  range  of  remote  handling facilities;  probleM  of  tritium 
handling,  and  so  on. 
It seems  to your  drafts•an that  the above  factors,  plus  the ones  •entioned 
below,  •ean that  a  working  fusion  reactor will be  an  extre•ely costly and  compli-
cated device;  at  least  as  complicated and  costly as  a  fission  reactor.  There  is 
no  consensus  on  the  likely  costs of  fusion generated electricity.  The  Commission's 
expert  study of  the  likely costs,  published as  a  separate "Statement"  in 
COMC87)302  final,  concludes  that  fusion  costs should be  within a  factor of  2  to 3 
of  fission costs,  and  maybe  lower  still.  On  the other  hand,  Colin  Sweet  <Centre 
for  Energy  Studies,  London>  in his  inte• im  report  presented  to  the  STOA  fusion 
Workshop  CJET,  12-13  Nov.1987>  noted wi  :,  reference  to  the  Commission  study  that 
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~3 "We  find  the  approach  to  the  long  ter• resource  costs and  the possible benefits to 
be  seriously defective.  we  can  only  take  the  view  that  the  economic  study  is not 
so  much  inadequate  as  misconstrued and  ought  to be  put  to one  side and  new  efforts 
•ade  to assess economic  feasibility which  are consistent with •ainstrea• energy 
investment  appraisal  techniques  and  resource evaluation".  (p.4).  Even  .are provoca-
tively,  Dr  K-H  Schmitter and  Dr  o.  Pfirsch of  the  Max  Planck  Institut  fUr  Plasmaphysik, 
in a  communication  to  the  EP  STOA  project dated 21/12/87, state that "a  tokamak 
power  plant  would  be  at  least  10  times,  but  •ore likely 20  ti•es as expensive  as a 
PWR  of  equal  net  power." 
A fusion  reactor would  be  intrinsically auch  safer than a  fission reactor.  It 
does  not  contain a  large amount  of  heavy  radionucleides,  and  it cannot  suffer from  a 
runaway  'nuclear excursion'  of  the  Chernobyl  type,  since there  is only a  relatively 
smatl  amount  of  fuel  present at any  one  time,  and  in any  case disturbances to the 
plasma  tead to collapse of  the confinement,  and  the  reaction stops.  Nonetheles$ 
accident  scenarios  can  be  i•agined which  would.result,  for exa•ple,  in a  release of 
200  gm  of  tritium to the environment  (COM<87>302  final). 
Routine  production of  radioactive substances 
The  most  significant environmental  problem,  which  may  prove  to be  the most  signi-
ficant  political problem  facing  the development  of  fusion,  is that of  the  routine 
generation of  substantial quantities of  radioactive •aterial.  Most  of  this  is 
produced  by  the  int.ense  neutron bombardment  of  the  first  wall  and  blanket  materials by 
the  14  MeV  neutrons  produced  in the plasma  by  the  fusion  reaction.  These  materials 
are  likely to be  special  steels which  have  been  developed  to have  a  low  activat,ion 
potential.  Even  so,  the  total amount  of  radioactivity present  in such  materials at 
the end  of  a  fusion  reactor working  life would  be  nearly as  high  as  those  in a  fission 
reactor.  It would  be  present  in the more  benign  form  of  structural steels rather  than 
in  liquids or gases,  and  thus  will  pose  less of  a  biological  hazard,  but  this material 
is radioactive waste,  and  each  working  1GW  fusion  reactor might  be  expected  to produce 
several  hundred  tonnes  of  such  waste •aterial per year.  Clearly,  then,  if a  country 
adopted  fusion on  a  large scale,  then perhaps  10,000  tonnes  of  the •aterial· will  be 
produced  each  year  due  to  regular  replacement  of  first wall  and  blanket  segments.· 
Precisely  how  problematic  these wastes  would  be  remains  uncertain.  CQM<87>  302 
concludes  that  "deep  geological  disposal  would  not  be  required"  <annex  ··~~tatement 
p.8>.  The  ESECOM  report  produced  by  the  La·~rence Livermore  Laboratory,  USA,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  Dr  JotnHoldren  (1987,  .n  print>  states that  "In some  of  the 
reference designs  examined  by  ESECOM,  all  ,f  the  radioactive wastes  would  qualify  for 
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.  ~·· shallow burial  under  the  logic  of  current  regulations··  <Summary,  p.75>. 
Your  draftsman  would  draw  your  attention,  however,  to a  report  published by 
the  UK  National  Radiological  Protection Board  in December  1987,  entitled 
"Radiological  Aspects  of  the Management  of  Solid Wastes  from  the Operation of 
0-T  Fusion  Reactors"  (J.P.  Davis  & G.M.  Smith,  NRBB  - R.210),  which  appears  to be 
an  extremely  thorough  investigation of  this problem,  and  which  concludes  t~at: 
"1.  None  of  the  candidates  for  first  wall  and  breeder blanket Materials· 
appear  to give  rise to wastes  suitable for direct disposal  to shallow  land burial 
facilities  <  ••••  )  ••••  the activity  levels  in the wastes are significantly above  the 
upper  limit  for  low-level  waste" •••• 
The  report  concludes  that deep  geological or deep  ocean disposal probably 
would  be  possible,  but  presumably  this will  add  considerable costs to fusioh  power 
generation.  The  report  also concludes,  in contrast  to COMC87>302  and  the  ESECOM 
report,  that  there  is little long-term advantage  from  the use  of special  low-
activation steels or vanadium  alloys,  because of  the problematic generation of 
carbon-14  and/or  rhenium-186.  Indeed  "14c  is unusual  in that, once  released,  it 
ijs  both  suffici~ntly long-lived and  mobile  in the environment  to become  dispersed 
over  the entire globe before it decays substantially"  (NRPB  210,  op  cit, p.11). 
Lastly there  is  the  problem  of  the  routine production of  tritium, which,  being 
the  third  isotope of  hydrogen,  is the  third smallest  atom  in  the  known  universe, 
and  hence  extremely difficult  to contain.  It is so  small  that  it diffuses gradually 
through  r.ontainment  materials.  It  is  radioa~tive  ~~>, and  presents  a  serious radio-
logical hazard.  Ylether  the  estimated 800  T8q  <=  8x1o14  Bq)  per arrua routine  release froa a camercial 
fusicn  reactor  is a hazard  ;s a matter of debate  (C()1(87)  302,  arnex  p.33> 
Conclusions  and  recommendations 
Defined  in  its own  terms,  which  are  largely so far  those of  science,  the 
European  Fusion Research  Programme  can  be  seen as  a  very  successful example  of 
European  collaborative strategic research.  Defined as a  progra ..  e  ai•ed at  the 
competitive production of electricity,  there  is still a  very  long  way  to go.  It 
is clear that major  decisions  about  the  future  stages of the  fusion  research pro-
gramme  will  have  to be  taken  in  the early 1990's, but  the current  proposal  from 
the  Commission  does  not  pre-empt  these decisions:  indeed,  the  Co.mission  argues  that 
necessary  information will  have  to be  provided  from  the next  five-year  programme 
to ensure  that  informed  decisions  are  made  for  the  next  phase,  and  that  before  these 
decisions  are  made,  ••the  Commissir  will  undertake  an  in-depth evaluation of  the 
fusion  progra•me,  including  the  e··lVironmental  and  economic  aspects"  (COMC87)  302 
final  p.82>.  Your  draftsman~  1gly  recommends  that  any  such  evaluation should  ~e 
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ItS completely  independent  of  the  Commission  Fusion  PrograMme,  since previous evalua-
tions appear  to have  involved mainly  the e•inent members  of  the  international  fusion 
research  community,  hardly a  neutral  forUM.  The  European  Parliaaent's STOA  Project 
Fusion  Study  is an  excellent first step in the direction of  enabling "outsiders" 
to contribute to the  fusion debate,  given the  li•ited resources at its disposal. 
The  STOA  Fusion  Workshop  held at  JET  in Nove•ber  1987  was  particularly valuable  in 
letting more  daylight  into a  very  ca.plex subject area, and •ay have  resulted  in 
subtle changes  of  attitude a.angst  the participants.  Consideration should be  giv~n 
to the possibility that  the  European  Parliament •ight be  the •ost appropriate body 
to organise the next  external evaluation of  the fusion prograMme. 
With  respect  to the  current  five  year program•e  proposal, it would  probably be 
churlish to place any  obstacles  in its way  since it is essentially work  in prepara-
tion for  the key  decisions of  the early 1990's. Moreover,  during  this period the 
ITER  design  team  should  reach  the stage where  it will be  possible to decide which 
step,  if any,  to  ta~e next.  Alternatively,  the entire programme  could be 
cancell~d now,  thereby  saving a  great  deal of •oney.  Nonetheless,  the problem 
of  the  legal base  remains.  The  Com.ission has  chosen  Article 7 of the 
Euratom  Treaty,  which  covers  research  carried out under  the aegis of the 
Euratom  Treaty  - i.e. nuclear  research.  But  the fusion  proposals "are 
programmatically and  financially  coherent  with  the Decision  concerning  the 
framework  Programme  of  Coamunity  Activity in the field of Research  and 
Technological  developments"  (COM  <87>  302,  p3).  In other words  the 
fusion  programme  is being  treated effectively as part of  the  Fra•ework 
Programme,  the  specific programmes  of which  are subject to the  cooperation 
procedure  with  the  European  Parliament  according  to Article 130<q><2>  of 
the  Eet  Treaty  as  amended  by  the Single Act. 
It is politically indefensible to deny  the use  of  the  cooperation procedure 
for  the single most  expensive  research progra ..  e  in the  European Community  budget. 
It is a  denial  of  adequate  democratic  control  by  the directly elected European 
Parliament.  ·An  insistance on  the  legal  correctness of  Euratom  Article 7  by  the 
MeMber  States can  only  be  seen  as farcical when  one  considers  that  huge  swathes 
of  the ·Euratom  Treaty  have  never  been,  and  will never  be  properly applied by  the 
sa•e Member  States. 
Accordingly,  the  Committee  strongly reca.mends  that  the  Committee  on  Energy, 
Research  and  Technology  should anider chall~ing tbe  legal  base ~  a-d should  seek 
to ensure  that Article  130<g>~> is used  instead. 
Lastly,  it is noteworthy  that  in its recent  proposals  for  the  reorganisation 
of  the  Joint  Research  Centre,  the Coemission  •akes considerable  reference  to the 
customer/contractor principle  in the organisation of  applied  research.  If  this 
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·.: :  ~ :  . . .  ' . ,•: ..... :  ,  ~ .. ' principle were  to be  applied to  the fusion progra ..  e,  then  the  logical  conclusion 
would  be  to •ake  OG  XVII  <Energy)  the custOMer  for  this applied energy  R & 0 
programme,  and  OG  XII  (Science,  Research &  Devel~nt) the executive contractor. 
This  would  ensure  that  fusion  had  to be  justified as an  energy  research  invest•ent, 
rather  than  as  the  favoured  option of  fusion  scientists and  engineers.·  ... The 
Committee  feels  that  this is an  essential  feature of  the custo.er/contractor 
principle which  should be  closely borne  in •ind by  the  C~ittee on  Enerpy,  Research 
and  Technology. 
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I 
FUSION  RESEARCH:  CONTEXT  AND  SCALE 
Judy  Clark  and  Gordon  HacKerron 
Science Policy Research  Unit 
University of Sussex 
Brighton  BNl  9RF 
1.  This  short  paper  is  intended  to contribute to the  STOA  initiative on 
fusion  research  in  Europe.  It is based  on  our  knowledge  of fusion  research 
and  othP.r  energy  R&D,  and  on  our  attendance at the very  useful  workshop 
held  at Culham  Laboratory  on  November  12  and  13,  1987  as  part of the  STOA 
project. 
2.  Technology  assessment  of  fusion  (or  of  anything  else)  can  be  either 
'internal'  or  •external•.  Fusion  is still at a  point  of predominantly 
s~ientific  d~velopment with  thP  bulk  of  SP.rious  technological  and 
engineering  development  still  to be  done,  so  internal  review  necessarily 
remains  a matter  of judging  the scientific quality of  the work  and  ensuring 
that  funds  allocated are  used  to the greatest advantage.  This  is an 
important  task  in  itself but. it doP.s  lean  heavily  on  the  expertise of 
scientific pPer  groups  and  science administrators:  the contribution of 
outsiders  is necessarily  limited.  MorP.  difficult,  but  equally  important, 
is the external  review  of fusion.  This  is the attempt  to evaluate  its 
priority and  success  (present  and  future)  in  the context  of other  energy 
research  whose  products  may  compete  with  it.  The  problems  inherent  fn  all 
such  external  reviews  are more  acute  in  the  case  of  fusion  because  of  the 
unique  character  of the enterprise in  terms  of  its time-scale,  R&D  costs. 
and  scientific. technological  and  P.ngineering  ambitions. 
3.  In  the  context  of extPrnal  review.  our  stress on  alternative lines of 
enP.rgy  research  is of fundamP.ntal  importance.  For  the  individual  countries 
of  EuropP.,  collahorAtion  plus  the  financial  contrihution made  hy  the 
European  Communities  has  helped  to keep  national  annual  fusion  expenditures 
small  relative to total  P.nergy  R~O commitments.  If fusion  development 
continues  along  the  lines explained  ~t the workshop.  then  it seems 
inevitable that the  sums  expendPd  must  get  substantially larger  (we  return - 2 -
to this point  later), and  thP.refore  that this situation must  change. 
Nonetheless.  in  1986,  the  leading  lEA  nations  in  the European  fusion 
progra1nme  were  already  spending  more  on  fusion  research  than  on  all 
renewable  sources  of  energy  put  together,  and  (with  the exception  of 
Britain)  than  on  energy  conservation,  while  fusion  has  commanded  the 
largest slice of the CEC  energy  R&D  budget  (varying  between  33  and  49  per 
cent)  since 1981. 
4.  The  larger sums  spent  on  fusion  reflect the  inherently more  costly 
nature  of  fusion  research  compared  to renewables  or conservation  research. 
It is also  important  to note  that  the  present  sums  expended  on  fusion  are, 
for  the stage of  development  reached,  large 1n  relation to all  other energy 
technology  research,  including  the fast  breeder  reactor.  By  stage of 
development  we  refer to the spectrum  of  activities along  a continuum  from 
research,  through  development  and  demonstration,  to commercially 
sustainable diffusion.  Fusion  research  - in the era  of  JET  - is squarely 
in  the  reserch  category;  it is hardly  possible to argue  that a  significant 
amount  of  development  work  has  yet  taken  place.  This  makes  JET  broadly 
comparable  to the  laboratory  reactor stage  of  fast  breeder  research,  or 
testing to confirm  the  principle of  a wave  power  device.  The.JET  project 
itself amounts  to more  than  just the construction  of  a  large machine,  and 
in  turn  is complemented  by  a  larger Community  fusion  programme,  the costs 
of  which  are  shown  in  Table  1  (1986  prices  and  January  1986  exchange 
rates).  The  cost  of  fusion  research  may  be  compared  with  those  for  wave 
power,  an  equally  novel  technology;  the  UK  government  has  spent  about 
£27.5  million  (44.6  MioECU)  to  reach  the P.quivalent  of  the  end  of the JET 
stage  of  fusion.  The  108kW  experimental  wave  power  station being 
con:;;tructed  un  t.: ..  ~  I sl c  ()f  Isla)  is  .·Xi":•!C.t.'!~.
4  to  cost  i~l.  ~:3  l!lill ion  to  build 
(~~.37 ::ioEC!I);  tiS  tlds  Sltvlll:'  proriUCf'  PlPCt.ricity  it Cnl\  f.,•  consicil.!red  ctt 
le;,st  equivalPnt  to the  NET  st11g\!  of  fu5ion  (\t~hir.•·.  Nill  nnt).  Fusion 
research  costs  may  also  us~fully bP.  compared  to those  for  the fast  breedP.r, 
as  the  energy  technology  most  nearly  approaching  it in  comp1P.x1ty.  Fast 
brP.eder  research  in  the  UK  (19~4-1982)  is estimated  to have  cost  some 
i2700m  of  public  money  (4360  MioECU)  (1986  prices)  to take  the  technology 
to the  stage  of  an  e  1  ect ric  i ty-produc i ng  2SOt1~1e  prototype  reactor;  that 
is. to the equivalent  of  the most  successful  possible  outcome  of  the  DEMO 
('demonstration'  -see below)  stage with  fusion. 1. 
• 
2. 
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Table  1 
European  expenditures  on  fusion  research  : 
1976-86  and  forecasts  for 1987-91 
(1986  prices and  January  1986  exchange  rates) 
1976-1986  MtoECU 
(a)  General  Progranme  (Cormaunity  648 
expenditure  only) 
(b)  General  Programme  (Member  States'  1350* 
expend1turP.) 
{c)  JET  project  (Community  + Member  .  634 
States'  expenditure) 
[JET  construction cost  :  630  mioECU  (£388m)] 
Estimates  1987-91 
(a)  General  Progranne  (Community  expenditure)  533 
(b)  General  Programme  (Member  States)  1117 
(c)  JET  Project  (Community  + Member  States)  531 
(d)  Construction  of  NET  not  included 
2181 
(&I) 
(400) 
(833) 
(390) 
(328) 
(688) 
(327) 
[NET  construction cost. preli•inary est1-.te :  2760  •ioECU  (f1700.)] 
Note:  *  It is difficult to obtain  accurate  figures  for  this item.  The 
estimate made  is  cons~rvat1ve :  that  is. actual  P.xpenditures  are 
almost  certainly under-estimated  rather  than  over-estimated. 
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5.  There  is a crude  rule of thumb  that ratio of expenditures  on ·the 
successive  stages  of  research,  development  and  demonstration  commonly· 
amounts  to 1:10:100.  It may  well  be  that the two  later stages of fusion 
development  will  entirely defy  this admittedly mechanistic  (but  empirically 
based)  rule, and  prove  to he  comparatively  cheaper.  However,  Dr  Epstein  of 
the  US  Congress  Office of Technology  Assessment  told us  at the workshop 
that the  US  fusion  community  will  probably  need  to spend  a further $20. 
billion (roughly,  22.5  BioECU),  alone  or  in  collaboration, before  1t will 
be  possible to sensibly assess  fusion•s  economic  potential.  This  does  not 
suggest  that  fusion  will  prove  radically different, in  tenMs  of successive 
stages  of cost  increase,  from  other technologies. 
6.  All  this  points  clearly to the  fact  that, before  many  years  have 
passed,  continued  fusion  development  along  the  lines of current thinking 
will  lead  to a situation in  which  expenditure  on  the  European  programme 
become  noticeable  on  a national  scale (unless  the Community  allocation to 
fushion  increases  vP.ry  substantially).  In  either case,  expenditures  will 
hecome  even  larger in  relation to existing energy  research  alternatives. 
To  argue  that this  is not  yet  so  is to ignore  that  imminent  decisions,  for 
example,  on  NET,  will  bring  such  a day  much  closer.  We  therefore regard  it 
as  essential  that,  in  principle,  fusion  he  evaluated  across  the  board  in 
relation to competing  long-term  energy  sources.  In  other words,  there is 
an  important  element  of  opportunity  cost  - other  research  opportunities 
foregone  and  the  alter-native  employment  of  valuable  scientific and 
engineering  skills - in  pursuing  the  current  and  proposed  form  of  the 
European  fusion  programme. 
7.  This  raises the question  of what  alternatives exist to fusion  power. 
Excluding  fast  hreeder  reactors, the  representatives of the  fusion 
community  at  the workshop  identified only  coal, to which  other  participants 
rightly added  renewable  energy  sources.  (To  be  fair, memhers  of  the fusion 
community  have  elsewhere  irlentified solar  photovoltaic  power  stations as 
possible competitors).  We  suggest  the  further  addition  of  research  on 
enP.rgy  conservation  anrl  energy  efficiency.  This  is related to the 
important  question  of the  general  shape  of  the energy  future  into which  a 
commercial  fusion  reactor  would  he  implanted.  There  is a need  for 
extremely  long  term  speculation  here  because  of the extended  time-scale - 5  -
over  which  fusion  could  possibly  become  a commercial  proposition.  The 
current  vision  within  the  fusion  programme,  as  reported  as  the workshop, 
'  seems  to assume  an  inevitable high  energy  future  - a scenario  in  which 
energy  demand  has  grown  inexorably  and  seemingly  without  obvious  limit or 
saturation.  This  is clearly one  possibility and  should  be  considered. 
However,  other  possibilities also exist,  no  less  implausible,  including 
scenarios with  much  lower  energy  demand.  These  futures  could  result partly 
from  the application of generic  new  technologies  like micro-electronics 
(for example,  to control  systems)  and  new  materials  (for example,  lighter 
materials  replacing  heavier  ones)  but  also  partly from  deliberate energy 
R&D  strategies which  emphasise  conservation  and  efficiency.  After all, 
technology  can  only  become  available if the  R&D  is performed.  There  is 
therefore an  element  of  circularity and  the  self-fulfilling prophecy  here. 
If a high  energy  future  is expected,  and  fusion  is reckoned  to be  essential 
to its achievement,  the consequence  may  be  increasingly  heavy  spending  on 
fusion  R&D,  and  (the opportunity cost  point)  a consequent  neglect  of  the 
possibilities of  research  aimed  at enabling  lower  energy  futures  via 
conservation  and  more  efficient energy  use.  A similar argument  applies  to 
a  second  aspect  of  the  energy  future  implicitly projected within  the  fusion 
programme  - that it will  be  one  in  which  electricity is the overwhelmingly 
dominant  energy  carrier and  economies  of  scale turn  out  to favour  high 
capacity  generating  plant. 
B.  But  whatever  may  be  true about  the opportunity  cost  of  fusion 
research,  low  energy  futurPs  are at least a serious  possibility and  a 
tninimal  condition  for  the  evaluation  of  fusion  research  would  be  to test 
the  robustness  of  fusion  against  low,  as  well  as  high,  energy  futures. 
9.  In  the  context  of  alternatives and  opportunity  costs, it is important 
to  remember  that while  fusion  is scientifically unique,  it is far  form 
exceptional  in  energy  tenms.  This  is because  fusion  is a  route  to the 
productio~ of  electricity,  and  there are  many  other  routes,  including 
fission  (thermal  and  fast),  coal  (including  combined  heat  and  power  and 
combined  cycle  gasifiers),  and  many  renewables.  A failure on  fusion's  part 
\o~ould  not  deprive  us  of  the  availability of  electricity:  merely  of  one 
possible  way  of  obtaining  it.  In  other words,  fusion  power  is not  an 
example  of  an  economically  revolutionary  technology;  it would  not  allow - 6 
us  to  do  sornr.th i ng  m~w or  different that we  cannot  do  a  1  ready.  The  ana 1  ogy 
made  hy  a  mP.mbP.r  of  the  r.EC  team  at the  workshop  b~tween fusion  and 
aerospace  technology  is therefore not,  in  energy  or  economic  tenns  va11d. 
~Ji thout  aerospace  techno 1  ogy  we  cannot  fly;  "'i thout  fusion  we  can  still 
have  nlectricity.  In  this very  important  energy  and  economic  sense,  fusion 
power  is therefore  very  diff~rent to recently-devP.loped  areas  of  science 
and  technology  such  as  micro~lectronics, which  is radical  both  in that it 
has  applications  over  the whole  spectrum  of  technological  tasks  and  in  that 
it admits  us  to entirely new  activities. 
10.  Of  course,  it mity  be  that the  economic  benefits of fusion  would  turn 
out  to  be  very  largP.  if the technology  can  bP.  commercia11sed.  It is of 
course  exceptionally difficult to evaluate any  ben~fits because  of the  long 
time  horizon  hcfore  they  could  become  apparent.  It is  howev~r, important 
to  note  that the  idoa  of  'incxhaustibilty•  of  fusion  power  (not  one,  ft 
must  be  said,  claimed  by  participants  in  the  workshop,  hut  one  that 
commonly  characterises  fusion  PR)  is  not  the  same  thing  as  large economic 
benefits.  Inexhaustihility can  only  possibly  refer to the availability 
over  time  of  'fuel'  inputs  to fusion  and  this notion  therefore applies 
equally to the  ren~wable sources  of  power.  What  is more  important  is the 
availability of  power  at  any  particular time  and  in this context  what  are 
not  inexhaustible are the capital  investment  resources  needed  to get  useful 
energy  out  of  'inexhaustible'  inputs.  If current  research  trends  are 
followed,  it seems  virtually  inevitable that  fusion  reactors will  he  large, 
complex,  and  P.xpPnsive  to builrl.  For  fusion's  benefits to be  large,  either 
substantial  impr~vements will  he  needed  here,  or  (and  hP.rein  lies the 
importance  of eneryy  futures  and  scenarios),  competing  sources  of  energy 
will  need  to hecome  r.xtrP.mely  scarce  ~nd expensive. 
11.  Our  final  issue concerns  the stages  of  future  development  of  fusion. 
Fusion  community  repr~sP.ntativP.s at  C:ulham  suggPsted  that there might  he  -
only  two  further  stagPs  - NET  and  a  'demonstration'  machine  (OEMO)  - bPfore 
utilitiPs might  ordPr  fusion  rt-'!actors  on  a  fully commercial  basis.  All 
earlier expericnc0  with  comparahlc  technologies,  for  examplP.,  fast  brP.Pder 
rf'actors,  suggP.sts  that  this  is  optimistic to the  point  of  unreality.  It 
is  of  paramount  important~' to  remP.mher  that  in  the  JET  - NET  - DEMO 
SE~qu~nce,  only  nEr~o  is,  conceptufllly,  a  fully  P.nginP.P.rf'd  power  producing .. 
:  ~ 
i 
I 
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reactor.  (JET  is a  plasma  physics  experiment;  NET  is essentially a 
test-bed device  which  will  not  produce  el~ctricity and  research  with  it 
will  in  fact  begin  with  a  plasma  physics  phasP.,  although  to succeed,  NET 
will  need  to produce  ignition or  something  approaching  it).  The  idea  that 
in  so  complex  a tP.chnology  as  fusion  there  n~ed be  only  one  power-producing· 
device  before  full  commercialisation  is achieved  contradicts all  earlier 
P.xperience.  For  instancP.,  in  British devP.lopment  of  fast breeder  reactors 
tht~  sequencP  of  pilot  reactor  (OFR)  followed  by  prototype  reactor (PFR)  has 
not  been  enough  to persuade  utilitiP.s to take  a  serious  interest in  them; 
the  building  of  a commercial  demonstration  reactor  is awaited.  Given, 
then,  that a  comm~rcial  fusio·n  reactor would,  according  to the fusion 
scientists at  the  wor~shop, need  to  ~nhody substantial  technical  changes 
compared  to  DENO,  WP.  suggest  that,  rP.alistically. at least one,  and 
possibly  two  further  pre-commercial  large devices  would  be  needed  prior to 
real  commercialisation.  This,  if accepted,  has  major  implications  for the 
timescale  and  cost  of  fusion  RO&O. 
12.  Adequate  Pxternal  review  of  a technolog.v  so  unique,  complex  and 
long-term  as  fusion  is an  exceptionally difficult task.  We  have  sought, 
in  this brief paper,  to  outline  so~e of  the  major  issues  that we  believe 
such  an  external  review  should  consider,  not  in  the  belief they  admit  of 
easy  resolution,  hut  in  thP.  conviction  that they  do  need  to be  drawn  out 
as  fully as  possibl~  • Section V 
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Fusion  is one  of the first three areas of investigation chosen·by the 
European  Parlia•ent•s experiaental  project in technology assess.ent -the STOA 
Project - which  was  launched earlier in 1987.  The  European  Parlt ..  ent has 
always  taken •  close interest in the European  Fusion Progr .... in aeneral  and 
the JET  (Joint European  Torus)  Joint Undertaking  in particular.  The  reason 
for looking  at fusion at this stage is to help to clarify the various issues -
scientific,  technical,  econo.ic,  political  and  environaental  -which are 
likely to be  relevant as a  nu•ber of key  decisions of the future of  Europe~n 
research  in controlled ther•onuclear fusion  co•e  up  on  the horizon. 
It is not STOA's  job to aake  political  decisions,  and  the ~urrent 
investigation,  including the Workshop,  is not  intended to replace the nor•al 
syste• for  consulting the European  ParliaMent  on  Co••ission proposals. 
There  are two  distinct aspects to STOA's  work  on  fusion.  The  •ain STOA 
Report  on  the European  Fusion Research  Progr ..  •e will  be  published in the 
su••er of 1988  and  will  concentrate on  the long-ter• issues and  questions of 
interest to the European  ParliaMent,  in particular those that relate to the 
key  decisions to  be  taken  in the early 1999's and  the possible consequencies 
of these decisions.  As  part of the process of preparing this report,  the STOA 
Fusion  Project organised a two-day  Workshop  at the JET  Joint Undertaking  in 
the  UK  on  12  and  13  Hove•ber  1987,  where  experts and  officials fro• the 
European  Fusion  Research  Progra••e exchanged  views  with  independent  experts in 
the presenee of MEPs.  The  revised views  of the independent  experts present at 
the STOA  Fusion  Workshop  will  be  incorporated  into the final  STOA  Fusion 
Project Report,  but  STOA  believes that the contributions ••de by  the 
participants at the Workshop  •ay help to infor• the debate to be  held  in the  , 
European  ParliaMent on  the report  p~epa~ed by  "r Al•an  "ETTEH  for the 
Com•ittee  on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  CDoc  A2-l2B/87))  on  the proposal 
fro• the Co••ission for •  council  Reaulation adopting  a research and  training 
prograaae  (1987-1991)  in the field of controlled ther.onucle•r fusion,  and  the 
proposal  for  a  Council  Decision  •pproving  a•endMents  to the Statutes of the 
Joint European  Torus  CJET)  Joint Undertaking  CC~C87)382 final>. 
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Dr  Gerald  Epstein,  author of the recent fusion report bv  the Office of 
Technology  Assess•ent of the us  Congress  in Washington,  Professor Jochen 
Benecke  of the Sollner Institut in "unich,  Professor Josi c ..  pos  of the 
University of "adrid,  Dr  John  Davies  and  Dr  John  L.wson  of Rurtherford 
Appleton  Laboratory,  "r Robert Carruthers,  retired technology dtrector of 
Culha•,  Dr  Gordon  ".cKerron  and  "s  Judy  Clarke of the Science Policy Resa.rch 
Unit,  University of Sussex,  and  "r Colin sweet  of the Centre for Energy 
Studies,  South  Bank  Polytechnic. 
The  presentations on  behalf of the European  Fusion  Proar ...  e  and  JET 
were  •ade  by  Dr  Paul-Henri  Rebut,  Director of JET,  Dr  Charles "aisonnier, 
Director of the European  Fusion  Progra••e,  Professor Pinkau,  Director of the 
"ax Planck  Institute of PlasMa  Physics,  Garching,  near "untch,  Dr  Roaano 
Toschi,  Head  of the HET  Tea•  and  "r RS  Pease,  Director of the UKAEA  Fusion 
PrograM•e. 
The  Workshop  was  chaired  by  Rolf  Linkohr,  "EP  CD,  Soc)•.  The  other 
MeMbers  of the European  Parli,.ent attending were  ~'d'e Tuner  CUK,  EDG>  -he, 
like "r Linkohr,  is a •e•ber of the STOA  Supervisory Panel  - Al•an  Mitten  CHL, 
Soc>,  who  is rapporteur on  fusion for the Coa•ittee on  Energy,  Research  and 
Technology,  Jaaes Elles  CUK,  EDG>,  MEP  for Oxford  and  Buckingh ..  shre,  Otto 
lardong  CD,  EPP>,  a "e•ber of the European  Parlia•ent•s Coa•ittee on  Budgetary 
Control  and  two  other "eabers of the Co••ittee on  Energy,  Research  and 
Technology:  Undine  Bloch  von  Blottnitz  CD,  Arc>,  and  "'dron Selia-an  CUK, 
EDO). 
In  addition,  the Workshop  was  attended  by  a  nu.ber of observers, 
including specialist journalists. 
This  Background  Briefing is a  coapilation of the •ain presentations •ade 
at the Workshop,  edited where  necessary to avoid  unnecessary  duplication.  In 
addition,  the STOA  Fusion  Project has  provided  an  introduction to the basic 
scientific and  technological  aspects of fusion  research. 
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•  NOTE: 
D:W.  Ger.any  ,  UK:United  Kingdo•,  NL:The  Netherlands.  As  regards political 
group  affiliation,  Soc:Socialist Croup,  EDG:European  deaocratic Group 
Cincluding Conservatives),  EPP:Group  of the European  Pople•s Plrty (Christian 
DeMocratic  Group)  and  ARC:Rainbow  Group  Cincludtng Greens). 
THE  STOA  PROJECT  - IIACKGRCUID  IHFORMTION 
The  STOA  Project caMe  into existence as the result of a  report adopted 
by  the  European  ParliaMent on  18  october 1985.  That  report,  which  was  drawn 
up  for the Co••ittee on  Energy,  Research  and  Technology  CCERT)  by  one  of its 
Members,  Rolf  Linkohr,  reco••ended that the European  Parlia•ent should equip 
itself with  a facility •odelled on  the  Offi~e of Technology  Asses ..  ent fo the 
us  Congress,  albeit on  a saaller scale.  After this proposal  had  received the 
end~rsement of  the  plenary session,  it was  studied during  1986  and  plans were 
drawn  up  for  an  experiMental  project  in  •scientific and  Technological  Options 
AssP.~s•ent•  which  would  begin  work  early in 1987  and  operate for a trial 
period of  18  Months. 
on  6  February  1987,  the Supervisory Panel  of STOA  •et in Brussels  and 
decided  on  three initial  topics for  investigation: 
1.  The  re-organisation of telecoMMunications  in Europe, 
2.  Proble•s of transfrontier che•ical  pollution,  and 
1.  Controlled thermonuclear  fusion. 
The  Supervisory Panel  consists of five "e•bers of CERT,  alt-hough  the Project 
is being  fun  for the benefit of all  the Co••ittees of Parli,.ent.  Ideally, 
the functioning of STOA  would  be  de•and-led:  that is, it would  respond  to 
requests for  inforMation or •ssistance by  the various Parli,.entary Co.aittees 
arising fro• their norMal  work.  To  get the Project off to a start,  however, 
the decision was  taken to co••ence with  three areas of investigation likely to 
be  of •ore than short-ter• relevance to such  Co••ittees of the European 
- 5  - PE  121.237 ParliaMent  as  CERT,  the Co••ittee on  EconoMic  and  "onetary Affairs and 
Industrial  Policy  and  the Co••ittee on  the Environ.ent,  Public Health and 
Consu•er  Protection. 
The  "e•bers of the Supervisory Panel  of STOA  •re Michel  Poniatowski· CF, 
LDR>•  the Chairaan of CERT,  Bernhard  Silzer  CD,  EPP)  Uice-chair.an,  Felice 
Ippolito  CI,  LDR),  A•'d44  Turner  CUK,  EDG>  and  Rolf Linkohr  (D,  Soc>. 
There  is also  a  STOA  Project Tea•  of  EP  officials,  who  also continue to 
have  other duties  in the  EP  Secretariat- General.  The  STOA  Ad•instrator is 
Dick  Holdsworth  of the CERT  Secretariat.  The  STOA  Fusion  Project Leader  is 
Gordon  Lake,  of the Secret•riat of the Coaaittee on  the EnvironMent,  Public 
Health  and  Consu•er  Protection.  Fro•  the Directorate-General  for Research, 
there are John  Wittenberg  (Pollution Project Leader),  Anton  Lensen 
CTeleco••unications  Project Leader>,  Peter Palinkas  (Indicators/statistics) 
and  Ralph  Spencer  CLibrarian  and  docu•entalist).  The  Tea•  is advised  by 
Pietro Bianchessi,  of the  InforMatics  Directorate. 
STOA  is building  up  a Network  of  individuals and  organizations 
interested in keeping  abreast of  developMents  in European  parlia~ntary 
technology  assessMent.  "embers  of the Network  receive the STOA  Hewsletter. 
~ron maintians  contacts with  other spec;alised TA  bodies. 
~  NOTE: 
F~France,  O:Germany,  I=Italy and  UK:United  Kingdoa, 
Political  Groups:  LOR:Liberal  •nd  De•ocr•tic Refor•ist Group,  EPP:Group  of 
the European  People's Party  CChristian  DeMocratic  Group),  EDG:European 
DeMocratic  Group  <including Conservatives>,  Soc:Socialist Group. 
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Ato•s  are the  basic building blocks of the universe,  but  ato•s the•selves are 
coMposed  of sMaller  particles.  In  a si•ple •odel,  an  atOM  consists of a 
nuclcu' or central  core,  surrounded <at  a considerable distance)  by orbiting 
electrons,  rather like a •iniature •odel  of the solar syste•.  The  nucleus 
itself,  although only occupying  a ainute space within the centre of an  atom, 
accounts for over  99.9~ of a total  ato•~~ •ass.  It consists of a •ixture of 
protons  <carrying  a  positive electric charge)  and  neutrons  Cwhich  have  no 
charge),  and  is thus  positively charged.  The  orbiting electrons are 
negatively charged,  resulting in overall  electrical  neutrality for the ato•. 
Since  like charges repel,  the positively charged  protons in the nucleus  would 
repel  each other,  if this force were  not overco•e  by  an  even  aore powerful, 
but extre•ely short-range force which  'glues•  the •ixture of protons  and 
neutrons  <collectively known  as  nucleons)  together.  Just  how  tightly a 
nucleus  can  be  •glued•  together will  depend  on  the particular nUibers  of 
protons  and  neutrons  which  constitute a  particular nucleus. 
The  si•plest ato• of all,  hydrogen,  has  a  nucleus  consisting siaply of a 
single proton,  around  which  orbits a single electron.  Hydrogen  can,  however, 
exist in two  other for•s.  The  second  variety,  deuteriUM,  has  a  nucleus 
consisting of one  proton  and  one  neutron.  The  third variety,  tritiuM,  has  one 
proton  and  two  neutrons in its nucleus.  All  three variations are still forMs 
of hydrogen:  they  all  have  Just one  orbiting electron,  and  are thus 
che•ically identical.  <CheMical  behaviour is oouerned  by  the orbiting 
electrons,  not  by  the nucleus).  These  varieties of the s ..  e  cheMical  eleMent 
thus have  the saMe  atoMic  nuaber  <nuMber  of protons),  but  different ato•ic 
Masses,  because of the different nu•bers of neutrons  present.  They  are  known 
as  jsotopes of the eleMent. 
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nucleus  together is the bindjna  energy  per  nucleon.  The  total  aass of a 
nucleus  is always  less than  the sua of the aasses of its constituent nucleons 
- the missing  aass represents the binding  energy  of the nucleus,  accordtftl to 
Einstein's faaous  •••s-eneray equation E:"c2• 
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Since  the  binding  energy  is •aiven out•  as  you  aoue  to the centre of this 
graph  fro• either end,  then  in  •  sense the aost stable nuclei,  those of 
siMilar atoMic  numbers  to silver (47>,  can  be  seen  to be  sitting at the botto• 
of the  deepest  energy  valleys,  and  thus  in principle light nuclei  could  be 
••de to co•bine together  (undergo  fusion>;  or heavy  nuclei  could  be  aade  to 
split apart  (undergo  fission>,  so  as  to produce  •ore energetically stable 
nuclei,  together with  a  considerable release of energy.  The  problea is that 
high  •energy •ountains•  separate the deep  •energy valleys•,  and  energy  has to 
be  expended  to push  the nuclei  over these barriers. 
In  the case of nuclear fission,  ce~tain heavy  nuclei,  in particular those of 
certain isotopes of uraniua  and  plutoniua,  are so unstable that they only need 
the energetic i•put fro•  ao  inco•inQ  ne•Jtron  ~o persuade  thea to fall  apart, 
and  since the neutron  is rteutral,  it doe•n•·.:  aeet any  electrical  resistance en 
route. 
6.3 
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things are auch  aore difficult.  The  .ost pro.ising fusion reaction at present 
for  use  in a fusion reactor is that between  deuteriua and  trit1u.i,  .mt.ch  fuse 
together to for• a  heliUM  nucleus  plus  a  high  energy  neutron. 
+ ,.f  -)  He~ 
2 
Cdeuteriua)  <trittua>  (heliu•> 
C"eU:Million  electron volts) 
+  n'  0  + 
Cneutron) 
17.59  MeU 
cenergy) 
~th! energy  output is distributed approxi•ately 14.1"eu for the neutron,  and 
J.5"eu for the  heliua nucleus  <alpha  particle)) 
As  can  be  seen,  this reaction liberates Crelatively)  enor•ous  aaounts  of 
energy.  Burning  a single ato• of coal  Cie  carbon>,  would,  for ex ..  ple,  only 
liberate about  4eV  of energy:  the fusion  reaction is .ore than 4 •illion 
times  as  eneraetic. 
The  probleM  is that in order for such  a fusion reaction to occur,  the 
repulsive forces which  act between  positively charged  nuclei  have  first to be 
overca.e  before the powerful  nuclear glue  can  co.e into play.  Thus  the nuclei 
have  to be  aade  to collide with  each  other with sufficient force,  and  the 
basic way  to do  this is by  heating the aixture to ouer  a  hundred  Million 
degrees  centigrade,  at the saae tiae as  soaehow  keeping  it contained. 
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co•pressiva power  generated  by  an  •ordinary•  fission ~b  as  a triaaer for an 
uncontrolled fusion reaction- 1  ther.onuclear explosion.  The  sun,  lika all 
other stars,  is a very  co.plax fusion systea,  but  again  is not  very  useful  IS 
a aodel  of controlled theraonuclaar fusion  in a  power  station on  aarth. 
There  are  a variety of ~ays of  •containing•  an  extre•ely hot  pl ...  a. 
CAt  these teaperatures,  atoas  becoae  ionised:  their orbiting electrons are 
stripped away  leaving  positively charged  nuclei  and  negatively charged 
electrons in highly  energetic randoa  •otion.  This  is a  pl•••4·1 
Since  no  aaterial  substance can  withstand teaperatures of 188 aillion•c 
or More,  the Most  popular concept  has  been  to use  powerful  •aanetic fields to 
·create  a •aanetic  'bottle'  in which  to trap the plasma.  The  •ost successful 
configuration so  far is the tokamak  <fro• the Russian  acrony•  taken froa  the 
words  for  •toroidal  cha•ber with •agnetic coil'>,  announced  by  the·Soviet 
Union  in 1968. 
A toka•ak  is designed  to trap a  doughnut  shaped  ring of plas•a by  coabinina a 
powerful  externally generated  toroidal  •agnetic field with  a  poloidal  •agnetic 
field generated  by  driving an  electrical  current .round the rinD  of p1asaa. 
fhe  resultant field lines twist around  the plas•a as  they  extend  around  the 
rina. 
II 111k11 G COI!fllla 11m1y 
t{'  lfltll1lttic /Ieith to 
~,  tlw t:OnjiMmmJ 
coNipnulon klfDWI'Itu D 
tolitzmDk.: TIU$(tw•er 
Col& ttftl"  a curmtt in 
th, p/tumD, tJnd k«p il 
j/owir~~: TOI'Oid•l Fkld 
Ollis ond Pololal Field 
Coils combiM with·th' 
/iftd protjuad bl  ,,.~ 
Clllmtt j/owinlthrough 
IM  p/tumll ID tmll, 
~ic  /Mea that k«p 
t.~, P/ttsma DWIJ)•from 
""  WtUJs of  tit~ Plasma 
Yeael. The uhinrtllt' aim 
of fftlllnnic conlainmrnt 
IJIIfmJS il to producr a 
Mt of M..-etk F.eld 
Una thtU spirtJitJround 
the loroidtJI p/tU111tl 
Source:  New  Scientist,  26  November  19H7  \from  an  article by  Bill Spears: 
'Fusion  through  the  NET'> 
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other conti n••nt SUit-s 
Other  confine•ent syste•s are regarded  as  possible alternatives to the 
tokaaak.  A stclltrator is a toroidal  device  which  uses aagnetic coils 
arranged  in a  kind  of double  helix shape  around  the vacuua  chaaber  containing 
the plas•a, coupled with  inner and  outer annular coils.  These  result in a 
confining field which  does  not  depend  on  a  current flowing  through the plasea 
itself.  This  in turn aeans that the stellarator is designed to operate in a 
I 
steady state •ode rather than  using  pulses as  in the tok ..  ak  systea. 
The  stellarator design  concept  predates the tok ..  ak,  but  interest in helical 
designs  has  revived recently in several  fusion  laboratories. 
Design  variants on  the original stellarator concept  are soaetiaes known  as 
•beljotroni'· 
Another  alternative systea is that known  as Rgyerted  Field pinch.  which  as  in 
a  tokaaak  co•bines  an  externally generated  toroidal  field with  a.  plasaa 
current generated  poloidal  field.  The  difference is that the toroidal  field 
reverses direction near  the outside of the plasaa.  In this systea,  the  plas~,~ 
current driven  poloidal  field plays  a aore  iaportant role than the  toroid~l 
field,  and  consequently  the external  •aanets can ·be  saa11er  and  siapler.  The 
large  heating  effect provided  by  the plasaa current also reduces  the need  for 
other fores of  external  heating. 
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A co•pletely different approach  to controlled ther.onucle.r fusion  involves 
focussing  a series of high  power  lasers onto  a  pellet containing dluteriu. 
and/or tritiuM,  and  then  repeating this process  Many  tiMes  per second.  In 
theory,  a spherical  pellet can  be  •ade to iMplode,  with  the  te~perature and 
pressure  increasing draaatically as  the  iaplo~ion aoves  in towards  the centre 
of the  pellet.  Indeed  the density which  can  be  achieved  is thought  ~o be  of 
the order of  18  billion tiaes that of Magnetically confined  pl•saa,  and  this 
only  needs  to be  confined for aaybe  one  billionth of a second for the fusion 
reaction to take  place. 
~nfortunately auch  of the aathe•atics and  physics which  describes this 
iMplosion  process  is the sa•e as that used  in the desian of ther•onuclear 
weapons  and,  therefore,  areat deal  of intertial  ~onfined•ent work  is therefore 
still classified.  There  are also rather substantial  enaineerina proble•s in 
designing  a reactor using  a ranae of hiahly sophisticlted and  sensitive lasers 
which  have  to cope  with  an  explosion •aybe  equivalent to 118kg  of THT  several 
ti•es a second,  the energy  fro• which  •ust be  successfully transferred to an 
electricity generation syste•. 
There  is no  doubt  that the toka•ak  is the Most  hiahly developed  confine•ent 
concept,  but  the possibility reaains open  that fund ..  ental  probleas with it 
•ay one  day  lead ~o a  change  to another  preferred systeM.  The  difficul~y is 
that resources  are  not  large enough  to perMit  equal  developaent  of all 
possible systeMs.  The  situation is so•ewhat  analagous  to the early 
developaent  of the •otor car engine.  The  reciprocating internal  cOMbustion 
engine  eventually e•eraed  as  the •ost popular  design,  (despite the 
eccentricity of using  up  and  down  linear displaceMents  to generate rotational 
energy),  because  it works.  I¥  tha  toka~ak wo~~s, there will  not  be  a  areat 
incentive to Jevelop  an  alternativa. 
PliSI!a hc4tina 
s;nce the fusion  reaction occurs  only  at extre•ely high  te•peratures,  the 
plasma  has  to  be  heated  ;n order to start the reaction off.  A range  of 
different techniques  have  been  developed  to do  th;s. 
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Passing  an  electrical  current throuaht the  plasaa causes it to aat hotter, 
just as  passing  an  electric current through  the bars of an  electric fire 
causes the• to beco•e  hotter.  The  higher  the resistance in the conductors, 
the More  heat  is produced.  Unfortunately as  a  plas•a gets hotter,  the better 
it conducts  electricity,  and  therefore the  heating effect of the pl ..  •• 
current di•inishes. 
Radjo  frequency  heatjnq  <RfH) 
This operates in a siMilar Manner  to a  eicrowa~e o~en.  ElectroMagnetic 
radiation will  resonate with  particle  ~ibration/energy levels at specific 
frequencies,  increase the vibration/energy,  and  thereby  heat the plasea via 
collisions.  The  JET  experiMent  is Making  increasing use  of RFH. 
Heutral  bea•  jnjcction  CNBil 
This technique relies upon  transferring the  kinetic energy  of hiah speed 
neutral  particles,  usually  hydrogen  or deuteriuM  atoMs,  to the plasMa. 
Neutral  particles have  to be  used  because  charged  particles would  be 
blocked/deflected  by  the powerful  eaanetic fields confining the plasaa. 
Since,  howe~er,  it is only  possible to accelerate charged  particles,  the 
neutral  bea•  injection device first accelerates hydrogen  or deuteriu• ions 
(nuclei)  and  then  electrons are  added  to produce  the neutral  atoas which 
collide with  the plas•a particles. 
Compressjon  beatjnq 
Higher  plasMa  pressures created  by  •ore powerful  aagnetic confineMent  also 
increase plasaa teMperatures.  The  Reversed  Field Pinch  device would  atteapt 
to aake  the Most  of this characteristic. 
Heatjna  bu  alpha  partjcles 
The  0-T  fusion  reaction produces  a 3.5"eu  alpha  particle Cheliua  nucleus)  as 
well  as  a  14.1"ev neutron.  The  neutron,  carrying  no  charge,  usually escapes 
fro• the  plasMa  and  transfers its energy  to the first w•ll/bl•nket.  The  alpha 
particles,  four  tiaes heavier  and  positively charged,  will  usually collide 
with other particles in the  pl•saa,  thereby  heating it.  In  order for  a fusion 
reactor to  •work',  ie to generate auch  •ore power  than it consu•es,  the  plasaa 
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&8 will  have  to beco•e  ianjted.  That  is to say  the fusion reaction •ust he 
self-sustaining via the plas•a self-heating through  •lpha particle collisions. 
Once  this stage is reached,  •s with  an  ordinary do.estic fire,  there should  be 
no  need  for further external  heating,  just the provision of •ore fuel. 
QMQDStritina the &cjtntjfjc ftnihjlity of fniona  bretkdgMo  and ianitjg 
In order for fusion reactions to take  place,  the  plas•a •ust be  as hot  as 
possible,  as  dense  as  possible,  and  be  confined for as  long .s possible.  The 
so called Fusion  Product  is a •athe•atical  device for •easurina the success of 
fusion devices  in reaching reactor relevant conditions.  If the Central  Ion 
TeMperature,  Ti,  is •easured. in keU  Ctkeu =  11.6Million•c>;  the central  Ion 
Density,  ni  in ions per cubic •etre;  the Global  Energy  confine•ent Ti•e,  T~, 
in seconds,  then the Fusion  Product  is expressed  in units of .-l skeV. 
Reactor  relevant conditions need  a  Fusion  Product of 5xte21.-3skeV.  This 
would  be  achieved,  for exa•ple,  by  Ti:tBkeU 
ni:2.5X1B28.-l 
TE:2s. 
The  fundamental  problem  in reaching  these figures is that all  three factors: 
teMperature,  density  and  confine•ent ti•e,  tend  to be  inversely related.  The 
hotter a  plas•a is,  the  lower  its density tends to be,  and  the harder it is to 
confine.  The  MOst  successful  experi•ents so  far at JET  have  reached  a  Fusion 
Product  of 2x1e28M-3skeU. 
Another  way  of •easuring success  in fusion  experi•ents is to look  at the 
cnergu  gain  in the syste•.  Energy  gain,  Q,  is the ratio of the fusion  power 
output fro•  a  given  device  to the  input  power  injtcted into the plas.a.  No 
large experi•ental  device  ;n the  wor•lrl  yet uses  tritiu•,  so  no  fusion  power 
output  has  yet been  achieved.  Consequently  an  •equivalent•  Q is •easured, 
which  is defined  as  the Q  that would  have  been  resulted fro• the particular 
plas•a paraMeters  achieved,  if the plas•a had  been  fueled  equally by  tritiu• 
and  deuteriuM.  When  Q:1  the condition is described  as  "breakeven":  the 
output  power  equals  the  input  power.  It Must  be  stressed,  however,  th•t this 
•easure•ent only relates to the internal  energy  balance within the plasMa.  It 
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being  transMitted to the first wall  and  blanket,  and  it also •easures energy 
input as  the  energy  finally deliycred to the pl•t•i· 1nd  thus t1kes  no  .ccount 
of the energy  losses incurred  in aenerati.ng  the heating  power  1nd.  in 
delivering it to the plasaa,  nor  does  it allow  for the energy  needed  to 
•aintain the ••gnetic fields,  or the v•cuua,  or other support •ysteMs. 
"In present-generation experiMents,  the  power  excluded  fro• the definition of 
Q is as  •uch  as  35  ti•es greater than the power  accounted for  by  this ratio11 
(OTA  'Starpower•  Report,  p69). 
'Breakeven•  is thus  essentially a scientific concept  rather than  a 
technological  one.  Achieving  it will  be  a significant Milepost  en  route to 
the  demonstration of the scientific feasibility of controlled therMonuclear 
fusion,  but  it Must  not  be  regarded  as  a •easure of technological  feasibility: 
it does  not  represent an  overall  energy  balance  in the systeM. 
As  values  of  Q higher  than  unity are  reached,  the reaction will  eventually 
reach the stage of  iqnitjon.  when  Q essentially should  becOMe  infinite,  since 
no  further external  energy  should  need  to  be  added  to •aintain the fusion 
reaction.  Before  this stage is reached,  the reaction •ay  achieve  conditions 
which  have  been  described  as  those of  a  •wet  wood  burner•.  In  other words 
energy  output fro• fusion reactions will  be  significantly higher  than  energy 
input from  heating systeMs,  but  the latter will  still  be  needed  to keep  the 
fusion  reaction going  - just as  a wet  wood  burning  stove  needs  the addition of 
a  constant source of additional  energy  such  as  burning oil  or gas. 
None  of the world's existing fusion  experi•ents will  achieve  ignition.  NET  is 
designed  to do  so,  and  so  is the •ore •odest CIT  (Co•pact  Ignition Torus> 
being  designed  in the  USA.  It ;s generally •greed thit ignition will 
represent the final  de•onstration of the scientjtjc feasibility of controlled 
fusion. 
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~ Trjtju• breeding 
As  well  as trans•itting the  heat energy of the fusion reaction the intense 
neutron flux would  also be  used  to produce  trtttu• in the breeder blanket 
which  surrounds the vacuu•  cha•bar.  The  favoured  ele•ent for breeding 
purposes  is lithiu•,  and  there are two  possible routes to tritiUI fro. 
lithiu•,  depending  upon  which  isotope is involved. 
1 .  n  +  -) 
<neutron>  Clithiua> 
2.  n  +  + 
+  + 
(tritiUM) 
+ 
3.8MeU 
(energy) 
+  n 
c6Li  constitutes only  7~ of natural  lithiu•,  but •ost of the tritiuM would  be 
generated  by  the 6Li  reaction,  since it has  a •uch  higher  individual 
probablility of occurring.) 
Judicious  use  of neutron •ultipliers such  as  berylliu•,  which  can  react with 
one  neutron  to produce  two,  would  i•prove the prospects for tritiu• 
production. 
Clearly if one  tritiua nucleus  is generated  in the blanket for  every tritiua 
nucleus  'lost•  by  fusion  in the  plasMa,  then the reactor will  •produce•  the 
sa•e a•ount  of tritium that it consuaes,  and  the overall  breeding ratio will 
be  1.  To  allow  for  losses and  other uncertainties,  a  breeding ratio of 1.1  or 
1.2 would  probably  be  needed  to guarantee tritiu• replace•ent  in the reactor 
system. 
Heft  cxtr•ction 
In so•e fusion reactor designs,  a  liquid •etal  coolant  containing liquid 
lithiu. would  act si•ultaneously as  coolant and  breeding •aterial.  The  ESECO" 
study referred to in  'Fusion As  A Source of Energy:  Its Econo•ics  And  The 
Enuiron•ent•  refers to a  reference case fusion reactor using  a  pure  liquid 
lithiu• coolant,  but  in fact the  European  Fusion  Research  Progra••• has 
decided  that such  a  coolant is too probleeatic because of the fire risk 
associated with  the extre•e reactivity of liquid lithiu•. 
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Whichever  aater1al  is finally selected for the coolant,  its final  purpose  is 
exactly the sa•e as  in a fission reactor;  that is to transfer the heat  f~o• 
the nuclear reaction via a  heat  exchanger  to a water/stea• syste• used  ~o 
drive conventional  stea• turbines to provide  electricity.  As  will  be 
appreciated,  the engineering  proble•s still to be  faced  in the developaent of 
the tritiu• breeding  and  heat transfer syste•s in  1  working  fusion  reac~or are 
at least as  significant as  the scientific proble•s which  have  f~eed the 
developaent  of a  controlled iantted plas•a. 
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Thursday,  12  Hovaber 1987,  15.  •  - Afternoon session 
THE  EIA)PEAH  FUSIOH  PROGRtJitE  AHD  THE  JET  JOINT  litDERTAKittG 
The  afternoon  session opened  with  welco•tna  re•arks  by  the  Director of 
JET,  Dr  P-H  Rebut. 
The  ChairMan  of the Workshop,  Mr  Linkohr,  "EP,  thanked  Dr  Rebut  and 
!.Poke  on  the nature  and  purpose  of STOA  and  the Workshop. 
Or  c Maisonnier,  Director of the  EC  Fusion  Progra••e  then  addressed the 
Workshop  on  EUROPEAN  FUSION  PROGRA""E  STRATEGY.  The  following  written su••ary 
_...  •  - ~,,.._  •  •  ~r  ,. 
of  his re•ar.ks .was  ,_uppl i ed  after the Workshop  by  the Co•aission.  (Note:  the 
•L•  - _  •• ,  ... -- -·•  --~·-··-- _ ....  • 
sa•e  proc!du~~ ,has  been  fo  11 owed  here  in respect  of_  the Speeches  by  Dr  Rebut, 
- ,-;.---... ---
Professor Toschi,  Professor Pinkau  and  Dr  RS  Pease) 
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?2 EI,ROPEM  FUSIQit  paocjR8111E  SJB8TEAY 
1.  Future  energy  1ource5.  Dr  "aisonnier started with  the funda•ental 
question which  is:  What  are the energy  sources  having  the potential  to supply 
a  ~ubstantial fraction of the electrical  energy  need•  in the long-tar.?  ln. 
his view  these are  coal,  fission,  fusion  and  perhaps •olar.  their larae sc•le 
deploy•ents  have  to be  considered to be  strongly dependent  on  •any fiCtors, 
technical,  environ•ental  and  econo.ic.  At  the end,  these sources •iaht well 
turn out to be  •ore co•ple•entary than co•petitive. 
2.  The  Commynjty  Fysjoo  Proaramme.  Dr  Maisonnier  point•d out that by 
decision of the council  of Ministers of the European  Coa•unities ALL efforts 
in the fjeld of thermonuclear  fusion  are  coordinated  in QruL European 
progra••e,  which  has  as  its single ai• to design  a  de•onstration reactor. 
3.  fuiion ''  an  Enerqu  source.  The  principle of a fusion  re~or, the fact 
that its pri•ary fuels  <deuteriuM  and  lithiu•)  and  its reaction products  are 
non-radioactive were  illustrated by  Dr  "aisonnier.  He  stressed,  however,  that 
"inside the  box"  fusion  is not  altogether "clean"  due  to activation of the 
mechanic•l  structure by  neutrons.  OVerall,  fusion  has  the potential  for a 
Noderdte  i•pact on  the environ•ent,  for  inherent safety and  for using 
~J•"'.:.c.:ti call  y  i nexhausti bl e fuels.  As  the fuel  wi 11  be  ·consu.ed  in very uall 
quantitie~ in a future fusion  eactor,  the electricity generating costs of a 
ro!4Jmeri cal  fusion  reactor wi 11  be  do•i nated  by  capital  i nvest•ent.  It is too 
~~rly to Make  definite stateaents on  fusion  as  an  econoaically coapetitive 
ene~gy $Ource;  preliminary studies show  that the order of aagnitude of the 
tost of fusion  energy  is right.  Given  the ti•escale for the developaent of 
therMOnuclear  fusion,  fusion  plants should  not  be  expected  to be  ••king a 
substantial  contr;bution to energy  supply  before the •iddle of the next 
century. 
4.  European  Fusion  progr•••e Str•tcgy.  The  path to a fusion reactor, 
Dr  Maisonnier said,  could  in a very siapl;fied picture,  be  viewed  as  a series 
of steps involving  the deMonstration  of  the scientific,  then  the technical  and 
finally the econoMic  feasibilities.  Of  course,  in practice these steps are 
not  independent  fro• each  other  and  overlap  in •any  aspects.  JET,  now 
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essentially the scientific aatters while  NET  which  could start operation 
around  2888  will  largely be  devoted  to de•onstrate the technical  fe.sibtlity. 
The  economic  feasibility has  to be  de•onstrated later by  a  DE"O  device. 
In  particular,  Dr  "aisonnier e•phasized the •erits of the sliding nature of 
the European  Fusion  PrograMMe.  He  also noted  that experience with  high-levtl 
assessment  panels  in  1981  and  1984,  chaired  by  Professor  KH  Beckurts,  shows 
such  panels  being  extre•ely useful  in tiMes  when  iMportant  decisions h.ve to 
be  taken.  According  to the 1987-91  progra••e which  is on  the Parliaaent•s 
desk  and  in view  of the possibility of launching  a  detailed HET  design  at the 
beginning of the  199Bs  the Co••ission foresees  a further independent 
high-level  assessment  around  1999. 
5.  The  1287-91  program•e.  The  •ain objectives of the progra••e are to 
establish the  physics  and  technical  basis for  NET,  to eabark  on  its detailed 
design  before  the end  of the prograa•e  period  and  to explore the reactor 
potential  of so•e alternative lines;  they  have  been  explained  by  Dr  "aisonnier 
in detail.  In  particular,  he  •entioned that the overall  voluae of the 
prograMMe,  which  occupies  1388  professionals in Europe  as  a whole,  is about 
2388  "ECU  for  5  years,  about  42~ of it being  financed  by the Co•aission.  The 
i•ple•entation of the programme  is •ostly devoted  to •agnetic confine•ent in 
toroidal  devices  through  JET,  NET,  the Associations,  the JRC  and  European 
industry  <which  received about  128  MECU  of contracts in 1987).  A substantial 
increase of the involveaent of European  industry is expected  when  a  decision 
is taken  on  the start of the engineering  design of NET. 
6.  Amgnd•cnts  to the Statutes Qf  JET.  Concerning  the docu•ent  (~0"(87)382 
final)  containing three proposals- a  ~ouncil regulation adopting  a fusion 
research and  training progra••e  (1987-91),  a state•ent of enuironaental  i•pact 
and  econoMic  prospects of fusion,  and  an  adaendaent  to the Statutes of JET  -
which  has  been  trans•itted by  the Coa•ission to Council  and  Parlia•ent, 
Dr  "aisonnier explicitly pointed out the need  to prolong  JET  by  the end  of 
1992.  He  expressed  and  underlined the scientific conviction of the European 
fusion  co••unity to have  extre•ely good  chances  to •eet fully the initially 
stated JET  objectives  by  introducing into JET  soae  additional  equipaent,  the 
virtues of which  have  been  highlighted  by  recent experi•ents.  This  requires 
an  extension of 2.5 years of the life of the project. 
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all  four  large fusion  progra ..  es  CEurope,  USA,  Japan,  USSR)  are coapar•ble in 
overall  voluMe.  He  stressed the iaportance of international  cooperation which 
the Coamission  realizes by  having  bilateral  fraaework  agreeaent• with the USA, 
canada  and  Japan  Cin  preparation)  and  several  iaplea~nting aareaaents in the· 
fraMework  of the  IEA  COECD>.  In  particular,  Dr  "aisonnier eaphasized the 
quadripartite cooperation initiative of Europe,  USA,  USSR  and  Japan on  an 
International  TherMonuclear  ExperiMental  Reactor  CITER)  under  the  IAEA 
auspices.  The  conceptual  design  phase  of  ITER  is scheduled to start in April 
1999 with Garching,  where  the NET  tea• is located,  actina as a technical  site 
for  joint work.  This,  and  the work  of NET  as  well,  deaonstrates,  as 
Dr  Maisonnier  was  pleased to note,  the  recognize~ outstanding position and 
leadership of Europe  within the  ITER  initiative. 
The  Chairaan  asked  for questions.  These  were  put  by  "r Lake,  STOA 
Fusion  Project Leader,  and  Mrs  Bloch  von  Blottnitz,  MEP.  "r Maisonnier 
replied.  CDetails  o·f  this discussion will  be  given  in a  later, fuller version 
of this Report  of Proceedings.) 
Dr  PH  Rebut  then  addressed the Workshop  on  PRINCIPLES  OF  FUSION  AHD  THE 
JET  PROJECT. 
p8IHCIN5 OF  FUSigt  ANQ  THE  .1EI  I!RO,lECT 
1.  Dr  Rebut  reainded the Workshop  that fusion is the aain source of energy 
in the universe.  Huclear  fusion takes p1ace  in stars but  at lower 
teaperatures and  reaction rates than to be  envisaged on  earth to produce  the 
required fusion  power  in a  reactor. 
2.  Ba5ic5  of Fusion.  Dr  Rebut  described the basic processes of nuclear 
fusion,  considering deuteriua and  tritiua as the reacting eleaents.  The 
pri•ary fuels of a  reactor are deuteriu• and  lithiua,  which  are abundant  in 
the sea water  and  in the earth.  Tritiu• which  does  not  occur  naturally is 
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stage,  Dr  Rebut  said,  other possible reactions Nith  advanced  fuels requiring 
Much  higher  teMperatures,  but  without  usina tritiUM  and  not  producing 
neutrons,  Might  be  considered. 
3.  problems  of Fusjqn.  The  probleMs  in fusion  experi•ents are essentially 
.  . 
twofold:  first,  the need  to heat the fuel  to about  118 Hio•c.  and  second,  the 
need  for  a container for the hot  fuel.  Dr  Rebut  aentioned that the three 
essential  heating Mehtods  tthe oh•ic heating  based  on  a strona·plasaa current, 
the heating  by  radio-frequency waves  that the injection of fast,  hiah-energy 
atoMs)  have  all  been  applied  and  studied on  JET.  Studies on  plasMa 
containment  have  been,  of course,  concentrated on  Maanetic  confine•ent. 
~.  Advaotaaes  of Fysjon. 
fusion  was  given  by  Dr  Rebut: 
A sua•ary of  the  principal  advantages  of.nuclear 
the basic fuels  are  cheap,  and  abundantJ  they 
are  not  radioactive;  a reactor is inherently safe and  cannot  runaway,  and,  the 
environMental  iMpact  is low. 
5.  ~.  JET  is the  largest  nuclear fusion  experiaent  inside the Coaaunity 
and,  indeed,  in the world,  as  pointed out  by  Or  Rebut.  Its aiMs  are to 
provide  the  inforMation  necessary to define the paraMeters  for  HET  and 
eventually of  a reactor  by  studying the  plasMa  in conditions close to those 
needed  tor a fusion  reactor. 
6.  Statys of JET  Experiments.  Dr  Rebut  described  the  way  to be  followed  in 
order to advance  towards  ignition conditions.  In  1986,  JET  was  about  25  tiMes 
away  fro• the  ignition point  in teras of  the fusion  product  "density ti•es 
teaperature tiMes  confineaent  tiae*'.  In  JET  each  of these par ..  eters can 
separately be  produced  at the value  required for a reactor.  Future 
developaents  are  aiMed  at increasing their coMbined  value  in the fusion 
product. 
7.  JET  progra••e  and  Cost$.  It is planned  that JET,  Dr  Rebut  said,  should 
be  in  its  fin~l  configuration in  1998  and  that operation with  tritiuM would 
start soon  after in ordr to study  a  burning  core  plasMa  and  a significant 
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be  planned  in future,  will  be  about  528  "ECU  <1987  prices>.  The  annual  budaet 
is about  118  "ECU  with  a staff of about  258  professionals. 
8.  JET  Acbjeye•cnts.  Dr  Rebut  eMphasized  that JET  is recognized  as  the 
leading fusion  experiMent  in the world.  It has  been  built on  ttae and  broadly 
to cost.  The  design  perfor•ance  has  been  achieved  or exceeded.  ~IT ts an 
excellent exa•ple of successful  scientific collaboration in Europe  •nd  an 
attractive and  successful  partner of European  industry. 
- 22  - PE  121.237 .· 
I 
The  Chair•an called for questions.  These  ~ere iSked  by Krs Bloch  von 
Blottnitz,  the Chair••n,  Dr  Benecke  and  "r SWeet.  Dr  Rebut  replied. 
Professor Toschi,  Leader  of the NET  Tea•,  then  ad~ressed the Workshop  on 
NET,  TECHNOLOGY,  PROJECTIONS  TOWARDS  A DE"ONSTRATION  REACTOR. 
1.  Professor Toschi  reainded  the Workshop  that,  in the agreed strategy for 
the European  Fusion  Prograaae,  there would  be  only one  step  CH£T)  between  JET 
and  a  demonstration  reactor  (DE"O).  Therefore,  the design solutions for HiT 
need  to  be  directly extrapolable to reactor conditions. 
2.  Obiectjves of NET.  Professor Toschi  said that the Main  objective of H£T 
is to deeonstrate fusion  energy  production  in an  apparatus that ..  ets the 
basic design  and  operating requireaents of a reactor and,  in parttculara 
To  de•onstrate a self-sustainin D-T  therMonuclear  re~ion1 
To  extend  the  burn  tiMe  up  to steady state; 
To  qualify coaponents  in reactor-like conditions; 
To  de.onstrate the breeding of tritiua; 
To  deaonstrate the extraction of energy  at a  suffi~iently high-grade· for 
electricity generation. 
To  achieve  these objectives the  NET  Machine  ~ill  need  to operate at a 
relatively high  availability.  Professor Toschi  considered a 25t  availability 
to be  an  interesting design target for  NET. 
3.  opcr•tion of  NET.  As  it will  be  the only aachine  betNeen  JET  and  DE"O, 
NET  will  h•ve  both  a  physics  phase  and  a  technology  phase.  Professor Toschi 
considered,  however,  that this division into two  phases  was  rather arbitrary 
as  the  physics,  which  would  have  an  integrated burn  tiMe  of about  388  hours, 
would  include  a significant technology  prograaMe  such  as  the assessaent of 
plasaa facing  coMponents,  the assess•ent of aachine relability,  and 
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integrated burn  tiae would  likewise contain a strong physics el ..  ent in the 
progra•ae. 
4.  paraweters of NET.  Professor Toschi  described the current thinking on 
the  NET  design,  in  particular the desire to have  •  flexible aachine,  that 
would  allow  for  i•prove•ents during operation and  which,  wherever  possib  .. le, 
would  use  reactor-relevant technologies.  Aaong  its aain par ..  etars would  be  a 
plasaa current of about  15 "A.  He  described the design  as •  prudent one  in 
which  the confineaent  capability of the aachine should  allow  an  ignition 
margin  up  to about  three depending  on  the scaling law  used,  but  he  e•phasized 
that the  uncertainty on  the scaling law  to be  adopted  was  still rather large. 
The  ignition Margin  needs  to be  unity in order to reach  ignition). 
5.  Timetable  for  NET.  The  NET  design  activity was  launched  in 1983.  This 
activity has  provided  a  sound  basis for the  Coaaunity•~ technology  proaraa•e, 
much  of which  is directly geared to the requireMents of NET.  In 1998,  the MET 
Tea•  will  present  a  case  for •oving  into the detailed engineering  design  and 
prototype  t~sting of  N~T.  Professor Toschi  siad that,  to succeed,  the case 
will  need  to show  that there is an  adequatee scientific bases for the 
extrapolation to  NET  and  that it is feasible to build a aachine with  a 
sufficient reliability and  availability to perfora the required  proora••e.  It 
will  also  need  to give  details of schedule  and  costs.  Construction could 
start about  1994  and  be  coapleted  by  about  2BBB. 
6.  ~. Turning  to  ITER,  the quadripartite initiative <Europe,  USA,  USSR, 
Japan)  to  produce  a  conceptual  design for the Hext  Device,  Professor Toschi 
reMarked  that Europe  had  succeeded  in convincing its partners that the •ain 
paraMeters  of  NET  should  act  as  th~ starting point for the conceptual  de~;an 
phase  of  ITER,  ~hich is stheduled to end  in 1999.  The  total  effort of the 
ITER  partners •>n  this phase  of  ITER  is  ns~imated at about  ~aa •an-years over 
two  and  on~ half  vears  and  ~bout  ~129 M1ll1on  of supporting RID  over  the same 
period. 
7.  ~. The  purpose  of  DEMO  will  be  to provide  the basis for assessing 
the  potential  of  fusion.  Professor Toschi  e•phasized that  DE"O  will  not 
necessarily itself be  econoMic.  In  terms  of the extrapolation fro• HET,  the 
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neutron  fluence of  DE"O  will  be  a fictor of fiua greater,  tha •uailability • 
factor of  three and  the  breeding r1tto a  factor two.  Studtes h.ue shown  that 
the critical  extrapolation factor is the plant .u•11ib11ity 1nd  tn·  particular 
the  lifetiMe of in-vessel  coMponents.  It is to these crtttc1l  factors that 
the  NET  Progra••e would  be  especially addressed. 
Questions were  put  by  Dr  Benecke,  the Chatr.an,  "r.  Carruthers and 
f1r  Sweet. 
Professor K Pinkau,  Director of the Institute for Plas•a Physics, 
Garching,  then  addressed  the Workshop  on  FUSION  AS  A SOURCE  OF  EHERGY:  ITS 
ECONOMICS  AND  THE  EHUIRONf1EHT 
FU5IOit  85  A 5CQtCE  OF  EHERCy;  ITS  ECOtQIIC$ enp  THE  BIUIRCIIIENT 
1.  Introducing  his talk,  Professor Pinkau  explained that he  was  not 
personally involved  in studying the econo•ics  and  environ.ental  i•pact of 
fusion.  He  saw  his role as one  of explaining why  the findings of recent 
studies,  in particular the Co••ission•s publication on  the Enuiron.ental 
Impact  and  Econoaic  Prospects of Nuclear  Fusion  and  the  ESEC~ CHoldren) 
Report  on  the Coapetitive Potential  of Magnetic  Fusion  Energy,  are what  they 
are. 
2.  Professor Pinkau. first asked  how  many  different energy  systeMs  do  we 
need  to  d~velop.  At  present  and  for  the  iMMediate  future,  there appears  to be 
sufficient energy.  But  perceptions of this can  and  have  changed  rapidly.  RID 
po 1  i-CY  regarding future  energy  systeMs  •ust have  a  1  onaer ti  •e-fra•e and,  to 
ensure  contfnuity,  •ust act as  a  buffer against these shorter ter• changes  of 
attitude.  In  the distant future,  only  ther•al  fission  and  fission breeders, 
solar energy  and  fusion  have  the scope  to provide  energy  on  the required 
scale.  As  each  has  its own  special  features  and  drawbacks,  all  need  to be 
developed. 
go 
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explained why,  in order to •ini•ize the RID  resources required,  the scientific 
and  political  co••unities had  aore1d  on  a  sequential  strategy to achiev• thttr 
goal.  In this strategy,  the results of each  successive step,  for ex ..  ple JET, 
.  :  ·-"  .... .._ 
HET,  DE,.O,  need  to  be  evaluated  befor1  proceeding to the next.  Each  step 
requires  about  28  ye~rs.  The  alternative,  a  crash proora ..  e,  would  be  •uch 
•ore expensive  and  would  carry hiaher risks of failure. 
4.  Professor Pinkau  considered that the European  Parlia•ent had  a very 
special  responsibility to support fusion,  which  will  require a  continui·ty of 
political  and  financial  support for each  step once  it is underway.  He  also 
pointed out that,  unlike other RID  prograMMes,  the fusion  proara.•e exists 
only on  the  European  scale.  Without  support at the European  level,  the 
developMent  of fusion  would  cease.  It could  not  continue on  a  national  scale. 
The  Enyironmental  Impact  of  Fusjon 
5.  Professor Pinkau  considered there to  be  two  funda.ental  reasons  why 
fusion  plants should  have  only  a •oderate i•pact on  the environMent: 
First,  because  fusion  energy  is produced  in  an  oven,  not  in a  reactor. 
In  a fusion  plant,  the "oven"  contains only that quantity of fuel  that 
is required for  im•ediate  use  Csay  1-2 seconds).  The  energy  content of 
the oven  is therefore very  sMall.  By  contrast,  a  fission reactor needs 
to contain the fuel  needed  for a  large part of the life of the syste• 
<say  1-2 years>. 
Second,  the reaction products of fission,  ie those derived fro• the 
splitting of the  nuclear fuel  in the fission process  and  fro• its 
irradiation by  the fissionneutrons,  are radioactive because  of the laws 
of nature.  The  reaction products of fusion  are  not  radioactive.  The 
radioactivity in a tritiu• plant arises fro• the interaediate tritiuM 
fuel  and  fro• the  interaction between  neturons  and  the strucutral 
Materials of the  plant.  The  development  of an  environaentally benign 
fusion  reactor is,  therefore,  a question of  engineering  and  Materials 
development  aimed  at keeping  the activiation of structural  Materials to 
a  low  level,  and  at maintaining  a  low  tritiu• inventory. 
~I 
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constituent isotopes of present-day structural  ••terials actually produce 
long-lived radioactive products  as  a result of neutron  bo•bardaent.  The  ai• 
of •aterials  develo~ent is,  therefore,  to "tailor• new  structural •aterials, 
which  do  not  contain such  constituents,  and  whose  radioactivity woud  decay  to 
such ••nageabe  levels attar say 51  years,  perhaps  even  31  years,  that a fusion 
plant could  then  be  dis•antled like any  other non-nucear  plant. 
7.  Saftty.  Professor Pinkau  referred to the four  levels of safety 
assulrance defined  in the Holdren  Report,  1ovin1  frOM  Level  1,  the •ost 
desirable to Level  4,  the least desirable: 
In  a Level  power  plant,  •aterial  properties suffice to prevent fatal 
release. 
In  a Level  2  plant,  1aterial  properties and  passive  design features  are 
sufficient to •ake off-site fatalities incredible.-
In  a Level  3  plant,  passive  design  features  alone  are sufficient to •ake 
off-site fatalities incredible  provided  that,  for exa•ple,  the coolant 
boundary  is substantially intact. 
In  a Level  ~  plant,  there events  that,  if they occur,  require  active 
syste•s to preclude  an  off-site fatality,  and  that cannot  be  Made 
incredible  by  design  Measures  alone. 
The  Holdren  Report  deMonstrated  that sevel  concepts  of  a fusion  pwer  plant 
could  fall  in Levels  1  or 2.  A fission plant,  for example,  a  PWR,  is,  by  its 
very  nature,  Level  4. 
e.  Intruder pose.  Professor Pinkau  explained the  concept  of an  "Intruder 
Dose",  as  used  in the Holdren  Report.  This  is the dose  received  by  a  person 
excavating  and  living at the site where  the waste 1aterials of a  fusion 
reactor had  been  buried  between  188  and  1888 years  ago  in a  "shallow"  fashion. 
The  "Intruder Dose"  for  a  fusion  reactor would  be  of  the order of 8.22 reM,  or 
even  less. 
9.  Tritju•.  To  prevent  the  possibility of  large-scale iMpact  on  the 
environ•ent of  a  D-T  fusion  plant,  the  active  inventory of tritiu• will  be 
kept  as  low  as  possibel  and  the  tritiuM that is being  stored for  future  use 
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generations of fusion  plant •av  e~ploy syste.s that do  not  require tritiu. 
fuel. 
The  ECODOilC$  of Eutfoo 
18.  Professor Pinkau  noted that it had  been  said by  critics of fusion that, 
as fusion  plants will  be  •uch .ore co•plicated than,  for exa.ple,  PWR  fission 
plants,  they will  produce  electricity at a  •uch  higher cost.  He  referred to 
the Holdren  Report,  which  had  concluded  that fusion plants had  the potential 
to generate electricity at costs co•parable to those of present  and  future 
fission syste•s,  perhaps  within  a factor of two  or three or so. 
11.  Su••ing up,  Professor Pinkau  concluded  that it is too  early to say 
whether  or not  fusion  plants would  be  econo•ically attractive.  There  are two 
reasons for this uncertainty:  first,  fusion will  finally have  to be  costed in 
the technological  and  econo•ic world  of the •ore distant future  and,  second, 
we  do  not  know  now  which  price we  will  wish  to pay  then  for which  type of 
energy  generation. 
There  was  another  round  of questions. 
Dr  RS  Pease,  PrograMMe  Director of the  UKAEA  addressed  the Workshop  on 
MUOH-CATALYSED  FUSION  <soMetimes  referred to colloquially as  •cold  Fusion•>. 
1.  The  UKAEA's  Culha•  Laboratory  has  been  working  tor •any  years in fusion. 
Dr  Pease  explained that,  although  the laboratory's progra••e is based 
essentially on  the •agnetic confine•ent  route to a fusion  reactor,  it has 
always  been  part of the  progra••e to see whether  there are other options that 
deserve  to be  exa•ined.  Muon  catalysed fusion  could  be  one  of these 
alternatives. 
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fusion  as  it is often called.  Its chief advantage  is that D-T  fusion  takes 
p1ace  at •ore-or-less aabient t ..  peratures but  otherwise it would  h.va 1any  of 
the features of hot  D-T  fusion.  He  pointed out one  of the  i ..  edtate problaas 
as  there is to find a aeans  to increase the  low  nuaber  of fusion reactions 
catalysed by  each  auon  which  would  result in a  low  overall  efficiency.  The 
prospects  based  on  today•s theory of obtaining sufficiently high  catalysis 
rates are  not  considered to be  very  proaising.  In  addition,  there is,  at 
present,  no  reason to suppose  that auonic  fusion  could  have  significant 
advantages  with  respect to costs and  environaent  coapared  with aagnetic 
confinement  systeas. 
J.  The  UKAEA  Euratoa  Fusion  Association is contributing to an  international 
experiaent on  auon-catalysed fusion  conducted  at the Rutherford Laboratory. 
Dr  Pease  recoMMended  to keep  an  eye  on  research  in this field but  not  to  .. aake 
any  substantial  inuestaents at the tiae being.  Dr  Pease  underlined the fact 
that,  at the Moaent,  aagnetic contineaent research  as  deMonstrated  by  the JET 
•achine is Much  aore  proaising. 
This  was  followed  by  questions. 
At  19.38 Hrs  the Afternoon  Session  closed,  and  the He•bers  of the 
Workshop  proceeded  on  a visit to the JET  laboratories. 
0  8  0 
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Prnent.tions lrt'  tnvttad experts other th•n reprnent.ttves 
of the Europa•n  Fusion Proar ... 
The  Chair•an opened  the Session and  aaue  the floor to "r Colin SWeet  of 
the Centra for  Eneray  studies,  South  Bank  Polytechnic,  London. 
Mr  Sweet  1ddressed the Workshop  CHote:  "r SWeet  has  been  co••tssioned 
by  STOA  to present a study on  fusion.  An  interia version of the study was 
available at the Workshop.  For  reasons of  length,  it cannot  be  reproduced 
here.  The  full  ~tudy will  be  published  later in the year in the STOA  series 
of docu•ents on  fusion). 
"r Sweet  e•phasized the  i•portance of ••kina an  intearat«d approach  to 
the question of fusion  energy.  Stating that 
11fusion  is e•ergina froa  the 
laboratory",  he  said this integrated approach  aeant takina all  the various 
aspects together:  scientific,  technological,  econoMic  and  environMental.  He 
detailed especially the econo•ic questions  and  the feasibility of esti•ates 
based  on  •scaling-up•  fro• the experi•ental  to the co••ercial  stages. 
Co•menting  that it was  a mistake  to believe that variable costs would  be 
negligable,  he  said that at the end  of  the  day  it would  be  the Marginal  cost 
of fusion  energy  which  would  deter•ine its fate in the energy  Market  place. 
He  noted  the argument  that in the long  run  there would  only  be  3 significant 
energy  sources:  fission,  fusion  and  solar,  but  he  thought  this was  too  rigid. 
Any  technology  could  be  unecono•ic:  it was  only  econo•ic  by  comparison  with 
alternatives.  This  meant  that •ore e•phasis should  be  given  to the economic 
and  the Management  aspects of the question. 
Mr  Sweet  said that before  a  decision was  taken on  HET  there was  a  need 
for a aajor feasibility study on  an  inter-disciplinary basis. 
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·or Haisonnier,  Dr  Rebut,  Hr  Turner,  "EP,  Dr  Lawson,  Or  Pease,  Hr  Selig•dn, 
Professor Pinkau,  Hrs  Bloch  von  Blottnitz, "EP,  "r "etten,  "EP,  who  is the 
european Parlia•!nt•s rapporteur on  fusion,  "r Sweet  and  his colle•oue 
Dr  Jackson. 
At  the end  of the discussion,  there was  a  break  for coffee. 
The  Session resu•ed  at 11.11 Hrs  with  a  presentation by 
Dr  Jochen  Benecke  of the Sollner Institut, "unich. 
Dr  Benecke  addressed  the workshop  (Note:  Dr  Benecke  has  also  prepared  a 
paper  which  is printed in the  next  section of  the~present document>. 
In  brief sum•ary,  Dr  Benecke  said that in the presentations of the 
previous  afternoon  the counter  arau•ents to fusion  had  not  been  presented,.but 
there was  a  need  to consider the possibility that controlled fusion  energy,· 
which  was  at present only  in the experi•ental  stage,  •ight never  prove  to be 
possible or practically viable.  The  scientific criteria were  not  the only 
criteria of practical  feasibility,  but  when  other criteria were  taken  into 
.account,  the costs escalated. 
Dr  Benecke  •entioned the view  the electricity de•and  •ay decline  in 
future with  the use  of enhanced  techniques for  energy  conservation.  He  also 
discussed  environmental  aspects,  stating that in ter•s of radio activity,  as 
opposed  to radio toxicity,  fusion  would  not  be  very •uch different fro• 
fission.  other topics discussed were  the viability of tailored structural 
•at~riats,  cost of size co•parisons of fusion  and  fission reactors and 
uncertainties about  the future  energy •arket. 
The  Chair•an opened  a  discussion which  involved "r Selio•an, 
Dr  Haisonnier,  Dr  Davies,  Professor Pinkau,  Professor Toschi,  "r Darvas  and 
Dr  Benecke. 
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Workshop  on  internation•l  cooperation  and  ITER.  He  reported on  the 
19-19 October  aeetina .t the  IAEA  in Uienn•  between  the USSR,  the USA,  Japan 
and  the Europeans.  There  h•d  been  aareeaent to 10 ahead  with  the conceptual 
desian of the International  Experiaental  Reactor  CITER). 
There  w.s  •  discussion involving "r Seltaaan, "r "etten and 
Professor Pinkau.  The  Ch•iraan c•lled the next speaker. 
·Dr  cerald Epstein  addressed the Workshop  on  •star Power•,  the fusion 
report recently published  by  the Office of Technology  Assessaent  COTA)  at the 
us  Congress  in Washington.  CNotet  STOA  has  prepared the following  suaaary 
based  on  the OTA  report and  reaarks  by  Or  Epstein  who  w  .. the author of the 
report). 
SUMMARY  Of  "STARPOWER:  TUE.US  AND  TilE  INTERNATIONAL 
QUEST  FOR  FUSION  ENERGY  (US  CONGRESS  OffiCE  Of  TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT,, 
OCTOBER  1987)  PRESENTED  BY  Or  GERALD  EPSTEIN,  PROJECT  DIRECTOR,  OTA 
Potenual Role o1  Fusaon  ·  The Q,ana ..  m  • olE  ·  (DOE)  ~·  :-•'  " .. en,  nergy  manages I  he~ 
If  successfully developed, nuclear fusion could  U.~. fusaon  prosram, and its goal is to evaluate 
provide humanity with an effectively unlimited  fusion's  technolog~al feasibility-to determine 
source of electricity that has environmental and  whethe.r or not a .fus1on reactor can be designed 
safety advantages over other electric energy tech- and bu!lt-early an  the 21st century. A positive 
nologies. However, it is too early to tell wheth~r  evaluat!on would enable a decision to be made 
these advantages, which could be signifant. can  at that tame to.const~  a prototype commercial 
be economically realiled. Research aimed at de- reactor· ~o~,  thas schedule cannot be met 
vcloping fusion as an ener&y source has been  under exa~lu'l U.S.  fusion  budgets. The 00£ 
vigoc_ously pursued since the 1950s, and, despite  plan  requares  eit~er that U.S.  budgets be in-
considerable progress in recent years, it appears  creased substanlaally or that the world fusion 
that at least three deades of  additional research  ~rosrams  collaborate much more dosely on fu-
and devclopmcnt will be required before a pro- saon  research. 
totype commemal fusion reactor can be dem-
onstrated. 
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The budget for fusion research increased more 
than tenfold in the 1970s, due largely to lfOW· 
ing public concern about environmental protec· 
tion and uncertainty in long-range energy sup· 
ply.  However, a much-reduced sense of public 
urgency in the 1980s, coupled with the mount· 
ing  federal  budget  deOcit,  halted  and  then 
reversed the growth of the klsion budget. Today, 
the fusion program is being funded (in 1986 dol-
lars)  at about half of its peak level of a decade 
age 
The <:hange in the fusion program's status over 
the past 10 years has not resulted from poor tech-
nkal performance or a more pessimistic.e.v~lua· 
tion of fusion's prospects. On the contrary, the 
program  has  made substantial progress.  How-
ever, the disappearance of a perceived need for 
near-term  commercialization  has  reduced the 
impetus to develop commercial fusion energy 
and has ·tightened pressure on fusion  research 
budgets. Over the past decade, the fusion pro-
gram  has  been  unable to maintain  a constant 
funding level, much less command the substan· 
tial funding increases required (or next.generation 
facilities. In fact, due to funding constraints, the 
program has been unable to complete and oper· 
ate some of its existing facilities. 
Choices  made  over  the  next  several  years  can 
place  the  U.S.  fusion  program  on  one  of  four 
fundamantally  different  paths: 
1.  The  Independent  Path 
With  substantial  funding  increases,  the 
fusion  program  could  c~lete its cur-
EOl TOR's note  : 
It should  be  noted  that  in the  cotnparative 
table which  follows  the  Independent  Path 
refers to a  completely  independent  pursuit 
of  commercial  fusion  power·by  the U.S.A; 
the Collaborative Path  refers  ... ainly to  .• 
the prospects offered by  the  quadripart;te 
ITER  agreement  working  u~der the auspices 
of  the  lAEA  ;  the Limited  Path  envisages 
continuing  research  into the final  demons-
tration of scientific feasibility,  with 
a  "not  very  limited path" possibly  inclu-
ding  the  construction of  a  Compact  lgnition 
TORUS(CIT>;and  the Mothballed  Path  is self 
explanatory. 
Advantages:  Control  over  R & 0;  Energy 
Supply;  Infrastrcture;  Stature 
rently mapped-out  research effort domes- Disadvantages:  Cost,  Potential Over-
tically, permitting decisions  to be  made  emphasis 
2. 
early  in the next  centur.y  concerning 
fusion's potential  for  co ..  ercialization. 
The  Collaborative Path 
At  only moderate  increases  in U.S.  fund-
ing  levels,  the  same  results as  above 
might  be  attainable - although possibly 
somewhat  delayed  - if  the United  States 
can  work  with  some  or all of  the world's 
other major  fusion program.es  (Western 
Europe,  Japan,  and  the Soviet  Union)  at 
an  unprecedented  level  of collabor•tion. 
Advantages:  Cost-sharing;  Energy  Supply; 
Improved  Technical  Base,  Foreign Policy 
Benefits 
Disadvantages:  Share  control;  Obstacles 
to Collaboration;  Cost;  Potent;al 
Adverse  Domestic  Impact 
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Dtcreased  funding  levels, or current 
funding  levels  in the  ~bsence of exten 
sive collaboration,  would  require aodi-
fication of  the progra••s overall goals. 
At  these  constrained funding  levels, 
u.s.  evaluation of  fusion  as an  energy 
technology  would  be  delayed. 
4.  The  Mothballed  Path 
If  fusion  resea~ch ceased  in the United 
States,  the  possibility of  do.estically 
developing  fusion  as  an  energy  tech-
nology  would  be  foreclosed unless  and 
until  funding  ~ere restored.  Work 
wou~~ probably  continue  abroad,  although 
poss1bly  at  a  reduced  pace,  resu•ption 
of  research  at  a  later time  in  the United 
States would  be  possible but  difficult. 
Advanteats:  Cost;  flexibility,·  Atsk 
Avoidanct 
Disadvantages:  Delaying  Energy  Supply· 
Loss  of Direction and  Scope;  Da•age  t~ 
Infrastrcture,  Loss  of Mo.entu.  and 
Statutre;  Oiffi~ulty in Collaboration 
Advantages:  Saving  Honey 
Disadvantages:  Unavailability of  Energy 
Supply;  Destruction of  Infrastructure· 
Loss  of  Stature;  Inability to Collabo;ate 
The  Main  Issues  Concerning  Path  Choices  Are: 
Cost  Likelihood of  Success;  Perceived Urgency.  Attitude Towards  Collaboration· 
of  Research  Facilities;  Near-Ter• Benefits;  Potential  for  Surprise.  ' 
Findings 
Here ,ue some  of lhc  ovcr;~ll findin1:\  horn 
OTA's  .1naly~is:  · 
•  Experiments now built or propo!.t.'d shoulcf,._ 
over the next few yc:.rs, resolve most of the 
major remaining scientific unct•rtainties r(!· 
garding the_ fusion process. If those experi-
ments do not uncover major surprises, it is 
likely-although by no means certain-that 
the engineering work necessary to build an 
electricity-producing fusion  reactor can be 
completed successfully.  ·· 
•  Additional sdentiriC understanding and tech-
nological development is required before fu-
sion's potential an  be assessed. It will take 
.at )east  2~ years,_  und~r.  the  .. ~  circum· 
stances, to determine whether constructaon 
of  a prototype commeldal fusion ~aCtor  will 
be possible or deskable; additional time be-
yond then will be required to build, oper-
ate, ~d  evaluate such a device. 
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•  It is unlikely that major, irreversible energy 
shortages will occur early in the next ccn· 
tury that could only be ameliorated by the 
crash development of fusion power. There 
Is little to be gained-and a great deal to be 
lost-by Introducing fusion before its poten· 
tial economic, environmental, and safety ca· 
pabilities are attained. Even if difficulties with 
other energy technologies are encountered 
that all  Cor the urgent development of an 
alternative  source of energy  supply,  that 
alternative must be preferable in order to be 
accepted. It would be unwise to emphasize 
one fusion feature-economics or safety or 
environmental advantages-over the others 
before we know which aspect will be most 
important lor fusion's eventual acceptance. 
•  Due to the high risk and the long time be-
fore any return can be expected, private in· 
dustry has not inves&ed appteeiably in fusion 
research and cannot be expected to do so 
In the near future.  But, un.less the sovem-
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•  It fs now too early to tell whether fusion ce-
actors, onc:e dewloped, can be .economi-
cally -competitive with  other .eneray tech· 
notosies. 
•  Demonstration and commercialization of fu-
sion power will take several decades after 
completion of the research program. Even 
under the most favorable circumstances, it 
does not appear likely that fusion will be able 
to satisfy a sisnlf"ant fraction of the Nation's 
electricity demand before the middle of the 
21st century. 
•  With  appropriate  deslsn,  fusion  reactors 
should be environmentally superior to other 
enersv technofosies. Unlike fossil fuel com-
bustion, fusion felc::tors do not produce car· 
bon dioxide ps,  whose accumulation in the 
atmosphere could affect world cUmate. Un· 
like nuclear resslon-the process utilized in 
existing nudear powerplants-fusion ruc:tors 
should  not  produce  high~e¥el, Ions-lived 
radioactive wastes • 
.  •  One of the most attraaive features of fusion 
is ks essentially unlimited fuel ~y.  The 
onlY. resouiiCeS possibly constrainins fusion's 
~ment  might be the materials needed 
to build fusion reactors. At this stage of de-
velopment,  it  is  ImpoSsible  to  determine 
what materials ~II  eventu~lly be developed 
and selected for fusion reador construction. 
•  If fusion cechnok>gy is developed success-
fully,  it sho\lld be possible to design fusion 
reactors with a higher degree of safety as-
surance than 'fission reactors. It m.ay be possi· 
ble to design fusion reactors that are incapa-
ble of causing any immediate off-site fatalities 
in the event o( malfunction, natural disaster,. 
or operator  error~ 
•  Potential problems. with other major sources 
of  electricity-fossil  fuels  and  nudear 
fission-provide incentives to develop alter· 
nate energy technologies as well as to sub-
stantially improve the efficiency of energy 
11<1'  fet<inn ic:  nnf' ,,( <.f'vN.ll tN"hnnff'\c•i•·~ ~ 
ing explored. 
ment clecWes  to own and ~  fusiOn 
aeneratlnc stJdons, the -~~~for  .fu-
sion reseaiCh, cM:velopmeri, ind commer-
cialization must be transferred to private In-
dustry at some stage  .. The natuA! and dmins 
of this transition are highly -controversial. 
•  Fusion research has provided a number of 
near.(enn benefitS such as de\felopment of 
.. plasma  physia, education  of trained  r.e-
seatdlefs, contribution to "spin-off'' tech-
nologies, and support of the scientific stat· 
ure of the United States. HoweVer, fusion's 
contllbutJons to these areas do not imply that 
devotlna the same· res0llrce5to other fields 
of study would not produce equivalent ben-
er.cs. Therefore, while near-term benefits do 
pcovide adcfltlonal justif"eation for condUd·  i,. research,  it Is difrecuk  to  use them to 
Juttify one rae lei of saudy over another. 
•  Fusion research has a Ions history o1 s. IOOeJS-
ft.d and mutuaUy beneftdallncernationalco-
operation. If this tradition can be extrapo-
lased in the future to an unprea:derMd level 
of collaboration, much of the remainins cost 
of developins fusion power can be shared 
amons the world's major fusion  program~. 
•  International collaboration cannot subttitute 
for a strona domestic research program.  If 
the domestic program  is sacrifeced to sup-
port international projects, the rationale for 
collaboration will be lost and the ability to 
conduct it successfully will be compromised. 
•  Aareeins to collaborate on fusion research, 
both within the  U.S. Government and be· 
tween the U.S. Government and 1)0\entlal 
partners, will require sustained support at the 
highest levels of government. A  variety of po-
tential difficulties associated with large-scale 
collaborative projects will  have  to be  re-
solved, and  Presidcnti~l support will be re-
quired. If these difficuhies can be resolved, 
the benefits of successful collaboration are 
substantial. 
There  was  a discussion involving Mr  Selia•an,  Hr  Turner,  Mr  Hetten, 
Dr  Maisonnier,  Mr  Carruthers and  Professor Pinkau.  Dr  Epstein replied. 
The  Chair.an closed the Session at 13.38 Hrs. 
During  the  lunch  break,  an  inforaal  talk was  given  by 
Professor John  Davies  of Bir.inaha• University on  cold  fusion. 
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·i  .. Frtd.-,.  13 ttov•ber 1987,  14.• Mrs -Afternoon Snsion 
After  lunch  the Afternoon  Session  began  1t 14.38 Hrs. 
"r Carruthers,  for•erly Head  of  Applied  Physics  and  Technology  Division, 
Culh._  addressed  the Workshop  as the first speaker  in the Afternoon  Session. 
He  considered that state•ents about  the econo.ic  prospects for fusion  energy 
were  uncertain  and  preMature  despite the fact that fusion reactor studies had 
already  been  going  on  for at least 23  years.  He  expressed  doubts  about 
esti•ated pay-back  tiaes,  about  •ass/density scaling and  about  capit•l  costst 
There  was  a discussion  involvtna  Mr  Hancox,  Mr  Carruthers,  the ChairMan 
and  "r "acKerron  of the Science Policy Research  Unit  <SPRU),  Sussex 
UniveAity. 
Professor Jos4  CaMpos  of the University of "•drid then  addressed  the 
Workshop.  H•  spoke  on  areas of spin-off fro• the fusion  proara••e in other 
sectors of science  and  technology,  Mentioning  collision physics,  •aterials 
science,  super conductors,  coMputers,  stiMulating the search for scarce 
el e•ents and  the quest for very  pure  Materi  .. al s,  etc. 
There  was  a discussion in which  Professor Pinkau,, 
"rs Bloch  von  Blottnitz,  Dr  "aisonnier,  Dr  Rebut  and  "r "acr.erron took  part. 
"r Linkohr  thanked  the Director of JET  and  all  the participants.  The 
Workshop  closed  at  16.BB Hrs. 
+An  edited version of  the  contribution by  Mr  Carruthers  is annexed  to the present 
document.  It has  been  edited for  reasons  of  space. 
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., Section V <Annex) 
Edited wrsicrt af cmtrib.tti01 by  Rdlert carruthtrs <for.rlr. 
Head of AFpl ied Physics w  Tedrologr Divisicrt,  Culhan> 
I~ is important tor the Committee  to remember  that fusion research started 
in the  UK  some  rorty years ago  and reactor studies have  been  un~er way  £or 
more  than·23  years.  We  have heard about  the great progress aaie in plasma 
physics,  but  the result or reactor studies are still given the saae cautious 
qualifications - uncertainty,  too soon,  ditticult to predict the economic 
environment ti!t7 years hence,  £uaion is a  high capital coat power  source 
but with benefits tor which  people will p&J  the  ~rice. 
To  better understand  the situation it is necessary tor the Committee ta 
appreciate  the background to Reactor Studies.  !his haa  been an an-going, 
iterative exercise,  through stages shown  in Pig.  1.  Since the tokamak 
became  so favoured as a  research tool tor plasma  phraics Reactor Studies have· 
been· pressurised by the question  'Can 70u build an  electricity~enerating 
t.oJ<:amak  ? 1 •  (To  be  1:1se<L  as.~vi4ence tha:t  the  .. C9mmi~aion· . was  bearing in mind 
its avowed  long-term objective.)  Unfortunately, it was  possible to reach an 
answer  'Yes'  after Stage 2  ;  but the subjective observation that it looked to 
be an unattractive engineering proposition did not carr7 much  weight.  · 
Only after completing Stage  3 and moving into Sta.ge.14  was  it possible to 
start to·  quantity the engineering and  econom~c worries. 
Fig.2 shows  the overall layout ot a  fusion reactor which  was  the outcome 
ot studies ·at Culham·- it m&7  be ·looked  upo~ as a  tirst.attempt to meet 
Stage 3,  but it omits  several,  as yet,  unspeci!iable !ea·turea and falls 
short or many  requirements tor acceptable operation.  Superimposing on  this 
layout the  outline or a  similarl7 rated  PWR  and its housing shows  a 
difference in scale which  we  felt could lead to a  subatanti~lly higher 
capital cost. and  consequently  t~ a  higher coat Cor  generated electricity. 
Many  different approaches  have  been tried to quantity this difference and 
try to present it in a  way  which would  clearly indicate the severe  problems 
which cast grave doubts  on  the prospects  of the tokamak  ever being developed 
to the stage of being an economically acceptable power  producer. 
It. was  natural to  think,  initially in money  terms  - an estimate of the 
building costs in cash at present worth.  There are  t~o ways  of  apprva~hing 
this.  They  may  be  regardeJas  'Top Down'  and  'Bottom Up'.  The  first is, 
broadly,  that behind an early Culham  study (1966).  Using  some  simple 
geometric  arguments  one arrives at the  hardware content of a  fusion  re~ctor 
and  the  power  rating it must  have  to be  •economic'.  There loa wel~ 
established engineering technique  of  obtain~ng a  rough cost from  data  f~r the 
- 1 
I .. 
REACTOR  STUDIES 
1.  DEV.EL OP  A  BROAD  CONC.EPT 
-Something which  can· b.e  drawn 
2.  INTRODUCE  SOME  PRACTICAL  ENGINEERING 
-..:A  design wh.i.ch  .cGn  be. built 
3.CONSIOER  THE  LIFETIME  PERfORMANCE 
-A design which  can  be  operated  and  mai ntai nee 
4.STAND  BACK  AND  THINK 
I 
-Will it be  ec on omi<:, 
ace eptable  to  a  utility  opera tor 
-·  2  --
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 coat/tonne ot different typea ot engineering artetacta aDd ..  terials. fhia 
approach has  an advantage that,  to a  tirst order, it is not contused b7 
plasma  physics:  indeed it indicates targets tor plasma  parameters  which 
ought  to· be  achieved £or a  reactor to be  economic.  An  important parameter 
in judging reactor economics  ia the  'wall loading'  - the total nuclear power 
produced eli videcl  by  the inner surface area ot the torua - expre~'Hd ; n 
Megawatts  per square metre  (Mw/m2).  It ia interesting to note that this early 
Culham  stucl7- it anittecf'that  )lhich  we  knew  remainecl to be invented. - tound tbat 
a  wall loading or at least 13  Mw/m2 would  be required. 
Reactor Studies in the  1970's were,  mostlr,  ot the  'Boito.. Vp'  Tarie~r. 
They are basecl  on  forward extrapolations base4 on  the beat interpretations 
o! current plasma  physics knowledge •.  This baa  led to reactor designs 
containing much  more  detail and  so,  seemingly,  more  appropriate tor  costing·~ 
on  the basis or comparable  engineering projects.  The  in-built constraints -
mainl7 determinecl  b)"  plasma  ph)"Sics  assumptions - lead to  'wall loadings'  or 
3 - 5 Mw/m2•  The  consequence is that both capital coat and  the estimated 
cost or electricitr generation are higher than  •competitors•  coated b7 tha 
same  methodology.  The  Commiasiom'a  report a-egesta  12  - 3 times•  and hints 
that this is  'pessimistic'.  I~ is not.  Such a~  figure caa only be  derivedf~ 
the  quoted  US  study,  STARFIRE.  !his has  long been  known  to be an under-
priced study.  It has  been  ma~e so compact  that the access tor routine 
maintenance is not  considered adequate  to achieve  the claimecl,  high availability.: 
An  important  Ca-ct.or  in its cost.ing was  some  assumptions  on  the sputter 
erosion ot the  1first wall'.  The  Surface Physics Group at IPP Garohing  dre~ 
attention to an error or a  !actor or  10  in an important  parameter which  would 
:cesul  t  1.n  an underestimate or wall erosion. 
Other cQsting studies would  suggest that the ratio or 2 - 3 is optimistic 
and  that it· would  be  more  realistic to anticipate a  figure in the range  5 - 10. 
We  had  to recognise  that costing in money  terms  was  presenting problems. 
~t was  not easy to compare  different studies - mon~ values  changed  with time, 
exchange rates added  contusion and  some  financing conventions varied !rom 
country to country. 
An  alternative approach was  the'energy audit'.  This  was  mentioned  in Pro!. 
Pinkau1s  presentation.  He  tried to dismiss  the  pessimistic findings  of 
some  energy audits  by suggesting that there  was  no  sound  reason tor scaling 
the  energy content of comparable  types  of engineering hardwar~- in terms 
- 4  -or Joules  per Tonne  or Joules  per cubic  metre.~ The  examples  h&.quoted 
were  misleadi~.and it the extrapolation h~been done  correctly (aa in 
the studies with which I  am  acquainted)  they would  not have  auppocted hia 
argument.  H~ railed to deal with one  or main motivations tor makinc the 
energy audits,  which vas to try and arrive at a  much  lese  controYe~aial way 
of displaying the parlous future tor a  tokamak  baaed tuaion reacto~.  We 
wished  to present a  picture of .'energy tlov•  which  can be much  ao~e 
instructive than a  consideration or cash flow.  The  results ot such a  studr 
are  shown  in Fig.  3.  For a  single reactor the energy  inv~sted in ita 
construction is recovered alter it has  operated tor a  number  or years,  th~ 
~pay-back time'  tp!•  For a  new  power  source to displace an eziatiug but ageing 
source  there must be a  growing rate or installation ot the new  aourcea. 
(~6 p.a.  represents a  doubling in ten years,  i.e. it one  had  2  working tuaion 
reactors  ten years  rrom  the start or commercialisation,  then one  would  only 
have  4 after twenty years •  not a  rapid rate o£  re-placement.)  As  mare  of the 
new  units are manufactured  an~ installed there is an increasing uae  o~ energy 
devote~ to this activity and therefore not available tor sale.  The  1 E~ergy 
R&eovery Time'  is the period tor which  the system baa  to operate betore th& 
new  technology ceases  to be an energy consumer and  can start to contribute 
to the country's  power  needs. 
For light water reactors and coal-tired generation the tp! is 2 years or less 
and it is clear that the  •Growth Rate•  may  be quite high without atrecting tha 
energy recovery time significantly - the system becomes  a  net energy generator 
.·  well within a  traction or.: the design lite.-t.ime o£  tl;le  plant..  The  energy 
investment in building a  tokamak  type  or Cusion reaetor will be much  greater 
than that tor a  PWR.  A ratio of 3 would  be  an optimistic minimum,  whilst 
a  figure o£·5- 10  is likely to emerge  as designs  become  more  realistic. 
Hence,  tPB  may  be  10  years  or more  and  a  tokamak  based fusion  system would 
still be  a  net  ener6,T  consumer  when  the first reactors to be  commissioned 
bad reached the  end  or their lives. 
It is this consideration or EI~GY FLOW  which ve  consider to be  one  or the 
cleare~t~RiiElighting the dangers  of the fiction  tha~ •--- even  though  fusion 
may  prove  to be  a  high cost power  source it will offer advantages  which 
people will be  prepared to pay tor ----•.  It is important  to keep this 
point under regular review to be certain that the fusion  programme  is  no~ 
at risk of  leading to a  situation where  a  progressive  c~nstruction of  tokamak 
power  stations serves  only to  provide  energy for the construction of more 
tokamaks  !. 
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- 6.  -ALTERNATIVES.  The  Commission  have mentioned  the  'alternatives'  in the 
programme.  It is important to understand that an 'alternative•  iD  teras ot 
flaama  physics is not necessarily an alternative to a  reactor eacineer. 
The  engineering and  economic  limitations to the exploitation o£  the 
'conventional'  tokamak  apply almost equally to the stellarator and to the 
reversed !ield pinch 
REACTOR  COSTS  related to COST  ESTIMATEs  FOR  EXPERI~mNTS. 
It has  been made  quite clear that there is much  scope for disputation and 
equivocation over  the cost of a  possible  tokamak reactor and ita chances  or 
commercial acceptability some  decades  hence.  The  nex~ stage or experiment 
(NET,  ITER  etc.) will be  seeking real money  and  the  estimated coats must  be. 
l 
• 
expected  to  come  closer to reality.  It is clearly right to avoid the 
waste~u! duplication of effort but a  major motivation !or the internationalisatio: 
of the next stage is the high,  anticipated cost  (NET  0  approx.  ,.6 Billion ecu 
in 1986  money).  I£ the cost or this  'experiment'  is to be  so high then 
the future  plans  should give  some  indication of the  steps whereby  the cost or 
the much  larger  ~evice,  producing economically acceptable  power,  will be 
brought below  the  costs of NET.  Vague  talk of  •technological progress'  and 
'cost reduction by  replication'  are not  considered  to be  engineeringl7 sound. 
Mr  Sweet,  in his  presentation,  made  reference to  programme  management  problems. 
I  should like to close with a  quotation which  is very relevant to this point. 
1970  -Meeting o! the  APS  Plasma;Physics  Division,  Washington  DC  (November). 
Commissioner Theos.  J  Thompson,  "Fusion Power  - An  Uncertain Certainty". 
'  The  danger in allowing ----- the  engineering aspects  of CTR  to  take 
a  back seat to  the  physics  on  the mistaken  premise  that engineering 
should only be  pursued  once  the  physics is completely understood.' 
Many  engineers  who  have  worked  a  long time in fusion feel that in 17  years 
we  have  striven to change  this situation - but with little effect  •  ..... 
- 7  -
I section VI 
On  the Prospects of Power  Reactors  based on Nuclear Fusion 
Compilation of some  Critical Arguments 
prepared for 
The  Scientific and  Technological Options Assessment 
(STOA)  of the European Parliament 
by 
Jochen Benecke 
Sollner Institut,  MUnchen 
February 1988 1.  Introduction 
Nuclear  fusion  power  has  lonq been advertised as beinq 
an unexhaustible,  clean and relatively cheap source of 
enerqy.  None  of these assertions  seems  to be warranted. 
It is not possible,  of course,  to prove that  fusion 
reactors will cause a  sizeable release of radioactivity 
and will exhaust its material resources and the financial 
reso?rces of the European countries  soon.  Precise state-
ments  on  these points must  be  based on  a  detailed and 
definite reactor desiqn which does  not exist yet. If a 
certain material proves to be  an obstacle because of 
limited supply or,  e.q.,  because of neutron-induced 
radiation one may  want to substitute that material by 
another one.  A particular problem may  be  solved this 
way  - but other problems  may  aggravate as,  e.q., the 
costs may  rise or the resistivity of reactor components 
with respect to high temperatures may  decrease. 
This  is to explain that there are  no  simple or quick 
solutions to the  problems listed below and,  in particular, 
there  are no technically proven ones. 
The  problems to be discussed do  not  touch  upon  the so-called 
scientific feasibility,  This  term designates 
"the proof that,  under  laborat~ry conditions 
a  reactinq fusion  plasma  can  bP.  confined for 
a  sufficiently long  time,  and that a  positive 
energy balance  can  be  obtained.  It is  expec~ed 
that this scientific feasibility will be  demon-
strated during the  80s  in the  large Tokamak  ex-
periments  now  in an  advanced  stage of construc-
tion  (JET  in Culham,  TFTR  in Princeton,  JT-60 
in Tokai Mura)•  [1]. 
Although  there is little hope  for demonstrating the 
scientific feasibility during  the  80s  I  am  supposing  for 
the  following  that it will  be  demonstrated eventually. 
My  criticism deals with the question whether  a  fusion 
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reactor will ever be  suitable for  a  power  station,  in 
other words,  it questions the technical an the commercial 
feasibility. 
The  definitions of the latter terms,  as expressed in the 
Report of the European Fusion Review Panel [1]  are as 
follows: 
"Technical feasibility,  i.e. the proof that 
the basic technical problems  of the  fusion 
reactor can be  solved.  Examples are:  larqe-
scale tritium handlinq,  materials behavior 
under  extreme  irradiation stresses,  remote 
handlinq of very complex machinery and con-
vertinq the fusion energy,  which mainly appears 
as  neutron kinetic energy,  into a  useful se-
condary energy  form.  To  demonstra~e techno-
logical feasibility is the main objective of 
some  very large and expensive devices  now 
under consideration in several parts of the 
world  (NET  in Europe,  FED  in the USA,  FER  in 
Japan,  INTOR  as  a  joint EC-US-USSR-Japan  pro-
ject)  with some  hope  that for at least one of 
them construction will start by  the middle of 
the  SO's." 
"Commercial  feasibility,  i.e.  proof that fusion 
power  reactors can  be built on  an industrial 
scale,  can  be operated reliably and produce 
usable energy at prices competitive with other 
·energy sources.  Studies  have  given  a  wide  range 
of cost estimates which,  though higher,  do  not 
differ in order of magnitude  from  the cost of 
conventional nuclear power,  but it .is·much too 
early to make  a  definitive assessment.  It appears 
very unlikely that commercial  feasibility will 
be  reached with the generation of devices to be 
built after technical feasibility has  been demonstra-
~ed.~  Rather,  at least one  intermediate step 
of  'demonstration fusion  power  reactor' will be 
required." 
With  respect to the technical  ~r commercial  feasibility 
of a  fusion reactor,  L.M.  Lidsky,  professor of Nuclear 
Engineering at the Massachusetts  Institute of Technology 
and  former  associate director of  the  Plasma  Fusion Center 
draws  the conclusion that 
"even if the  fusion  program produces  a  reactor, 
no  one will want  it"  [2). 
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This  judqment is based on the  finding that 
"a chain of indesirable effects ensures 
that any reactor employing deuterium tritium 
fusion will be  a  large,  complex,  expensive, 
and unreliable source of power.  That is 
hardly preferable to present-day fission 
reactors,  much  less the improved fission 
reactors that are almost  sure to come•  [2]. 
Two  of the directors of the Max-Planck-Institut fUr 
Plasmaphysik at Garching,  F.R.G.,  express similar views. 
They  state: 
"Tokamaks  with··superconducting magnetic field coils 
are scarcely suitable as  nuclear boilers in 
base-load power  plants since investment costs 
are estimated to be  high  and the degree of 
availability  low~"{3] 
I  want  to stress again that the negative  judgment does 
not touch  upon  the  unsettled question whether  fusion will 
work at least in a  laboratory scale.  In other words,  the 
lacking proof of scientific feasibility is not_the.origin 
of the criticism. 
Some  of the  arguments  which cast doubt on  the  technical 
and  commercial  prospects of fusion  power  plants are as 
follows. 
2.  Some  Critical Arguments 
2.1  Resource  Limitations 
In case of nuclear  fusion,  there are  no  fuel  limitations. 
There  may  arise a  shortness of certain materials,  though, 
like beryllium,  lead  and  molybdenum  - depending,  of course, 
on  the  specific reactor design. 
In order to achieve  a  sufficiently high tritium breeding 
rate an  enhancement of  the  neutron  flux  in the  blanket may 
be  indispensable.  In particular,  if thin blankets are  to - 4  -
be applied for cost and unit size reasons the enhance-
ment  of the neutron flux is a  necessity.  Neutron multi-
pliers like beryllium or lead may  do the  job - but only 
for  a  limited span of time,  due  to resource limitations. 
In the literature,  a  span of SO  years is mentioned (4]. 
Molybdenum  is an  ingredient of the stainless steel which 
is used  fOr  the reactor structures in most reactor design 
studies.  Because of rather short lifetime of a  sizeable 
portion of the structures,  huge  amounts  of this steel will 
be  needed,  causing shortage of molybdenum  in the fore-
seeable  future. 
Molybdenum  and other ingredients of the steel have  an awk-
ward  side-effect:  The  bombardment  by fast neutrons causes 
the steel to become  highly radioactive within a  short time 
of reactor operation,  see fig.l.  The  hazard indices for 
inhalation and  ingestion,  in comparison to a  liquid metal 
fast breeder reactor  (LMFBR),  are  shown  in figs •.  2  and  3, 
respectively.  Although  fusion  has  lower  hazard indices by 
about  one  order of magnitude  (i.e.  a  factor of ten)  it is 
plagued,  like fission,  with radiation problems. 
Consequently,  the  attempt of avoiding  rnolybd~num shortage 
by  reprocessing of waste steel will be  a  rather incon-
venient,  hazardous  and costly enterprise. 
The  pcoblems  caused  by  neutron-induced radiation could 
be  largely reduced  by  choosing  a  vanadium alloy instead 
of stainless steel,  see  fig.4.  Vanadium,  though,  has  the 
disadvantage of limited resource availability,  see table  1. 
If titanium is used  in addition to vanadium,  there  is only 
a  rather  narrow  band  of acceptable  temperatures:  Below 
250°C,  titanium is unacceptable  because of a  high tritium 
pickup rate  and  above  450°C,  it undergoes  an  unfavourable 
phase  transition. 
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In view  f  the activation problems,  fusion proponents 
offer the option of isotopically •tailored• structural 
materials\ until now,  however,  there are no  fa~urable 
candidates to substantiate the option,  not to mention 
the  probl~m of finding  technically and  economically 
viable routes  for producing the  •tailored•  ma~erials. 
Conseqently,  stainless steel is still the prime candi-
da~e in all reactor design studies so far.  Another 
reason  for sticking  to steel is  the  long experience 
and  the  large data base accumulated with this material. 
2.~ Ecological  Hazards 
Although the activated structures are not volatile  - in 
contrast to many  fission products  ~hat are produced 
in light-water reactors and  fast  br~eders - the activation 
radioactivity still poses  a  hazard to the public.  Pointing 
to Nukem,  Mol  and Transnuclear may  serve as  an  argument. 
If fusion reactors are to come  their fuel will be  - at 
least for  the  foreseeable  future  - a  mixture of deuterium 
and  tritium.  With respect to radio-ecology,  tritium is 
of  parti~ular concern.  A fusion  r~actor will probably 
contain several tens of kg  of tritium [s]  - not  just about 
3  kg  as  s~ated in the recent report of the Commission of 
the European  Communities  [6)  •  An  amount  of 10  kg of 
tritium corresponds to a  decay activity of  108  Curie or 
3.7  x  1ol8  Becquerel.Tritium is volatile  and  permeates metal 
walls easily at temperatures of a  few  hundred degrees 
centigrade~.  If released it forms  tritiated water  (HTOl 
which  unavoidably enters the biosphere. 
Tritium undergoes  a  rather soft beta decay,  i.e.,  the 
maximum  kinetic energy of the emitted electron is not 
very  high  (20  keV).  Despite its softness,  tritium decay 
causes  damage  to cells of a  living organism if tritium 
is incorporated into the  body.  The  damage  may  be  twofold: 
10~ 
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a)  Direct breaking of chromosomes  by  ionizing irradiation; 
each damaged cell may  be  the germ  for  a  cancer to 
develop 
b)  The  "doppelgKnger•  role. 
Usually the dosimetry  for tritium does  not take its 
"doppelgKnqer•  hazard into account:  When  incorporated 
as  HTO  by  plants and  animals it is not only retained in 
cell fluids  but will also get bound  in organic molecules. 
A discussion paper for last year's European Conference 
on  Radiation and  Health summarizes  some  of the effects 
as  follows  {7]: 
"This organically bound  tritium  (OBT)  has  the 
capacity to cause much  greater biological damaqe 
than  HTO.  For  instance,  in their tritiated forms, 
leucine  (a protein precursor),  uridine  (RNA  pre-
cursor)  and  thymidine  (DNA  precursor)  are,  res-
pectively,  approximately  10,  100  and  1000  times 
more  toxic than  HTO  [sl.  In.the case of newly 
formed  embryos,  tritium thymidine is 5000  times 
as  damaging  as  HTO  (9].  This is because  OBT  is 
better biochemically  'embedded'  in the organism, 
and  because it has  a  far  longer biological half-
life* than HTO:  between  400  and  600  days,  as  com-
pared with 10  days  for  HTO  !the highest value, 
600  days,  is for  brain  DNA  l10]) .(The)  ICRP 
(reconunendation)  30  Ull  chooses to neglect the 
effects of OBT  and bases its recommendations  on 
a  biological half-life of  10  days  for all tritium." 
*The  biological half-life is the  time  elapsing before 
half the  incorporated radionuclide  has  been eliminated 
from  the  body. 
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The  ecological and  the health hazards  posed by tritium . 
deserve  further study.  My  impression is that thia field 
of research has  not been adequately dealt with in the 
laboratories associated with Euratom.  History of techno-
loqy  teaches us  not to just believe the following state-
ment  made  by  the Commission [ 6): 
"  fusion would  provide a  safe power  source with 
a  very small environmental  impact on the public 
during normal operation or even  following  a  major 
reactor accident." 
This  statement is based on  the most  severe accident identi-
fied  - there may  well  be others.  Moreover,  the asserted 
maximum  dose of  60  to  80  mSv  (6  to  6  rem)  at a  distance 
of  1  km  from  the plant has  been estimated under the assump-
tion that HTO  is the most  hazardous  form of tritium - OBT 
has  not been considered. 
2.3  Economic  Prospects 
I  will be  brief here  since a  recent report from  the Max-
Planck-Institut fUr  Plasmaphysik lists the main critical 
arguments[4J.  This  report by  D.  Pfirsch und  K.  H.  Schmitter 
of December  1987  has  been  sent to the  STOA  Project and  to 
the rapporteur for the European Parliament,  Mrs.  Undine 
Bloch von Blottnitz,  MEP. 
At  first sight,  an  economic  assessment of an installation 
that can only be built in about  50  or 100  years  may 
appear  bold or impudent.  There is a  way,  however,  to esti-
mate  the cost of a  fusion  reactor by  comparing its con-
struction principles to that of  a  fission reactor.  This 
comparison yields  a  costing of the  fusion  plant relative 
to the  known  costs of present-day fission plants.  The 
result does  not ·speek in·favour of the  fusion  reactor: 
Its cost was  estimated by  Pfirsch and  Schmitter to exceed 
the  one  of  a  fission reactor of equal  power  output by 
at least a  factor of ten. - 8  -
This  kind of cost estimate was  questi6ned  .. by  R.  i'oschi, 
head of  the  NET  team,  at the  STOA  Fusion Workshop at JET 
last November.  Tosch!  claimed that there exist new  cost 
estimates for  NET  and  the  fusion reactors to come  that are 
much  more.  precise than the ones  by Pfirsch and Schmitter 
and yield costs of the order of magnitude of that of a 
fission reactor.  Unfortunately,  Tosch! was  not willing 
to present the mentioned new  cost estimates.  A check of 
his group's  figures  was  not possible,  therefore~· 
The  result of Pfirsch and  Schmitter is based on the follo-
wing  arquments: 
The  volume of the nuclear boiler of a  fusion reactor will 
rouqhly.be  a  factor of 100  larger than that of a  fission 
(pressurized water)  reactor,  see fig.  5.  The  difference 
in volume  (packed with complex  and expensive equipment) 
is reflected in the difference in cost of the respective 
nuclear boilers. 
The  difference in volume  is caused by  the much  lower 
power  density of a  fusion  reactor as  compared to a  fission 
reactor.  This  in turn is caused by  a  limitation in per-
missible temperatures  and  thermal  stresses of the so-called 
first wall,  and  by  plasma  physics constraints. 
Pfirsch and Schmitter also stress the point that,  due  to 
the complexity of the plant,  a  fusion  power  reactor will 
have  a  rather low availability.  By  sheer unit size,  such 
a  reactor will be  a  base-load plant;  on  the other hand, 
it must  be  expected  to be  so unreliable that it can never 
be  used  as  a  base~load plant. 
The  report by  Pfi~sch and  Schmitter [4] also proves  that 
the  economic  assessment of  the Commission  report { 6 J is 
without  any  justification.  It is based on 
lot . 
] 
I 
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- false  logic 
- false or uncheckable data 
- unsuitable methods of cost estimation. 
3.  Conclusion 
Despite the fact that it is unknown  how  and when  a  fusion 
reactor will function  physics-wise1 a  cost estimation can 
be  done  already at present days.  This is due  to the fact 
that the conversion of neutron kinetic energy into a  useful 
form of energy  (heat,  then steam,  then electricity) will 
be  accomplished by  conventional  technology.  Its cost  is 
known,  at least relative to the cost of a  ·fission reactor. 
The  technology needed  for  a  fusion  ~eactor will be highly 
complex.  By  basic principles,  its complexitiy is different 
from,  e.g.,  the complexity of  a  modern  airplane to which 
it was  c~mpared in .l6J.  The  difference is explained in [4]. 
The  high complexity  stipulates a  low availability of the 
plant. 
The  technical and  economic  prospects of a  fusion  reactor 
are extremely dim.  The  discovery of the  new  high-temperature 
superconductors  does  not change  the  pictur~. 
With  respect to radioactivity,  one  would  be better off with 
·fuoion than·with. fiQaion,  bu~ not by  much.  The  problems  asso-
ciated with tritium are far  from  being understood. 
In view of the fact that uranium can be  gained  from  sea 
water  the  fuel  abundance of  fusion  is not much  of an  ad-
vantage over  (conventional  light-water reactor)  fission 
technology. 
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Plasma  physics is certainly a  worthy field of scientific 
research.  This  does  not imply that plasa physics will 
eventually lead to useful  fusion  power  plants. It is al-
. ways  possible to question and  scale down  or stop the 
mission ot producing a  fusion powerplantwithout destroy-
ing plasma  physics  research. 
For  the development of a  sustainable source of energy 
we  do not have much  time to loose.  It appears  to be 
impcudent to base one's hopes  on  fusion  power reactors. 
A much  saver and  rewarding route is the development of 
techniques  for efficient utilisation of solar energy. - 11  -
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Ill Table 1 
Criteria for Selecting First Wall  Materialst 1n  f~sion 
Reactors  in General  Priority Order 
. Criteria  Favored  Materials  Less  Favored 
1.  Radiation  Damage  and  Lifetime 
a.  Swelling  (Dim.  Stability)  Tf I  v.  Mo,  ss  Hb,  Al, C 
b.  Embrittlement  C,  Nb,  Y,  T1,  SS  Ho,  Al 
c.  Surface  Properties  V,  Ti, Al, C  SS,  Hb,  Mo. 
2.  ComEatibilitl with  Coolants 
and  Tritium 
a.  Lithium  ft, V,  Nb,  Mo,  SS  t·cJ*"  .b.  Helium  SS,  Ti, Mo,  Al,  C  Nb,  y * 
c.  Water  SS,  Al,  Ti  C)* 
d.  Tritium  Mo,  Al,  SS  T1,  V,  Nb,  C 
'"'  .,).  Mechanical  and  Thermal 
Pro~erties IIrradiated} 
a.  Yield  Strength  Mo,  Nb,  V,  Ti,  SS  Al,  C 
b.  Fracture Toughness  SS,  Ti, Al  V,  Nb,  Mo,  C 
c.  Creep  Strength  Ho,  V  ,· TS,  SS  C,  Al,  Nb 
d.  Thenmal  Stress Parameter  Mo,  Al,  Nb,  V  Ti, SS,  C 
_ .. 2a;Y  k(l-v) 
(M  =  aE  ) 
4.  Fabricability and  Joining  SS,  Al,  Tf  Nb,  V,  Mo,  C 
5.  Industrial  Cl~abil  itx and  ~s. Al,  Tf, C  1-k),  Nb,  V 
Data  Base 
6.  Cost  C,  Al,  SS,  Ti  Mo~ Nb;  V  . 
7.  Long  lived  Induced  . 'i,  C,  Ti, Al  SS,· l~b,  Mo 
Radioactivity  .. 
.•  ~. i. 
8.  Resource  Availability  C,  Tt,  Mo,  Al,  SS  Hb,  V 
(U.S.A.) 
t  Alloys.· Ti-6\l-4V,Y-20Ti,  TZM,  Nb-lZr,  316  SS,  Al-6061.  This is an 
illustrative ifst.  · 
* Materials  in parenthesis are unacceptable  with  stated coolant. 
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